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Summary
A great part of human behavior is based on visual cognition, the processing of visual information about
external objects. For goal-directed behavior, two functions of visual cognition seem especially impor-
tant. The first one is object recognition. Objects in the environment must be identified as belonging to
an object category, so that they can be used to accomplish a given task. The second function is short-
term recognition. It must be recognized whether an object in the environment has been viewed recently,
so that current behavior involving the object can be related to previous behavior. Both functions share
a common constraint: They must be fulfilled across distinct episodes of visual processing, which are
interrupted by changes in processing demands.
For object recognition, visual processing episodes lead to a problem of selective integration. That
is, it must be decided whether object information from the current episode should update and thus be
integrated with object representations from the previous episode. Alternatively, object representations
from two successive episodes are retained separately. This decision is critical. Updating and integration
should enable a cumulative and fast object recognition. However, integration should also conceal object
changes across episodes by leaving no separate representations that can be compared. Separation should
improve change perception but impair object recognition, because limited visual processing resources
for object recognition must be split between the separate representations.
For short-term recognition visual processing episodes lead to a problem of matching. That is, an ob-
ject from the current episode must be matched against object representations, not only from the previous
but from several episodes in the recent past (irrespective of whether objects are categorized).
The overarching goal of the present dissertation is to make a first step in understanding how the
mechanisms underlying object recognition and short-term recognition operate across visual processing
episodes, and how they solve the two problems. In five empirical studies, we investigated key issues
that must be addressed before a theoretical account of object and short-term recognition across visual
processing episodes can be given.
The first three studies focused on object recognition across visual processing episodes of eye fixa-
tions. Fixations are periods of visual information uptake, in which the eyes stand relatively still. They are
separated by rapid saccadic eye movements. Saccades are necessary for object recognition, because they
direct the central fovea of the eye’s retina at interesting objects, allowing high-acuity inspection. How-
ever, saccades also disrupt visual input and displace and alter the retinal images of objects. Therefore,
saccades dissect visual information processing into distinct episodes of fixations, which the mechanisms
for object recognition must accommodate. In two studies (Poth, Herwig, & Schneider, 2015; Poth &
Schneider, 2016a), we investigated how the selective integration problem is solved to support object
recognition across successive fixations. We assessed the recent hypothesis (Schneider, 2013) that the
problem is solved by a mechanism testing for correspondence (“object continuity”) between an object
before and after a saccade. If object correspondence is established, the object before and after the sac-
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cade should be integrated into a common representation. In contrast, if object correspondence is broken,
the object before and after the saccade should be represented separately. Separation should allow to
compare the two representations, improving the discrimination of transsaccadic object displacements.
At the same time, however, object recognition of the object after the saccade should be impaired, be-
cause the necessary visual processing resources had to be split between the two representations. Results
were consistent with this hypothesis. Breaking object correspondence by briefly blanking an object after
a saccade to it improved the discrimination of displacements of the object but impaired object recog-
nition. Thus, the object correspondence mechanism seems to impact on object recognition after the
saccade. Further experiments investigated the nature of object correspondence. They showed that object
recognition was impaired when object correspondence was broken by changing an object’s contrast-
polarity (and luminance), its color-and-luminance, and its color alone. Together with the initial finding,
this indicates that object correspondence is based on spatiotemporal as well as on the surface features of
objects. In the third study (Poth & Schneider, 2016b, submitted), we went on to test the limits of object
recognition across saccades. Because object recognition relies on limited visual processing resources, it
can only be achieved for a few objects at a time. Here, we examined if different objects must compete
for these resources across saccades. If this was the case, visual processing after a saccade would be
slowed down as more and more objects are viewed before the saccade. Our findings show that this is
the case, but only if the objects are task-relevant. Therefore, the findings support a key prediction of a
recent theory, namely that the importance of an object representation determines whether it will survive
a saccade and take up limited processing resources afterwards (Schneider, 2013).
With the fourth study (Poth & Schneider, 2016c), we turned from the processing episodes of succes-
sive eye fixations to those defined by appearing and disappearing objects and associated task-requirements.
We asked about the relationship between the mechanisms underlying object recognition and those un-
derlying short-term recognition. Visual processing for object recognition is assumed to be complete
when an object has entered a limited-capacity visual working memory, where the object becomes avail-
able for being reported. We investigated if encoding into visual working memory is not only required
for object recognition in the current episode, but also for short-term recognition in upcoming episodes.
Supporting this notion, we found that objects that supposedly had not reached visual working memory
were not available for later short-term recognition. This finding argues that the initial steps of visual
processing before encoding into visual working memory are not sufficient for short-term recognition
in later episodes. Therefore, visual working memory may contribute to the solution of the matching
problem by limiting the amount of information considered in a short-term recognition task.
Finally, in the fifth study (Poth & Schneider, 2016d, submitted), we investigated short-term recogni-
tion further, asking how short-term recognition in a later processing episode can be prepared in advance.
We assessed how prioritizing among objects represented in visual working memory impacts on two
distinct components of performance in an upcoming short-term recognition task. Our results showed
that such a prioritization improves memory-retention in visual working memory but also accelerates vi-
sual processing of objects for short-term recognition in a future episode. This indicates that changes in
processing priorities contribute to ongoing solutions of the matching problem of short-term recognition.
Taken together, the five studies show how mechanisms of object and short-term recognition address
specific problems arising from the dissection of visual processing into distinct episodes. As such, the
studies implicate visual processing episodes as a source of problems for object and short-term recog-
nition, which is neglected in most contemporary research. Conversely, however, the studies also invite
speculation about the functional value of visual processing episodes for visual cognition.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Visual cognition: A cornerstone of human
goal-directed behavior
Any goal-directed and intelligent behavior requires
information about the environment it is situated in.
For humans, a great part of this information is ac-
quired visually, it is extracted from the light regis-
tered by the eyes (e.g., Marr, 1982; Palmer, 1999).
Using this information for controlling action re-
quires a great deal of further processing. An impor-
tant part of this processing consists in visual cog-
nition, creating and manipulating representations
of external surfaces and objects (Cavanagh, 2011)
from lower-level visual input (that is provided by
the lower levels of the brain’s visual hierarchy, for
overviews, see Gilbert, 2013a; Meister & Tessier-
Lavigne, 2013; Gilbert, 2013b; Albright, 2013).
Once processed up to a certain level, the ob-
ject representations established by visual cognition
can be used to perform goal-directed actions and
they become accessible for report (e.g., Bundesen,
1990; Cavanagh, 2011; Schneider, 1995, 2013).
One may say that the object representations are
in a state of “access consciousness” (Block, 1995,
2011, cf. Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur,
& Sergent, 2006). In this way, visual cognition
plays an essential role in most human goal-directed
behavior.
1.2 Functions and mechanisms of visual cogni-
tion
Visual cognition serves as a guide to human action.
How visual cognition fulfills this purpose can be
understood at different levels of explanation (Marr,
1982). For the present considerations, it is impor-
tant to distinguish the functions of visual cognition
from its mechanisms. The functions of visual cog-
nition can be thought of as the goals of visual pro-
cessing or computation, with respect to a given task
or given action requirements (cf. Neumann, 1987,
1990). This has been called the “computational”
level of explanation, because it dictates the overall
strategy of visual processing (Marr, 1982).
How the functions of visual cognition are pro-
vided can be explained in terms of the mechanisms
of visual cognition. Mechanisms specify input rep-
resentations that are processed (cf. Palmer, 1978),
output representations that result from processing,
and the transformation converting input into out-
put (the actual process). Defined in this way, the
mechanisms are at what has been called the “algo-
rithmic” level of explanation (Marr, 1982).
1.3 Two central functions of visual cognition:
Object recognition and short-term recog-
nition
Two functions of visual cognition are central com-
ponents of most tasks humans perform to achieve
their behavioral goals. The first function is object
recognition: identifying external objects as belong-
ing to a certain category and having certain features
(Bundesen, 1990). Object recognition answers the
question of which objects are there in the environ-
ment, which is a necessary requirement of using
the objects to perform a task. The second function
is short-term recognition: recognizing whether ob-
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jects have been viewed recently (e.g., Kahana &
Sekuler, 2002; Zhou, Kahana, & Sekuler, 2004;
Poth & Schneider, 2016c). Short-term recognition
answers the question of whether an object is en-
countered firstly in recent time or whether it has
occurred before. This function is implied in all
tasks in which specific object occurrences have to
be tracked or discriminated over time.
1.4 Distinct visual processing episodes in ob-
ject and short-term recognition
Object recognition and short-term recognition are
part of a great deal of human goal-directed behav-
ior, which is organized into tasks and subtasks of
distinct task steps (e.g., Duncan, 2013; Land &
Tatler, 2009; Norman & Shallice, 1986). While be-
ing engaged in a task, new processing demands can
arise from changes in the environment and from
the next task step (Schneider, 2013; cf. Duncan,
2013). This leads to a fundamental constraint of
both of the two functions of visual cognition: They
have to be accomplished across distinct visual pro-
cessing episodes, which are characterized by spe-
cific processing demands and processing settings
(Schneider, 2013).
The concept of the visual processing episode
has been introduced by Schneider’s (2013) the-
ory of “Task-dRiven visual Attention and work-
ing Memory” (TRAM; note that visual processing
episodes are called “competition episodes” there).
In this theory, a new visual processing episode
arises whenever the visual input or the processing
demands of the current task change, and processing
must be adapted accordingly.
In human vision, one ubiquitous type of vi-
sual processing episode consists in a fixation of
relatively stable eye position, which is separated
from the next by a rapid saccadic eye movement
(for reviews, see Gegenfurtner, 2016; Rolfs, 2015;
Schütz, Braun, & Gegenfurtner, 2011). Saccades
are crucial for object recognition because they shift
the central foveal region of the eye’s retina to-
ward potentially important objects, so that these are
viewed with the highest visual acuity (cf. Stras-
burger, Rentschler, & Juttner, 2011). During sac-
cades, however, vision is blurred and informa-
tion uptake is suppressed (Krock & Moore, 2014;
Wurtz, 2008). Sampling of visual information is
therefore largely restricted to the intervals of eye
fixations. In addition, each saccade drastically
changes visual input. It changes the location of ob-
jects on the eye’s retina, and due to the inhomo-
geneous visual resolution of the retina, this leads
to changes in the visual acuity with which the ob-
jects are sampled (Curcio & Allen, 1990; Land &
Tatler, 2009; Strasburger et al., 2011). Therefore,
eye fixations constitute visual processing episodes,
which are bounded by saccades, and which are dis-
tinct from one another due to the saccade-induced
input changes (Schneider, 2013).
According to TRAM theory (Schneider, 2013),
several factors create visual processing episodes
in addition to saccadic eye movements. A new
episode starts when objects appear or disappear in
the visual field, or when object features change to
a sufficient degree. Furthermore, visual processing
episodes commence when visual processing priori-
ties change, for instance when different objects be-
come relevant for the current task or the next task
step.
Taken together, there are a number of factors
giving rise to distinct episodes in visual process-
ing. It is an open question whether or not the visual
processing episodes caused by each of the different
factors are identical with respect to the mechanisms
of visual cognition. However, irrespective of this
question, it is clear that visual processing episodes
pose challenges that these mechanisms must over-
come.
1.5 Visual processing episodes as challenges
for object and short-term recognition
The mechanisms underlying object recognition
and short-term recognition operate over time and
require time for processing. Visual processing
episodes confine processing in time which leads to
contrasting problems for these two kinds of mech-
anisms.
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For the mechanisms underlying object recog-
nition, visual processing episodes lead to what I
call the selective integration problem. Successive
processing episodes must be integrated in order
to enable the cumulative acquisition of informa-
tion about objects for their recognition (e.g., De-
meyer, de Graef, Wagemans, & Verfaillie, 2009;
Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992; Rayner, Mc-
Conkie, & Zola, 1980). If this was not possible,
then each new visual processing episode would
force processing to start completely anew. This
would impair or even prevent object recognition
because new visual processing episodes may start
so often that the time left for a single episode is
less than needed for object recognition. For in-
stance, visual processing episodes consisting in eye
fixations are started anew by a saccade about ev-
ery 250-300 ms (Land & Tatler, 2009) but object
recognition can require that objects are viewed for
longer durations (e.g., Petersen & Andersen, 2012;
Shibuya & Bundesen, 1988). Likewise, new ob-
jects may appear or disappear and thereby start
new processing episodes very often (Schneider,
2013), so that the duration of each episode falls
short of what is necessary for object recognition.
Furthermore, object recognition could be impaired
because it relies on limited visual processing re-
sources that had to be split among object repre-
sentations if these were not integrated (Schneider,
2013). Thus, if there was no integration of process-
ing across successive processing episodes, object
recognition in active saccade-mediated vision, and
in dynamic environments would be strongly hin-
dered.
However, if object information was integrated
across processing episodes in any circumstance,
this would be likewise detrimental. Specifically,
it would conceal changes and events in the envi-
ronment that occur from one episode to the next
(cf. Deubel, Schneider, & Bridgeman, 1996; Tas,
Moore, & Hollingworth, 2012; Poth et al., 2015;
Poth & Schneider, 2016a). For instance, object
representations from the previous and the current
episode could be integrated by updating or replac-
ing the former with the latter (Schneider, 2013; cf.
Deubel et al., 1996), or by combining the two (e.g.,
Oostwoud Wijdenes, Marshall, & Bays, 2015; Wit-
tenberg, Bremmer, & Wachtler, 2008). In both
cases, changes of object features (e.g., color or
location changes) across episodes would be un-
detectable, because no two representations were
available for comparison (cf. Schneider, 2013).
This would impair goal-directed behavior, because
such changes of object features may be relevant to
the current task or may otherwise signal important
events in the environment (e.g., Rensink, 2002).
Therefore, the selective integration problem is, at
its core, that it must be decided whether object in-
formation should be integrated or separated across
visual processing episodes.
For the mechanisms underlying object recog-
nition, the current visual processing episode must
be reconciled with the previous one to establish the
object’s features or object category. For the mech-
anisms underlying short-term recognition, visual
processing episodes pose a different problem, one
of matching. Short-term recognition means deter-
mining whether a currently present object has been
viewed recently. Hence, an object from the current
visual processing episode must be matched against
the objects of multiple recent episodes, irrespec-
tive of whether objects are categorized (as in ob-
ject recognition). Such a matching requires to dis-
tinguish the content of visual processing episodes,
especially if similar objects can appear in multiple
visual processing episodes. Therefore, the func-
tion of short-term recognition is intrinsically linked
to visual processing episodes. For this reason, we
also called the function “episodic short-term recog-
nition” (Poth & Schneider, 2016c).
To fulfill their functions, the mechanisms
underlying object recognition and short-term
recognition must accommodate visual processing
episodes. It is unclear, however, how this is accom-
plished, how the mechanisms enable processing
across episodes, and whether and how they work
in concert to this end.
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1.6 The present dissertation
The present dissertation aims at shedding light on
how the mechanisms underlying object recognition
and short-term recognition operate across visual
processing episodes. Five empirical studies inves-
tigated issues that must be addressed as a first step
toward a theoretical account of such visual cogni-
tion across visual processing episodes. As such,
this dissertation is meant to be a starting point and
a call for research on the topic of episodic visual
cognition. The following chapters of the disser-
tation synopsis discuss the theoretical background
and the findings of the empirical studies. The origi-
nal studies are provided afterwards, as the final part
of the dissertation.
Chapter 2 provides the theoretical background
for studying how the mechanisms underlying ob-
ject recognition accommodate the challenges of vi-
sual processing episodes. To this end, the part
introduces theories of visual attention (Bundesen,
1990; Bundesen, Habekost, & Kyllingsbæk, 2005;
Desimone & Duncan, 1995) and visual work-
ing memory (VWM; e.g., Bundesen, Habekost,
& Kyllingsbæk, 2011; Eriksson, Vogel, Lansner,
Bergstrom, & Nyberg, 2015; Luck & Vogel, 2013;
Olivers, Peters, Houtkamp, & Roelfsema, 2011),
two heavily intertwined mechanisms that together
accomplish object recognition within a single pro-
cessing episode. On this basis, Schneider’s (2013)
TRAM theory is presented, which extends the
mechanisms to processing across episodes.
Building on the theoretical background, Chap-
ter 3 discusses three empirical studies that inves-
tigated these mechanisms for the visual process-
ing episodes consisting in eye fixations, which are
separated by saccadic eye movements. In Study 1
(Poth et al., 2015) and Study 2 (Poth & Schneider,
2016a), we assessed a central proposal of TRAM
theory (Schneider, 2013), namely, that there is a
mechanism establishing correspondence between
representations of an external object before and af-
ter the intervening saccade, which impacts on sub-
sequent object recognition. In this way, the two
studies investigated TRAM’s solution to the se-
lective integration problem of object recognition
across visual processing episodes. In Study 3 (Poth
& Schneider, 2016b, submitted), we went on to
study the limits of object recognition across sac-
cades. Object recognition can only be achieved for
a few objects at a time (for reviews, see Bundesen
& Habekost, 2008; Duncan, 2006). Therefore, we
examined how this limited capacity is distributed
across successive fixations for object recognition.
Chapter 4 asks about the relationship between
the mechanisms underlying object recognition and
those underlying short-term recognition. To ad-
dress this issue, in Study 4 (Poth & Schneider,
2016c) we investigated whether visual processing
for recognition of an object must have been com-
pleted for short-term recognition of the object in
a later processing episode. In Study 5 (Poth &
Schneider, 2016d, submitted) we then turned to the
question by what means such a short-term recogni-
tion in a later processing episode can be prepared
in advance. To this end, we assessed how priori-
tizing among object representations retained from
a previous episode impacts on two distinct com-
ponents of performance in an upcoming short-term
recognition task.
Finally, chapter 5 aims to offer a brief gen-
eral discussion of how the five studies contribute to
our understanding of object recognition and short-
term recognition across visual processing episodes.
Up to this point, visual processing episodes have
been regarded as a processing requirement and a
challenge. Abstracting from the mechanisms of
object and short-term recognition addressing this
challenge, Chapter 5 also presents some specula-
tions about the functional value of visual process-
ing episodes for visual cognition.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical background: Mechanisms for visual cognition
within and across visual processing episodes
2.1 Visual attention and working memory
Human capacity for object recognition is limited:
not all objects in the visual field can be recog-
nized at the same time (for reviews, see Bundesen
& Habekost, 2008; Duncan, 2006). As proposed
by the biased competition framework (Desimone
& Duncan, 1995), the objects compete against each
other for object recognition (Desimone & Duncan,
1995). Object recognition for task-driven behavior
therefore requires to select currently relevant ob-
jects for being recognized, at the expense of irrel-
evant ones. This function is called selection-for-
perception (Schneider, 1995; Schneider & Deubel,
2002).
Human capacity for acting upon objects is lim-
ited as well, because there are only a few effec-
tors (e.g., two hands) that can be used for this
purpose (Neumann, 1987, see also Allport, 1987;
Neumann, 1990). Again, the selection of rele-
vant over irrelevant objects is necessary. This
function is called selection-for-action (Allport,
1987). Selection-for-perception and selection-for-
action are assumed to be performed by common
mechanisms of visual attention (Deubel & Schnei-
der, 1996; Schneider, 1995; Schneider & Deubel,
2002).
A theory of how the mechanisms of visual at-
tention mediate object recognition within a sin-
gle processing episode has been provided by
Bundesen’s (1990) “Theory of Visual Attention”
(TVA; for more recent reviews, see Bundesen &
Habekost, 2008; Bundesen, Vangkilde, & Petersen,
2015). This theory provides a widely-used frame-
work for studying visual attention, not only in ex-
perimental psychology (for reviews, see Bundesen
& Habekost, 2008; Bundesen et al., 2015), but
also neuropsychology (e.g., Duncan et al., 1999;
Finke et al., 2005; Finke, Bublak, Dose, Müller,
& Schneider, 2006; reviewed by Habekost, 2015),
and clinical diagnostics (e.g., Habekost, Petersen,
& Vangkilde, 2014; Foerster, Poth, Behler, Botsch,
& Schneider, 2016).
TVA (Bundesen, 1990; Bundesen et al., 2005)
assumes that external objects are recognized, when
the objects become represented in VWM (in TVA
called “visual short-term memory”). VWM retains
information about a limited number of objects over
short time-windows, so that this information can
be reported (Luck & Vogel, 1997, 2013; Eriksson
et al., 2015; Shibuya & Bundesen, 1988; but see
Bays, 2015; Ma, Husain, & Bays, 2014) or other-
wise used for action (e.g., Schneider, 2013).
Whether or not objects become represented in
VWM depends on visual processing. That is, in
TVA (Bundesen, 1990) objects enter VWM if there
is sufficient retention space and if visual processing
of the objects has been completed. Visual process-
ing is assumed to proceed in two stages. In the
first stage, visual input is segmented into percep-
tual units corresponding to external objects. The
information provided by these perceptual units is
subsequently compared with visual features and
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categories that have been acquired with experience
and reside in visual long-term memory. This com-
parison yields values of sensory evidence that an
object has a certain feature or belongs to a certain
category. Importantly, the comparison proceeds for
all objects in the visual field and is thus unselective.
In contrast to the first stage, processing at the
second stage is selective. The categorizations of
objects in the visual field are assumed to partici-
pate in a competitive race toward VWM. The ob-
ject categorizations that finish processing first are
encoded into VWM (if enough retention space is
available there) and this allows all other catego-
rizations of the same objects to become represented
there as well. Encoding into VWM only continues
until it is filled up with categorizations of a lim-
ited number of different objects. On the neuronal
level (Bundesen et al., 2005), VWM is assumed to
consist in a topographically organized map repre-
senting objects, henceforth called the VWM map of
objects (following Schneider, 2013), and loops of
neuronal activity between these objects and neu-
rons coding for the visual features belonging to the
objects (Bundesen et al., 2005). By means of these
loops, the activity of the neurons representing vi-
sual object features is sustained and can outlast the
presence of the external object in the visual field.
Two mechanisms of visual attention jointly de-
termine the speed with which the categorization
of an object is processed, that is, the speed with
which the categorization races towards VWM. The
first is the pigeonholing mechanism. This mech-
anism consists in an internal perceptual decision
bias for categorizing any object as having a spe-
cific feature. That is, the bias multiplicatively
weights the sensory evidence for task-relevant fea-
tures, so that irrespective of which objects are actu-
ally viewed, categorizations of this feature are pro-
cessed faster. Neuronally, the pigeonholing may
be implemented as an increased firing rate of all
those neurons preferentially coding for the feature
in question (Bundesen et al., 2005).
For a given object, the speed with which its
categorizations are processed is proportional to the
amount of visual processing resources allocated to
the object. This is where the second mechanism
comes into play, which is called filtering. This
mechanism operates by assigning each object in
the visual field an attentional weight. The atten-
tional weight reflects the current importance of the
object. The weight is computed at the first stage of
processing by summing up the sensory evidences
that the object has certain features, whereby the
evidence for a feature is multiplicatively weighted
by the current importance of the feature. In this
fashion, the attentional weight combines bottom-
up information consisting in sensory evidence for
a feature with top-down information consisting in
the importance of this feature (additional bottom-
up factors of attentional selection may also con-
tribute to filtering, Nordfang, Dyrholm, & Bun-
desen, 2013, and attentional weights can be used
to monitor for object changes with low expected
bottom-up salience, Poth, Petersen, Bundesen, &
Schneider, 2014). Visual processing resources are
allocated to an object according to the object’s at-
tentional weight relative to the sum of the atten-
tional weights of all objects in the visual field. As
a result, the categorizations of currently important
objects are processed fastest. In this way, the ob-
jects are selected for object recognition.
According to the neural interpretation of TVA
(NTVA; Bundesen et al., 2005), the attentional
weights are stored in a spatially organized priority
map (see also Bundesen et al., 2011). Priority maps
exist in several areas of the primate brain, such as
monkeys’ frontal eye field (Schall, 2009), lateral
intraparietal area (Bisley & Goldberg, 2010), pul-
vinar (Kastner & Pinsk, 2004), and superior col-
liculus (Krauzlis, Lovejoy, & Zenon, 2013). In
general, they combine the bottom-up salience (in-
trinsic to external objects) with the top-down task-
relevance of objects or features (Fecteau & Munoz,
2006; Zelinsky & Bisley, 2015).
In NTVA, the attentional weights of the prior-
ity map set gates within the visual system’s ventral
stream for object recognition. The receptive fields
(the regions of the retina from which they receive
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input) of higher level neurons (e.g., in the inferior
temporal cortex) are dynamically remapped so that
they receive input from lower level neurons cod-
ing for visual features of a specific object. In this
manner, more neurons are allocated to objects with
high attentional weights than to those with lower
ones. Thus, these neurons are the visual process-
ing resources that are distributed across objects ac-
cording to their attentional weights.
The filtering and pigeonholing mechanisms
proposed in TVA (Bundesen, 1990) explain how
visual attention selects objects and visual object
features for object recognition. The selection in
TVA is restricted to the situation of a single pro-
cessing episode. This is necessary to develop
a mechanistic account of the selection, but falls
short of situations with more than one processing
episode. This issue is addressed by Schneider’s
(2013) TRAM theory, which extends the mecha-
nisms of visual attention (specifically the filtering
mechanism) and of VWM to processing across vi-
sual processing episodes.
2.2 Visual attention and working memory
across visual processing episodes
As explained above, TRAM theory (Schneider,
2013) assumes that visual processing for ob-
ject recognition is structured in visual processing
episodes (“competition episodes”). In TRAM, a
single visual processing episode consists of three
processing phases, whereby the first two phases
correspond to the two processing stages of TVA
(Bundesen, 1990; Bundesen et al., 2005).
The first phase is the unselective stage of TVA
(Bundesen, 1990; Bundesen et al., 2005), in which
attentional weights of objects in the visual field
are computed. Extending TVA, however, TRAM
(Schneider, 2013) assumes that the attentional
weights in the priority map form part of so-called
proto-objects, candidate object representations for
object recognition (Wischnewski, Steil, Kehrer,
& Schneider, 2009; Wischnewski, Belardinelli,
Schneider, & Steil, 2010, cf. Rensink, 2000). Be-
sides an attentional weight, a proto-object repre-
sents the rough location and shape of an external
object, as these two features are coded by the pri-
ority map additionally. Furthermore, a proto-object
comprises visual object features, which are rep-
resented in the ventral and dorsal streams of the
brain’s visual system (Wischnewski et al., 2009,
2010).
The second phase of TRAM (Schneider, 2013)
corresponds to the competitive race towards VWM
in TVA (Bundesen, 1990; Bundesen et al., 2005).
In TRAM, the proto-objects compete against each
other for encoding of their features into VWM and
for being recognized in this fashion. Proto-objects
are inaccessible for being reported. However, when
the features of a proto-object enter VWM, then the
proto-object is transformed into an object represen-
tation in VWM. If this has happened, the repre-
sented object can be reported.
In the third phase of processing, those ob-
ject representations in VWM that are task-relevant
are made available for controlling behavior be-
yond the current processing episode. As in
NTVA (Bundesen et al., 2005), retention in VWM
is assumed to consist in sustaining activity in
feature-coding neurons by looping neuronal ac-
tivity between them and the VWM map of ob-
jects (Bundesen et al., 2005). TRAM assumes that
with ongoing retention in VWM, the retained ob-
ject representations are consolidated into a passive
state that does not require such a looping of ac-
tivity any more (Larocque, Lewis-Peacock, & Pos-
tle, 2014; Stokes, 2015; and may rely on changes
in synaptic connectivity, e.g., Mongillo, Barak, &
Tsodyks, 2008; Rose et al., 2016). In this passive
state, the represented information can be retained
across the several visual processing episodes with-
out taking up retention space in capacity-limited
VWM. This is important because retained infor-
mation would otherwise block encoding of new
objects into VWM in the next episodes. Such a
blocking would impair or even prevent the per-
formance of tasks requiring visual guidance over
multiple episodes, such as multi-step sensorimotor
tasks (e.g., Hayhoe & Ballard, 2005; Foerster, Car-
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bone, Koesling, & Schneider, 2011).
After TRAM’s (Schneider, 2013) third phase
of processing has finished, the next visual process-
ing episode starts with its first phase. Importantly,
visual processing episodes are linked by the inter-
play of VWM and the attentional weights that me-
diate encoding into VWM. More specifically, the
task-relevant objects that are represented in VWM
remain connected to their attentional weights (cf.
Petersen, Kyllingsbæk, & Bundesen, 2012, 2013).
Consequently, the attentional weights of these ob-
jects from the previous episode persist in the cur-
rent episode. Both, the attentional weights and
the object representations in VWM are linked to
the representations of visual features. These links
are critical for integrating information across visual
processing episodes. For a given external object,
the attentional weight in a new visual processing
episode matches the one from the previous episode
(or a prediction of this attentional weight, respec-
tively). New visual input that arrives at the repre-
sentations of visual features can therefore be routed
by the attentional weight to the respective object
in VWM. As a result, the object representation in
VWM is updated by new visual information.
Importantly, if this updating refers to a feature
that has already been represented as part of the ob-
ject in VWM, then the representation of this feature
is overwritten (or combined) with the new informa-
tion about it (Schneider, 2013; cf. Poth et al., 2015;
Poth & Schneider, 2016a). In contrast, if the updat-
ing refers to a feature that has not been part of the
object in VWM, then this feature can be attached to
the object in VWM additionally (the VWM object
is said to be “re-categorized” with a new feature,
Schneider, 2013, p. 8-9).
The described updating mechanism provides a
means for integrating information about external
objects sampled in successive processing episodes.
Importantly, however, this does not yet solve the
selective integration problem of object recognition
across visual processing episodes. At the heart
of this problem is the decision whether integra-
tion should take place or whether objects from suc-
cessive episodes should be represented separately.
As solution to this problem, TRAM (Schneider,
2013) proposes a mechanism that tests for corre-
spondence (“object continuity”) between objects in
VWM from the previous episode and the objects of
the current episode. This test consists in a compar-
ison of the objects retained in VWM with objects
of the current episode in terms of their features in a
priority map, namely their attentional weights, lo-
cations, and rough shapes (or more precisely, pre-
dictions derived from these priority map features).
If the test for object correspondence is posi-
tive for an object, then this implies that the object
is processed with an identical attentional weight
across the visual processing episodes. In this case,
the attentional weight is used to update the repre-
sentation of the object in VWM with new visual
input. In contrast, if the test for object correspon-
dence is negative (i.e. object correspondence is
broken), then the attentional weight of the object
from the previous episode is encapsulated, mean-
ing that it is retained in its current state. This
shields the associated object in VWM from be-
ing updated with new visual input. Thus, new vi-
sual input is then treated as belonging to a new
external object and has to pass through all pro-
cessing phases (even if the input actually stems
from the same external object that resulted in the
VWM representation with the encapsulated atten-
tional weight).
Encapsulating an object’s attentional weight
has attentional costs. The neuronal processing re-
sources belonging to the attentional weights cannot
be used for processing other, subsequent objects
(see Petersen et al., 2012 for related ideas). Fewer
resources are thus available for processing new ob-
jects, so that these are processed more slowly and
their object recognition is impaired.
Critically, the encapsulation of attentional
weights is assumed to happen only for task-
relevant objects in VWM. Furthermore, the encap-
sulation happens only as long as these objects are
in the third phase of processing which ends when
they have been consolidated into the passive state
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of VWM. Thus, once the objects are in the passive
state, they can be made available for action control
(by retrieval into VWM) without permanently re-
quiring retention space in VWM and without caus-
ing attentional costs for object recognition of sub-
sequent objects.
In sum, two of TRAM’s proposals are essen-
tial for object recognition across visual processing
episodes. First, the proposal that there is a mech-
anism that tests for object correspondence across
visual processing episodes. This mechanism im-
pacts on subsequent object recognition by decid-
ing whether attentional weights are encapsulated or
used for updating. As such, this mechanism offers
a hypothetical solution to the selective integration
problem for object recognition across visual pro-
cessing episodes. Second, the proposal that only
those attentional weights are encapsulated that be-
long to task-relevant objects in VWM. This pro-
posal implies that attentional competition across
episodes is limited to task-relevant objects, pre-
venting that object recognition in general suffers
with each new visual processing episode.
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Chapter 3
Object recognition across visual processing episodes
3.1 Object correspondence linking the visual
processing episodes of successive eye fixa-
tions
TRAM theory (Schneider, 2013) presents a func-
tional view on object correspondence, assuming
that it serves object recognition across visual pro-
cessing episodes (Schneider, 2013). Tradition-
ally, however, object correspondence mechanisms
have mostly been held to explain phenomena of vi-
sual perception (which may also support behavior
by carrying information about regularities in the
world, e.g., Flombaum, Scholl, & Santos, 2009).
Among the most prominent examples is the percept
that one and the same object is present at succes-
sive locations in apparent motion (e.g., Kahneman
et al., 1992; Mitroff & Alvarez, 2007) and across
occlusion by another object (e.g., Hollingworth
& Franconeri, 2009). Most importantly to visual
processing across episodes, object correspondence
has recently been taken to explain visual stabil-
ity across the episodes of eye fixations separated
by saccadic eye movements (Tas et al., 2012; Tas,
2015; cf. Hollingworth, Richard, & Luck, 2008).
Visual stability is the phenomenon that exter-
nal objects are perceived as stable in their loca-
tions across a saccade, despite the fact that the sac-
cade changes their locations on the eye’s retina and
their visual resolution (for reviews, see Higgins &
Rayner, 2015; Mathôt & Theeuwes, 2011; Rolfs,
2015; Wurtz, 2008). Interestingly, the perception
of visual stability arises even despite actual ob-
ject displacements: Displacing an object while a
saccade is made towards it is hard to notice, even
for relatively large displacements (of up to about a
third of saccade amplitude, Bridgeman, Hendry, &
Stark, 1975, on the saccade axis, Wexler & Collins,
2014). The extent of this insensitivity to transsac-
cadic displacements provides an often used mea-
sure of visual stability in laboratory experiments
(e.g., Deubel et al., 1996; Deubel, Bridgeman,
& Schneider, 1998; for a review, see Higgins &
Rayner, 2015)
For a long time, it has been assumed that the
inability to detect (or discriminate) transsaccadic
displacements stems from a reset of visual process-
ing after a saccade, which leads to the loss of pre-
saccadic location information (Bridgeman, van der
Heijden, & Velichkovsky, 1994). This hypothe-
sis was, however, falsified with the blanking effect
(Deubel & Schneider, 1994; Deubel et al., 1996,
1998). That is, the insensitivity to transsaccadic
displacements is ameliorated when the object is
briefly blanked after the saccade and then reappears
at its displaced location. Under such conditions,
the direction of the displacement can be reported
accurately. This finding reveals that there is infor-
mation about the presaccadic object location after
the saccade, but that this information is usually in-
accessible, in the absence of the blank.
In the light of TRAM (Schneider, 2013), the
blanking effect may be interpreted as follows (see
also Poth et al., 2015; Poth & Schneider, 2016a).
After eye-landing, the visual system tests for cor-
respondence (“object continuity”) between the pre-
saccadic object and the postsaccadic object (the
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discussion in terms of object correspondence was
initiated by Tas et al., 2012). If the test for transsac-
cadic object correspondence is positive, the VWM
representation of the presaccadic object is updated
after the saccade with input from the postsaccadic
object. As a result, only a combined representa-
tion of the presaccadic and postsaccadic object is
available in VWM. This prevents any comparison
between the presaccadic and postsaccadic location.
Transsaccadic location changes (and visual feature
changes, Deubel, Schneider, & Bridgeman, 2002;
Weiß, Schneider, & Herwig, 2015) are therefore in-
discriminable and visual stability is perceived.
In contrast, if the eye lands on an empty dis-
play because the object is blanked, then the test
for transsaccadic object correspondence is nega-
tive (because there is a mismatch between the at-
tentional weight of the object from before the sac-
cade and from the blank display after the saccade,
see also section 2.2). Consequently, the attentional
weight of the presaccadic object that is now in
VWM is encapsulated. The object representation
is therefore maintained as is, rather than updated
with new input. A new representation is then cre-
ated for the postsaccadic object after the blank.
The two distinct representations can be compared,
which improves the discrimination of transsaccadic
displacements and prevents the perception of vi-
sual stability. However, encapsulating the atten-
tional weight of the presaccadic object represen-
tation means that the representation takes up vi-
sual processing resources required for processing
the postsaccadic object. Therefore, TRAM pre-
dicts that it should impair recognition of the post-
saccadic object.
The goal of Study 1 (Poth et al., 2015) was to
test the hypothesis that breaking object correspon-
dence across the saccade improves perception of
transsaccadic displacements but at the same time
impairs postsaccadic object recognition. For this
purpose, Experiment 1 of Study 1 combined the
classic blanking paradigm (Deubel & Schneider,
1994; Deubel et al., 1996) with an object recog-
nition task. Participants made saccades to a pe-
ripheral saccade target object containing an irrel-
evant special character. During the saccade, the
object was displaced, and after eye-landing a let-
ter was shown in the object and terminated by a
pattern mask. The postsaccadic object and the let-
ter in it were visible either immediately after eye-
landing, or after a brief blank display. Critically, in
one block of trials, participants discriminated the
direction of the object displacement. However, in
another block of trials, they reported the identity of
the postsaccadic letter.
Replicating the blanking effect, participants’
displacement discrimination was more accurate
when there was a postsaccadic blank compared
with when the object was shown immediately after
the saccade. Thus, breaking object correspondence
by blanking improved the perception of transsac-
cadic displacements and reduced perceived visual
stability. In contrast, however, participants’ letter
reports were less accurate when there was a post-
saccadic blank than when there was none. Thus,
breaking object correspondence by blanking im-
paired postsaccadic object recognition. Experi-
ment 2 followed up on this latter result to rule out
a number of alternative explanations based on the
object displacement and the delayed onset of the
postsaccadic object in case of a blank. In this ex-
periment, participants only reported the letter that
was shown in the postsaccadic object, and there
were no object displacements across the saccade.
In contrast to Experiment 1, object correspondence
was broken by changing the contrast-polarity (and
luminance) of the object across the saccade (this
manipulation followed Tas et al., 2012). A black
object on a gray background was changed into a
white one during the saccade and vice versa. Par-
ticipants’ letter report performance was compared
between conditions with and without such contrast-
polarity changes. Thus, here the time-course of
object appearances was identical in all experimen-
tal conditions, because there was no blank de-
laying the onset of the postsaccadic object. De-
spite the different manipulation of object corre-
spondence across the saccade, the results of Exper-
iment 2 were consistent with those of Experiment
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1. Recognition of the postsaccadic object was im-
paired when object correspondence was broken by
the contrast-polarity change, compared with when
no such change occurred. Thus, taken together,
the results of Study 1 offer evidence that breaking
object correspondence across saccadic eye move-
ments impairs postsaccadic object recognition.
Study 1 manipulated transsaccadic object cor-
respondence by means of blanking and changes
of the contrast-polarity of achromatic objects.
Both manipulations have strong perceptual effects
(Deubel et al., 1996, 1998; Tas et al., 2012). This
may imply especially strong effects on object cor-
respondence, because of a substantial contribution
to the priority map features on whose basis ob-
ject correspondence is tested for (Schneider, 2013).
One may therefore ask whether the findings of im-
paired object recognition generalize to other object
features and more subtle feature changes.
One of the most important surface features for
human object recognition is color (Gegenfurtner,
2003; Gegenfurtner & Kiper, 2003; Moutoussis,
2015). However, testing object correspondence
across saccades based on color may be problem-
atic. Specifically, the color of an object is repre-
sented with strikingly different quality and reso-
lution at the fovea of the retina, corresponding to
gaze center, compared with the retinal periphery
(e.g., Hibino, 1992; Johnson, 1986; Livingstone &
Hubel, 1987; Nagy & Wolf, 1993). Every saccade
displaces an object’s image on the retina, so that the
presaccadic and postsaccadic object image differ in
color quality. Thus, every saccade induces an ob-
ject change in terms of its color input. According
to TRAM (Schneider, 2013) and based on our pre-
vious findings (Poth et al., 2015), if such naturally
occurring color changes broke transsaccadic object
correspondence, then postsaccadic object recogni-
tion would be impaired with every saccade. There-
fore, one may hypothesize that color is ignored in
the test for transsaccadic object correspondence in
order to salvage postsaccadic object recognition.
The goal of Study 2 (Poth & Schneider, 2016a)
was therefore to test whether breaking object cor-
respondence with color changes, and thus with
more subtle surface feature changes, also impairs
postsaccadic object recognition. Study 2 adopted
the paradigm of the second experiment of Study
1 (Poth et al., 2015). In Experiment 1 of Study
2, transsaccadic object correspondence was bro-
ken by changing the object’s color-and-luminance
across the saccade, that is, by changing between
red and green of different luminances. In Ex-
periment 2, transsaccadic object correspondence
was broken by changing the object’s color alone,
by changing between blue and yellow of about
the same luminance. In both experiments, break-
ing object correspondence across the saccade im-
paired postsaccadic object recognition. These re-
sults show that the surface features of color-and-
luminance as well as the one of color alone con-
tribute to object correspondence and thereby im-
pact on object recognition.
Taken together, the findings of Study 1 (Poth et
al., 2015) and Study 2 (Poth & Schneider, 2016a)
reveal that the mechanism establishing object cor-
respondence across the saccade not only deter-
mines the perception of visual stability but also im-
pacts on object recognition. Thus, the findings sup-
port the prediction of TRAM theory (Schneider,
2013) that object recognition across visual pro-
cessing episodes, here successive eye fixations, de-
pends on a mechanism that tests for object corre-
spondence.
Such a mechanism for object correspondence
presents one solution to the selective integration
problem of object recognition across visual pro-
cessing episodes. Specifically, the mechanism de-
cides whether object information should be inte-
grated across the saccade or whether presaccadic
and postsaccadic object representations should be
kept separate (cf. Deubel et al., 1996; Tas et al.,
2012). The integration of object information across
saccades may enhance object recognition, by pre-
venting attentional competition between represen-
tations (i.e. their attentional weights, Schneider,
2013) and by enabling a cumulative visual pro-
cessing (Demeyer et al., 2009; Henderson & Anes,
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1994; Kahneman et al., 1992). In contrast, the
separation of object representations may enhance
comparisons across the saccade and thus help
discriminate transsaccadic object changes (e.g.,
Deubel et al., 1996, 2002; Weiß et al., 2015).
3.1.1 Object correspondence for object recogni-
tion based on multiple object features
Besides revealing a link between object correspon-
dence across the saccade and object recognition,
the results of Study 1 and 2 also shed some light
on the object correspondence mechanism itself.
Specifically, they show that the mechanism takes
multiple object features into account. The ques-
tion which features are used to establish object
correspondence is also hotly debated in the liter-
ature on object correspondence across occlusion
(Hollingworth & Franconeri, 2009) and apparent
motion (Kahneman et al., 1992; Mitroff & Alvarez,
2007). Some accounts maintain that object cor-
respondence is based on spatiotemporal features
only (Kahneman et al., 1992) or at least primar-
ily (Flombaum et al., 2009; Scholl, 2007). This
is consistent with the view that object correspon-
dence across saccades is broken by blanking, be-
cause blanking implies a mismatch between pre-
saccadic and postsaccadic objects in space and (ex-
pected) time.
However, we also found postsaccadic ob-
ject recognition impaired when transsaccadic ob-
ject correspondence was broken by changes of
contrast-polarity (and luminance) of achromatic
objects, changes of color-and-luminance, and of
color alone. Thus, such surface features contribute
to the test for transsaccadic object correspondence
as well. Converging evidence for this proposal
comes from two earlier studies. The first one
showed that changing contrast-polarity and more
complex visual features (pictures of real-world ob-
jects) improved the discrimination of transsaccadic
displacements and thus diminished the perception
of visual stability (Tas et al., 2012). The second
study induced transsaccadic object displacements
that caused a saccade to land between two objects
(Hollingworth et al., 2008). Corrective saccades
in response to these displacements were guided by
the objects’ color-and-luminance, which offers in-
direct evidence that the features contribute to ob-
ject correspondence.
As our findings, the ones of the two studies ar-
gue that surface features and not only spatiotempo-
ral features contribute to transsaccadic object cor-
respondence. A similar contribution of surface fea-
tures has been observed for object correspondence
across occlusion and motion as well (Hollingworth
& Franconeri, 2009). Thus, we may now conclude
that object correspondence across visual process-
ing episodes generally takes spatiotemporal as well
as surface features into account.
3.1.2 Object correspondence based on atten-
tional weights and predictive remapping of
receptive fields
How could a test for transsaccadic object corre-
spondence be implemented? According to TRAM,
transsaccadic object correspondence is tested for
by comparing the attentional weight of the object
(and other characteristics in the priority map) af-
ter the saccade with a prediction that has been
derived from the presaccadic attentional weight
(Schneider, 2013). This prevents that predictable
changes of sensory input due to the saccade-
induced shift of the object’s retinal image impact
on object correspondence (cf. Herwig & Schnei-
der, 2014). For the spatial location of an ob-
ject, this prediction may be implemented by pre-
dictive remapping (Duhamel, Colby, & Goldberg,
1992; for reviews, see Wurtz, 2008; Wurtz, Joiner,
& Berman, 2011; but see, Zirnsak, Steinmetz,
Noudoost, Xu, & Moore, 2014). Just before a sac-
cade is made, neurons in some retinotopically or-
ganized brain areas become responsive to the lo-
cations their receptive fields will be brought to
by the saccade. These brain areas include the
ones assumed to implement priority maps (mon-
keys’ frontal eye fields, Umeno & Goldberg, 1997;
lateral intraparietal areas, Duhamel et al., 1992,
and superior colliculi, Walker, Fitzgibbon, & Gold-
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berg, 1995). The predictive remapping of recep-
tive fields is based on a corollary discharge (ef-
ference copy) signal from saccade-generating neu-
rons in the superior colliculus, which informs about
the amplitude and direction of the impending sac-
cade (Sommer & Wurtz, 2006). This may allow
to track the approximate location of objects across
saccades. Specifically, predictive remapping may
make a given neuron receive input from one and
the same object before and after a saccade (Wurtz
et al., 2011) and this seems to contribute to the
perception of visual stability (Cavanaugh, Berman,
Joiner, & Wurtz, 2016; which should, however, tol-
erate transsaccadic object displacements to a de-
gree, cf. Bridgeman et al., 1975).
However, predictive remapping of receptive
fields is limited to object locations, it does not al-
low to track surface features of objects (Cavanagh,
Hunt, Afraz, & Rolfs, 2010). A specification of
TRAM theory’s (Schneider, 2013) object corre-
spondence mechanism may address this problem
(see, also Poth & Schneider, 2016a). That is, pre-
dictive remapping may configure the attentional
weights in a priority map for the impending ob-
ject correspondence test after the saccade. Ac-
cording to NTVA (Bundesen et al., 2005), the at-
tentional weights control the dynamic remapping
of neuron’s receptive fields in the higher ventral
stream. The attentional weights set gates in the
ventral stream, so that higher level neurons re-
ceive input from the lower level neurons coding
for the visual features of a specific external ob-
ject. Predictive remapping may now reconfigure
the attentional weights, so that they already set the
gates in accordance with the retinal locations ob-
jects will fall on after the saccade (see, Cavanagh
et al., 2010 for a related idea of remapping of “at-
tention pointers”). Then, after the saccade, the
higher level neurons should receive feature input
from the objects at the locations dictated by the at-
tentional weights. This feature input may in turn
retain the attentional weights, because it sets the
sensory evidence values from which the attentional
weights are computed (see the above description of
TVA, Bundesen, 1990) in this fixation (Schneider,
2013). Thus, when the same object is present be-
fore and after the saccade, the attentional weight
remains unchanged. In TRAM, the test for object
correspondence is then positive and the feature in-
put is routed through the gates set by the atten-
tional weights to update the presaccadically created
VWM representation of the object.
In contrast, when the object is blanked after the
saccade or when its surface features change, then
the feature input to the attentional weight is miss-
ing. This results in a negative test for object cor-
respondence. As proposed by TRAM (Schneider,
2013), the attentional weight should then be encap-
sulated. As a consequence, the higher level neu-
rons whose gates are set by the attentional weight
cannot be redistributed to receive input from new
objects. This cuts the resources for processing
these objects which offers one explanation for the
impaired object recognition that we observed in
Study 1 and 2, when object correspondence was
broken across the saccade (Poth et al., 2015; Poth
& Schneider, 2016a). Besides this explanation,
TRAM also provides another, not mutually ex-
clusive explanation of this effect. Namely, ob-
ject recognition could have been impaired because
breaking object correspondence prevented the in-
tegration and updating of the representation of the
object in VWM (for a discussion, see Poth et al.,
2015; Poth & Schneider, 2016a). That is, the post-
saccadic object would not have been processed by
using the same attentional weight as the presac-
cadic one, preventing that the postsaccdic features
are routed to the presaccadically created object rep-
resentation in VWM. Consequently, a new atten-
tional weight and a new representation in VWM
would have to be created for the postsaccadic ob-
ject. This would delay processing and should im-
pair postsaccadic object recognition, especially if
the object was terminated by a mask as in our
present studies.
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3.2 Attentional competition for object recogni-
tion across the visual processing episodes
of successive eye fixations
Object correspondence may determine whether or
not processing of an object is integrated across vi-
sual processing episodes. As we have seen so far,
this should decide whether visual processing re-
sources are allocated to one integrated object repre-
sentation (using one attentional weight) or two sep-
arate object representations from each episode (us-
ing two attentional weights; Schneider, 2013). In
most situations and visually-guided tasks, a num-
ber of objects are present in the visual field and
may appear, disappear, or change from one pro-
cessing episode to the next. Therefore, another
question of fundamental importance is how pro-
cessing resources for object recognition are dis-
tributed across different external objects in succes-
sive visual processing episodes.
Within a visual processing episode, such as an
eye fixation, different objects must compete for
the limited visual processing resources (Bundesen,
1990; Duncan, 2006, such as neurons, Bundesen
et al., 2005). Mechanisms of visual attention bias
this competition, so that currently important ob-
jects receive more resources than unimportant ones
(Desimone & Duncan, 1995). The filtering mech-
anism of TVA (Bundesen, 1990; see section 2.1)
is a specification of such a mechanism. As de-
scribed above, it operates by distributing resources
across objects according to attentional weights re-
flecting the objects’ current importance. However,
this mechanism does not allow a differential allo-
cation of processing resources for objects of equal
importance. Therefore, the more equally impor-
tant objects enter the visual field, the smaller is the
amount of processing resources allocated to each
individual object, slowing down the objects’ pro-
cessing for object recognition (Bundesen, 1990).
Surprisingly, while a great deal of research has
been devoted to understanding attentional competi-
tion for object recognition within eye fixations, it is
unclear whether it also extends from one fixation to
the next. In other words, it is unclear whether ob-
jects from one fixation compete with those in the
next fixation for object recognition.
Three hypotheses can be advanced as answers
to the question of whether objects compete for
recognition from one fixation to the next. The
first is that successive fixations are entirely separate
episodes with no competition between the objects
in them. This is in line with the proposal that to sur-
vive the saccade, objects have to be encoded into
VWM (Irwin, 1992; Irwin & Gordon, 1998). The
competition for object recognition is, however, as-
sumed to rely on object representations created be-
fore encoding into VWM (Bundesen, 1990; Bun-
desen et al., 2005). Therefore, these object rep-
resentations before VWM should not exist beyond
the current fixation and there should be no atten-
tional competition across the saccade per se.
However, some object information outside
VWM seems to persist across the saccade, al-
though it is largely bound to the retinal object lo-
cations which are changed by the saccade (Irwin,
Brown, & Sun, 1988). This argues against the
first hypothesis, because the competition for ob-
ject recognition includes all objects in the visual
field and should thus include these persisting ob-
ject representations (Bundesen, 1990; Bundesen et
al., 2005; Desimone & Duncan, 1995). Therefore,
the second hypothesis predicts that these persist-
ing object representations should compete with and
impair processing of objects in the next fixation.
The third hypothesis directly follows from
TRAM theory (Schneider, 2013), objects should
compete for object recognition across saccades, but
only if they are relevant to the task at hand. That is,
there should be competition between objects from
the current fixation and the objects from the previ-
ous fixation that are now in VWM and whose atten-
tional weights are encapsulated to ensure their con-
solidation into passive VWM. This encapsulation
should, however, only take place for objects that
have been encoded into VWM and that are task-
relevant (see the above description of TRAM).
The aim of Study 3 (Poth & Schneider, 2016b,
submitted) was to distinguish between the three hy-
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potheses and thus to investigate whether objects
compete for recognition across saccades. For this
purpose, we performed two experiments. In both
experiments, participants made saccades to an ob-
ject (a red circle) in the visual periphery. Their
task was to report a letter that was presented af-
ter the saccade within this object and terminated
by a mask. The letter was shown for different du-
rations. This allowed us to assess the processing
speed of this letter by modeling report performance
as a function of letter presentation duration (for a
recent overview, see Bundesen et al., 2015). Before
the saccade, either no, two, or four additional non-
target objects (digits) were shown until the saccade
was initiated. The non-target objects were in a sim-
ilar color than the saccade target object.
In Experiment 1, the non-target objects were
task-irrelevant. Under such conditions, the speed
with which the postsaccadic letter was processed
did not differ depending on the number of presac-
cadic non-target objects. This result argues against
the second hypothesis, which predicted that objects
per se compete across the saccade for object recog-
nition.
In Experiment 2, the presaccadic non-target ob-
jects were task-relevant because they had to be
matched against a probe at the end of a trial. Here,
the processing speed of the postsaccadic letter now
decreased with increasing number of presaccadic
non-targets. Cross-experiment analyses confirmed
that the effect of the number of presaccadic non-
targets on the processing speed of the postsaccadic
letter was indeed greater in Experiment 2 than in
Experiment 1. These findings provide evidence
against the first hypothesis, stating that objects can-
not compete for recognition across saccades. In-
stead, they lend support to the third hypothesis that
was based on TRAM theory (Schneider, 2013),
holding that objects compete for recognition across
saccades, but only if they are task-relevant.
In TRAM (Schneider, 2013), the findings of
Study 3 can be explained as follows. Before the
saccade, the saccade target object was the most
relevant object in the visual field, with the high-
est attentional weight, and should thus have en-
tered VWM (cf. Deubel & Schneider, 1996; Wis-
chnewski et al., 2009, 2010). However, as VWM
allows to retain more than one object, some of the
presaccadic non-target objects should have been
encoded into VWM as well. In particular, the
presaccadic non-target objects were of a similar
color than the saccade target and they appeared
with a sharp onset, which implies a high bottom-
up salience (cf. Yantis, 1993). According to TVA
(Bundesen, 1990), their attentional weights should
thus have been relatively high, supporting their en-
coding into VWM. After the saccade, the saccade
target object remained as it was, only that the letter
appeared in it. For this object, object correspon-
dence should have been established across the sac-
cade (as in Study 1 and 2, Poth et al., 2015; Poth
& Schneider, 2016a). However, this should not
have been the case for the presaccadic non-target
objects. These objects were extinguished across
the saccade, which should have drastically changed
their attentional weights. Therefore, for the rep-
resentations of these objects in VWM, object cor-
respondence across the saccade should have been
broken. This should have lead to the encapsula-
tion of attentional weights, but only if the objects
in VWM connected to the attentional weights had
been task-relevant. The reason for this is that en-
capsulation of attentional weights happens only for
objects in VWM that are task-relevant, in order to
ensure only their consolidation into passive VWM.
As a consequence of the encapsulation of atten-
tional weights, there should have been fewer re-
sources available for processing the postsaccadic
letter. This explains that the letter was processed
more slowly.
As an alternative to encapsulation, one might
suppose that the lower postsaccadic processing
speed was solely due to the higher attentional
weights of task-relevant presaccadic non-target ob-
jects compared to irrelevant ones. Arguing against
this, however, one may assume that even though ir-
relevant non-target objects should have had lower
attentional weights than task-relevant ones, their
attentional weights should not have been close to
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zero. As mentioned above, they appeared with a
sharp onset and shared features with the saccade
target, implying relatively high attentional weights
(Bundesen, 1990). Therefore, if attentional com-
petition took place across the saccade irrespective
of encapsulation, one should expect an effect of the
number of presaccadic non-target objects on post-
saccadic processing speed also for irrelevant ones.
That there was no such effect (in fact, it was more
likely that the effect was absent, see Poth & Schnei-
der, 2016b, submitted), might thus argue against
this hypothesis.
In conclusion, the findings of Study 3 (Poth
& Schneider, 2016b, submitted) reveal that ob-
jects compete for object recognition across sac-
cadic eye movements, but only if the objects are
task-relevant. This argues that the current task de-
cides how processing resources for object recogni-
tion are allocated to different objects in successive
visual processing episodes. Attentional competi-
tion between objects across processing episodes
seems limited to task-relevant objects. This may
reflect an intelligent compromise: The risk of im-
paired object recognition in the current processing
episode is only taken for those objects whose con-
tinued processing serves the current task.
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Chapter 4
Short-term recognition across visual processing episodes
4.1 Short-term recognition requires encoding
into visual working memory in previous
processing episodes
The previous chapter focused on the mechanisms
that link the current visual processing episode to
the immediately preceding one, in order to sup-
port object recognition. In contrast to object recog-
nition, short-term recognition requires to estab-
lish links from the current to several processing
episodes in the recent past, not only to the im-
mediately preceding one. More specifically, short-
term recognition across visual processing episodes
bears the matching problem (see section 1.5). It re-
quires to match an object from the current episode
to object representations that have been acquired
in several recent episodes. It is an open question
whether short-term recognition is based on mecha-
nisms that are also involved in object recognition.
For instance, one may ask whether object recogni-
tion in one episode has to be accomplished for an
object in order for it to be available for short-term
recognition in later episodes.
In Study 4 (Poth & Schneider, 2016c), we
aimed to make a first approach to this issue. As
argued above, VWM is one of the most important
mechanisms for object recognition. Particularly,
objects are assumed to be recognized and become
available for report and other actions with their en-
coding into VWM (Bundesen, 1990; Bundesen et
al., 2005; Schneider, 2013). In contrast to the func-
tion of object recognition, short-term recognition is
not recognizing that an object belongs to a certain
category but that it has been viewed recently (in
a previous processing episode, for which we also
called it “episodic short-term recognition”, Poth &
Schneider, 2016c). Here, we asked whether short-
term recognition of an object requires that it has en-
tered VWM at the time it was encountered. Alter-
natively, it could be sufficient to activate visual fea-
tures and categories in visual long-term memory,
which should happen for all objects in the visual
field as an initial processing step (Bundesen, 1990;
Cowan, 1988; Henderson & Anes, 1994; Oberauer,
2002).
For instance, in the first and unselective stage of
processing in TVA (Bundesen, 1990), the objects
in the visual field are assumed to activate repre-
sentations of visual features and categories in long-
term memory. Thereby, the sensory evidence that
the objects have certain features or belong to cer-
tain categories is computed as the basis of further
processing. Only afterwards, in the second and se-
lective stage of processing, these categorizations
can be encoded into VWM (i.e. this is TVA’s race
towards VWM, see section 2.1).
To investigate whether it is necessary to en-
code objects into VWM for their later short-term
recognition, we developed a paradigm combin-
ing letter report and probe recognition (Poth &
Schneider, 2016c). In Experiment 1, participants
viewed displays of ten different letters in circular
arrangement. They memorized them over a reten-
tion interval and then reported as many of them
as they could. Ten letters were displayed because
this number exceeds estimates of VWM capacity
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(e.g., Dyrholm, Kyllingsbæk, Espeseth, & Bunde-
sen, 2011; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Poth et al., 2014;
Shibuya & Bundesen, 1988) and ensures that par-
ticipants could not report all letters. After the let-
ter report, a single probe letter was shown. Short-
term recognition was assessed as participants’ per-
formance in indicating whether or not the probe
matched one of the preceding ten letters. To assess
whether the probed letter had been encoded into
VWM, the identity of the probe was conditional-
ized on the letters participants had reported. There
were three conditions. The probe either matched
one of the ten letters and had also been reported,
it matched one of the ten letters but had not been
reported, or it did not match any of the ten let-
ters. In general, objects are assumed to be available
for report and the control of other actions only if
they have entered VWM (Bundesen, 1990; Bunde-
sen et al., 2005; Martens & Wyble, 2010; Schnei-
der, 2013). Therefore, we assumed that the let-
ters participants reported had been encoded into
VWM, whereas the letters they did not report had
not reached VWM.
It is important to note that short-term recogni-
tion here referred to letters not from the immedi-
ately preceding visual processing episode, but from
several processing episodes ago. The reason for
this is that the display of the ten letters was fol-
lowed by a retention interval (without letters) and
by the action of reporting letters. Both of these
phases of the task should have triggered a new vi-
sual processing episode due to changes in process-
ing demands (Schneider, 2013).
The results of Experiment 1 of Study 4 (Poth &
Schneider, 2016c) showed that participants’ probe
recognition performance was higher for reported
letters than for those that had not been reported or
not been shown. This is consistent with the hypoth-
esis that short-term recognition presupposes en-
coding into VWM. However, reporting the letters
could itself have effects on a later short-term recog-
nition irrespective of encoding into VWM. For in-
stance, reporting letters itself could interfere with
visual features and categories in long-term memory
that had been activated by other letters. Without
an intervening report, short-term recognition based
on these initially activated features and categories
might still be possible.
Additional analyses of letter reports in Exper-
iment 1 revealed that participants predominantly
reported letters that had been close to each other
within the displays of the ten letters. This suggests
that letters were encoded into VWM in a spatially-
clustered manner. Experiment 2 made use of this
finding to address the alternative explanation of the
higher probe recognition performance for reported
letters in Experiment 1.
The paradigm of Experiment 2 was similar to
the one of Experiment 1. In contrast to Experi-
ment 1, however, the ten letters were placed in col-
ored frames, whereby the frame of one letter dif-
fered from the other frames. Participants only re-
ported this highlighted letter. The probe letter ei-
ther referred to this letter, to one of the two let-
ters next to it, or two one of two letters on the
other side of the letter display. Based on the spa-
tially clustered encoding into VWM in Experiment
1, we assumed that letters next to the highlighted
letter should have a higher probability of entering
VWM than those on the other side of the display.
Therefore, if short-term recognition required en-
coding into VWM, probe recognition performance
should be higher for the letters near compared with
those far away from the highlighted letter. The
results supported this prediction. Probe recogni-
tion was higher for letters that had been near to
compared with far away from the highlighted let-
ter. Importantly, probe recognition performance
was at chance level for these far away letters. This
indicates that short-term recognition could be per-
formed for letters that had been probable to enter
VWM, but was impossible for letters with a lower
probability of reaching VWM.
In sum, these findings argue that short-term
recognition is restricted to those objects that have
reached VWM. As such, the activation of features
and categories in long-term memory seems insuf-
ficient to enable this function. This means that
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VWM contributes to the solution of the match-
ing problem of short-term recognition across vi-
sual processing episodes. That is, VWM seems to
restrict the amount of information that has to be
considered by the mechanisms performing the ac-
tual matching, the comparison of objects from the
current and from recently past episodes. Further-
more, the findings indicate that VWM not only un-
derlies the function of object recognition but also
plays a crucial role for short-term recognition. This
also implies that object recognition and short-term
recognition share a common limit: Information
about only a small number of objects can be en-
coded into capacity-limited VWM per visual pro-
cessing episode to accomplish the two functions of
visual cognition.
4.2 Priority in visual working memory im-
pacts on distinct components of short-term
recognition
As we have just seen, VWM seems to play an im-
portant role in both, object recognition and short-
term recognition. As described before (see section
2.1), encoding into VWM is mediated by mecha-
nisms of visual attention, selecting among all avail-
able object those that are important to the cur-
rent task, thus prioritizing the objects for recogni-
tion (e.g., Bundesen, 1990; Duncan, 2006; Schnei-
der, 1995; for an overview, see Poth & Schneider,
2013). There has been extensive research on such
a prioritization of object information up to the time
of VWM encoding (as reviewed by Bundesen et al.,
2015; Duncan, 2006). However, a flexible use and
application of visual information in task-driven be-
havior, requires that processing priorities can also
be changed after VWM encoding. This may be es-
pecially important for accommodating and prepar-
ing for the requirements of upcoming visual pro-
cessing episodes, such as an impending short-term
recognition.
Prioritization of objects within VWM can
be studied by means of the so-called retro-
cuing paradigm (Griffin & Nobre, 2003, see also
Landman, Spekreijse, & Lamme, 2003). In this
experimental paradigm, participants memorize a
set of visual objects over a retention interval, af-
ter which a probe object is shown. Participants
then indicate whether the probe matches one of
the objects that had been shown before. Short-
term recognition is then assessed as performance
in the probe recognition task (cf. Study 4, Poth
& Schneider, 2016c). Importantly, a retro-cue (i.e.
a “retrodictive cue”) is presented after the display
of objects but before the probe. In the variants of
the paradigm that are of current interest, the retro-
cue is either valid or neutral (e.g., Astle, Sum-
merfield, Griffin, & Nobre, 2012; Kuo, Stokes, &
Nobre, 2012). Valid retro-cues predict which of
the memorized objects is going to be relevant for
the upcoming comparison with the probe. Neutral
retro-cues do not provide any information about the
comparison. The main finding of this paradigm is
that probe recognition performance is improved by
valid as compared to neutral retro-cues. Short-term
recognition thus benefits from the valid retro-cues.
Fueling a constant debate, retro-cues may im-
pact on a number of different mechanisms to sup-
port performance in an upcoming short-term recog-
nition task (for a review, see Souza & Oberauer,
2016). Most accounts assume that retro-cues af-
fect memory-retention, by interacting with repre-
sentations of the memorized objects in VWM (e.g.,
Kuo, Yeh, Chen, & D’Esposito, 2011; Lepsien,
Thornton, & Nobre, 2011; Matsukura, Luck, &
Vecera, 2007; Murray, Nobre, Clark, Cravo, &
Stokes, 2013; Nobre, Griffin, & Rao, 2008, for
a more extensive discussion, see Poth & Schnei-
der, 2016d, submitted). In contrast to this view,
one may, however, also hypothesize that retro-cues
exert their effects by interacting with processing
of the probe, improving its utility for short-term
recognition. Moreover, the two hypotheses are not
mutually exclusive, retro-cues could well influence
memory-retention and processing of the probe.
In Study 5 (Poth & Schneider, 2016d, submit-
ted), we investigated these hypotheses in an exper-
iment modifying the retro-cuing paradigm (and in
a near-exact replication experiment). Participants
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viewed two objects (colored squares) and memo-
rized them over a retention interval. Afterwards, a
probe was shown that either did or did not match
one of the preceding objects. Short-term recogni-
tion was assessed as participants’ performance in
indicating if the probe did or did not match a pre-
ceding object. A retro-cue was presented in be-
tween the retention interval and the probe. The
retro-cue was either valid or neutral. A valid retro-
cue pointed at the location of the one of the pre-
ceding objects that was going to be relevant for
the upcoming comparison with the probe. Specif-
ically, if the probe matched a preceding object, it
was always the one highlighted by the retro-cue.
A neutral retro-cue did not contain such location
information. Critically, the presentation duration
of the probe was varied and it was terminated by
a mask. This allowed us to assess performance
in the short-term recognition task as a function of
the presentation duration of the probe. We fit this
data with an exponential model (Bundesen, 1990;
Wickelgren, 1977) that disentangled two compo-
nents of performance (among an additional compo-
nent that is not relevant here, see Poth & Schneider,
2016d, submitted). The first component is the level
of asymptotic performance which is reached when
the probe is shown for a relatively long duration.
Based on a number of findings, we can assume
that perceptual processing of the probe improves
with increasing presentation duration (e.g., Bunde-
sen & Harms, 1999; Petersen & Andersen, 2012;
Shibuya & Bundesen, 1988). At the asymptote,
however, performance stops to increase with in-
creasing presentation duration of the probe. At this
point, perceptual processing of the probe should
be over. Therefore, variations of the asymptote
should not reflect processing of the probe but mea-
sure the performance in retaining the objects in
VWM. The second component is the rate at which
performance increases with increasing presentation
duration of the probe (toward asymptotic perfor-
mance). This is a well-established measure of pro-
cessing speed (Bundesen, 1990; Wickelgren, 1977;
see also Study 3, Poth & Schneider, 2016b, sub-
mitted). Here, it should represent the speed with
which the probe is processed for comparison with
the objects in VWM in order to accomplish short-
term recognition of the probe.
The results of Study 5 (Poth & Schnei-
der, 2016d, submitted) showed that both of the
two components were affected by the retro-cues.
Valid retro-cues improved memory-retention, as
assessed by the asymptotic level of performance.
This is well in line with several accounts from the
literature, assuming that retro-cues modulate object
representations in VWM (Kuo et al., 2011; Lep-
sien et al., 2011; Matsukura et al., 2007; Murray
et al., 2013; Nobre et al., 2008). However, valid
retro-cues also accelerated processing of the probe,
which is a finding that calls for an extension of cur-
rent accounts. One interpretation of this effect is
that briefer presentations of the probe caused it to
be represented with low quality. The valid retro-
cue may have compensated for this low quality. For
instance the valid retro-cue could have strength-
ened of the cued object in VWM (Kuo et al., 2011;
Lepsien et al., 2011; Nobre et al., 2008), so that
the comparison could still be conducted. Shorter
presentation durations of the probe (after exceed-
ing a minimum presentation duration, see Poth &
Schneider, 2016d, submitted) would still be suffi-
cient for short-term recognition. Thus, function-
ally, this would be equivalent to an increase in the
processing speed of the probe in the context of this
task.
Alternatively, valid retro-cues may have accel-
erated processing of the probe by engaging a mon-
itoring mechanism (see Poth & Schneider, 2016d,
submitted, for further discussion). That is, once
the valid retro-cue indicated which of the objects
in VWM was going to be relevant for the upcom-
ing short-term recognition task, the display could
have been monitored for the appearance of the fea-
tures of the cued object. This could have increased
visual processing speed by means of the pigeon-
holing mechanism of TVA (Bundesen, 1990; see
section 2.1). The perceptual decision bias for cate-
gorizing the upcoming probe as having the features
of the cued object could have been set high. This
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would have increased processing of these catego-
rizations. However, such a monitoring by pigeon-
holing only works on trials on which the probe in-
deed matched the cued object. This problem may
be solved by a setting a deadline for processing the
probe. If the probe was not categorized as having
the features of the cued object until this deadline,
it would be decided that the probe did not match
the cued object. Since valid retro-cues speeded up
processing of the probe, the deadline could be set
shorter compared with neutral retro-cues.
Together, the findings of Study 5 (Poth &
Schneider, 2016d, submitted) demonstrate that pri-
oritizing information in VWM can prepare the
use of this information in an upcoming short-term
recognition task. This seems to involve both, en-
hanced memory-retention in VWM and acceler-
ated processing of the probe on which short-term
recognition has to be performed. This suggests
that priorities in VWM contribute to the solution
of the matching problem of short-term recogni-
tion. They influence the retention of informa-
tion from recently past episodes and the acquisi-
tion of new information in upcoming episodes. In
this way, priorities in VWM may determine which
and how much information from different process-
ing episodes is taken into account by the mecha-
nisms performing the actual matching of objects
for short-term recognition.
The findings may add an interesting avenue
to short-term recognition across visual processing
episodes. They may suggest that task-driven in-
formation processing continues after information
has entered VWM and that it takes new informa-
tion (such as from a retro-cue) into account. Im-
portantly, this may then prepare processing in the
next visual processing episode, at least when this
episode belongs to the same short-term recognition
task.
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Chapter 5
Episodic visual cognition: Discussion and outlook
The central question of this dissertation was
how the two functions of visual cognition, ob-
ject recognition and short-term recognition, are
fulfilled across visual processing episodes. More
specifically, the dissertation asked how the mecha-
nisms underlying the two functions solve particular
problems arising from the dissection of visual pro-
cessing into episodes.
5.1 Mechanisms of episodic visual cognition
for object and short-term recognition
It was argued that visual processing episodes pose
two contrasting problems for the two functions
of visual cognition. For object recognition, vi-
sual processing episodes lead to the problem of
selective integration. That is, it must be decided
whether object representations from two succes-
sive episodes should be integrated into a com-
mon or separated into distinct representations. In-
tegration enables a cumulative processing of ex-
ternal objects across visual processing episodes
(see e.g., Demeyer et al., 2009; Kahneman et al.,
1992; Rayner et al., 1980). This is necessary for
object recognition in situations where processing
episodes are shorter than the processing time re-
quired for object recognition (see section 1.5). In
addition, integration may support object recogni-
tion by preventing a competition for object recog-
nition that would arise between two separate rep-
resentations (Schneider, 2013). Separation is nec-
essary to notice and discriminate changes of ob-
jects across episodes (cf. Deubel et al., 1996, 2002;
Weiß et al., 2015). Such change perception is also
required in many situations of visually-guided be-
havior (e.g., Rensink, 2002).
In contrast to object recognition, for short-term
recognition visual processing episodes lead to a
problem of matching. While the selective inte-
gration problem refers to object recognition across
one and the next episode, the matching problem of
short-term recognition requires links between the
current and (potentially) multiple episodes of the
recent past (and irrespective of object recognition
in the sense of categorization).
In our studies, we investigated components of
the mechanisms underlying object and short-term
recognition that may play key roles in solving the
problems of visual processing episodes.
Our first three studies focused on object recog-
nition across processing episodes of eye fixations
separated by saccadic eye movements, because fix-
ations are a type of episode ubiquitous in human vi-
sion (e.g., Gegenfurtner, 2016; Rolfs, 2015; Schütz
et al., 2011).
In Study 1 (Poth et al., 2015) and Study 2
(Poth & Schneider, 2016a), we investigated a
mechanism testing for object correspondence (“ob-
ject continuity”) across visual processing episodes,
which has been put forward in TRAM theory
(Schneider, 2013). Our findings indicated that such
a test for correspondence between objects across
saccades impacts on the perception of transsac-
cadic object displacements as well as on postsac-
cadic object recognition. That is, breaking ob-
ject correspondence across the saccade improved
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discrimination of transsaccadic object displace-
ments but impaired postsaccadic object recogni-
tion. Moreover, we found that object recogni-
tion was impaired when object correspondence was
broken by changing spatiotemporal object features
across the saccade (by briefly blanking the ob-
ject), but also by changing multiple surface fea-
tures (contrast-polarity and associated luminance,
color-and-luminance, and color alone). Based on
TRAM (Schneider, 2013), we interpreted the find-
ings as evidence that breaking object correspon-
dence across the saccade causes presaccadic and
postsaccadic representations of an external object
to be kept as separate entities. This should al-
low comparisons between them, explaining the im-
proved displacement perception. However, the
separate representations should also compete for
visual processing resources necessary for object
recognition, explaining why object recognition was
impaired. Conversely, establishing object corre-
spondence across the saccade should lead to the in-
tegration of the presaccadic and postsaccadic ob-
ject representations. Besides (or in addition to)
preventing a competition for visual processing re-
sources, this could improve object recognition by
enabling the cumulative processing of the object
across the saccade. Thus, taken together, the object
correspondence mechanism proposed by TRAM
theory may solve the selective integration problem
of object recognition across saccades and thereby
impact on object recognition in several ways.
An object correspondence mechanism may link
successive episodes for visual processing of a sin-
gle external object. For different external objects,
however, visual processing episodes create another
problem. Namely, limited visual processing re-
sources (e.g., neurons; Bundesen et al., 2005; Desi-
mone & Duncan, 1995) that are required for object
recognition must be allocated intelligently to dif-
ferent objects in successive processing episodes.
In Study 3 (Poth & Schneider, 2016b, submit-
ted), we examined how visual processing resources
are distributed across different objects of succes-
sive episodes of eye fixations. Here, we found that
objects compete for visual processing resources
across the saccade separating the fixations, but only
if they are task-relevant. Currently relevant objects
of one fixation seem to cut the resources for object
recognition in the next fixation, which becomes
manifest in slower visual processing. These find-
ings offer support for a key prediction of TRAM
theory (Schneider, 2013), namely that the task-
relevance of objects determines the distribution of
visual processing resources not only within a fix-
ation (as in classic attention theories Bundesen,
1990; Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Wolfe, 1994)
but also across intervening saccadic eye move-
ments. In sum, this suggests that the distribution of
processing resources for object recognition within
and across processing episodes is likewise con-
trolled by the current task. In this fashion, process-
ing of different objects within and across episodes
is reconciled in accordance with the task, which in
turn implies that the task (or task-step) unites suc-
cessive episodes under one roof of common pro-
cessing goals (cf. Duncan, 2013).
Within a visual processing episode, process-
ing for object recognition is assumed to end with
the encoding of objects into VWM (e.g., Bun-
desen, 1990; Bundesen et al., 2005). Once en-
coded into VWM, objects are available for being
reported (e.g., Bundesen, 1990; Luck & Vogel,
2013; Eriksson et al., 2015) or used for controlling
goal-directed action (e.g., Schneider, 2013).
In Study 4 (Poth & Schneider, 2016c), we
asked whether such an encoding of object infor-
mation into VWM is also required beyond the cur-
rent episode. More specifically, we asked if ob-
ject information must have been processed up to
the level of VWM in the episode it was acquired,
in order to be available for short-term recognition
in later episodes. Our results seem to support this
notion. We found that objects that supposedly did
not reach VWM (i.e. had not been reported or
were unlikely to be reported) were not available
for performing a subsequent short-term recognition
task. Therefore, encoding object information into
VWM seems to be a processing step that prepares
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and is necessary for short-term recognition in later
processing episodes. In this manner, VWM con-
tributes to the solution of the matching problem
of short-term recognition across visual processing
episodes. That is, VWM seems to limit the amount
of information that has to be considered by the
mechanisms performing the actual matching, the
comparison of objects from the current and from
recently past episodes.
Study 5 (Poth & Schneider, 2016d, submitted)
continued the investigation of VWM as a mecha-
nism underlying short-term recognition across pro-
cessing episodes. Here, we examined how pri-
oritizing objects within VWM can prepare for
short-term recognition in an upcoming processing
episode. In particular, we used a paradigm that al-
lowed to disentangle two components of short-term
recognition performance. The first component is
memory-retention in VWM. The second one is the
processing speed of a probe object that had to be
matched against objects held in VWM, in order to
perform the short-term recognition. Prioritization
in VWM was studied by retro-cues, which did or
did not indicate the object in VWM that was go-
ing to be relevant for short-term recognition. We
found both of the two components affected by the
prioritization. Prioritizing an object in VWM im-
proved its memory-retention, but also accelerated
the processing of a probe object in the upcoming
short-term recognition task. This suggests that the
matching problem of short-term recognition across
visual processing episodes is solved in a dynamic
and task-driven fashion. That is, current process-
ing priorities contribute to the problem solution in
two ways. First, by influencing the retention of in-
formation of recently past episodes, and second,
by guiding the acquisition of new information in
upcoming episodes. In this fashion, the priorities
determine which and how much information from
different processing episodes is used by the mech-
anisms performing the actual matching for short-
term recognition.
Taken together, the findings of the discussed
studies reveal specific mechanisms that contribute
to object recognition and short-term recognition
across visual processing episodes. The mechanism
of object correspondence seems to link one pro-
cessing episode to the next for encoding into VWM
and thus for object recognition. The mechanism
of VWM seems implied in both, object recogni-
tion in the current episode, and in the preparation
of short-term recognition in later episodes. Mech-
anisms that set priorities within VWM seem to im-
pact on the next processing episodes by influencing
memory-retention as well as the acquisition of new
information in service of short-term recognition.
However, by introducing these mechanisms in
the context of visual processing episodes, the stud-
ies also raise a number of new questions for future
research.
5.2 Open questions of episodic visual cognition
As explained in the Introduction (see section 1.4),
visual processing episodes arise due to a number
of different factors (Schneider, 2013). We here ex-
amined the mechanisms of object and short-term
recognition across different types of visual pro-
cessing episodes.
Our first three studies (Poth et al., 2015; Poth
& Schneider, 2016a, 2016b, submitted) focused on
eye fixations as episodes that must be overcome for
object recognition. Fixations are separated by sac-
cadic eye movements, which might make them spe-
cial in the sense that information about their onset-
time and direction is available in advance. For in-
stance, the saccade-eliciting signals can be made
available to brain centers for visual processing by
corollary discharges (see e.g., Wurtz, 2008; Wurtz
et al., 2011), and this information may contribute
to the linking of successive fixations (e.g., by spec-
ifying a time-window in which the test for transsac-
cadic object correspondence, Poth et al., 2015;
Poth & Schneider, 2016a, should be conducted).
Such predictive information would be missing for
visual processing episodes triggered by the appear-
ance or disappearance of objects in the visual field
(for a discussion, see Schneider, 2013), or by the
occlusion or movement of objects (Hollingworth &
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Franconeri, 2009; Kahneman et al., 1992).
In addition, a different kind of predictive infor-
mation about upcoming processing episodes may
be available when the episode is embedded in a
known task, such as in the presented studies (cf.
Duncan, 2013). For these reasons, an interesting
avenue for future research may be to investigate
how the factors eliciting and predicting visual pro-
cessing episodes impact on the solutions put for-
ward by mechanisms of visual cognition to over-
come them.
5.3 Is episodicness a principle of visual cogni-
tion?
Up to this point, we have considered visual pro-
cessing episodes as a problem that must be over-
come for visual cognition, specifically for its func-
tions of object and short-term recognition. How-
ever, the final part of this dissertation synopsis
aims to take a different view and speculate about
the functional value that processing episodes might
have for visual cognition.
The object correspondence mechanism pro-
posed by TRAM theory (Schneider, 2013) presents
a solution to the selective integration problem
of object recognition across visual processing
episodes. At the beginning of each visual process-
ing episode, the mechanism tests whether current
external objects correspond to objects from the pre-
vious episode (that are now in VWM). Depend-
ing on the outcome of this test, information about
an external object is either integrated or separated
across the visual processing episodes.
Integrating information about an object over
time into one representation may be a strategy for
fast information processing, because it can proceed
cumulatively (e.g., Demeyer et al., 2009; Kahne-
man et al., 1992). It should also prevent attentional
competition for object recognition, which arose if
separate representations were formed (Schneider,
2013). Integration may also provide the most
robust object representations (e.g., by capitaliz-
ing on potential information redundancy, as sup-
posed for information from different senses, Ernst
& Bülthoff, 2004). It may also allow a sparse
and computationally efficient processing (cf. Ol-
shausen & Field, 2004), because only one instead
of two (or more) representations has to be dealt
with. However, if information about two actually
different states of an object or two different objects
is integrated, then the differences would be missed.
This may be the case because there are no two rep-
resentations that can be compared to detect the dif-
ference (as discussed for the perception of visual
stability, see section 3.1).
Whether it is more important to have robust and
sparse object representations or to be able to de-
tect and discriminate object changes over time de-
pends on the current task and environmental cir-
cumstances. Critically, whether the one or the
other requirement prevails may change quickly.
This thought may lead to the new view that hav-
ing visual processing episodes can also support vi-
sual cognition and not only challenge it. That is,
dissecting visual processing into distinct episodes
offers temporally regular and controllable check-
points at which it can be decided whether ob-
ject information should be integrated or separated.
Therefore, having episodes rather than a continu-
ous stream of visual processing may reflect a com-
promise between the representational robustness
provided by integration and the temporal resolution
for detecting object changes provided by separa-
tion.
In addition to such a compromise between ro-
bustness and temporal resolution of representa-
tions, visual processing episodes may enhance pro-
cessing by limiting processing demands. Specifi-
cally, they may restrict the amount of information
that is carried forward in time. For instance, Study
4 (Poth & Schneider, 2016c) suggested that initial
processing steps that activate for all object in the
visual field specific visual features and categories
in long-term memory are not sufficient for an ob-
ject’s later short-term recognition. Instead, pro-
cessing the object up to the level of VWM seems
to be required. This might hint at that the linger-
ing activation of visual features and categories is
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not sustained over time (and hence cannot be used
for short-term recognition). As a consequence,
there may be less interference between features and
lower processing demands at the initial steps of
processing (e.g., the formation of proto-objects that
is proposed by TRAM theory, Schneider, 2013, see
also Wischnewski et al., 2009, 2010). Dissecting
processing into episodes and clearing initial stages
of processing at their beginning may be more ef-
ficient than resolving conflicts of current and past
feature activations. This should support object as
well as short-term recognition. In addition, this
proposal is also in line with the older idea that
carrying only a limited amount of information for-
ward in time is beneficial for action control (as in
the selection-for-action view of attention, Allport,
1987; see also Neumann, 1987). That is, the pa-
rameters for controlling action may be obtained
faster (cf. Neumann, 1987), because they can be
extracted from pre-restricted (e.g., in VWM) infor-
mation instead of all available information (e.g., at
the retina).
To conclude, visual processing episodes can be
regarded from two points of view. On the one
hand, there are a number of external factors and
task-requirements that result in visual processing
episodes (Schneider, 2013) and that must be ad-
dressed by mechanisms of visual cognition. Other-
wise functions such as object and short-term recog-
nition were not realizable. On the other hand, how-
ever, “episodicness” may also constitute a princi-
ple of processing that finds expression in differ-
ent mechanisms, and reconciles representational
robustness, temporal resolution, and potential in-
terference of information.
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Visual perception is based on information processing during periods of eye
fixations that are interrupted by fast saccadic eye movements. The ability to
sample and relate information on task-relevant objects across fixations implies
that correspondence between presaccadic and postsaccadic objects is established.
Postsaccadic object information usually updates and overwrites information on the
corresponding presaccadic object. The presaccadic object representation is then lost.
In contrast, the presaccadic object is conserved when object correspondence is
broken. This helps transsaccadic memory but it may impose attentional costs on
object recognition. Therefore, we investigated how breaking object correspondence
across the saccade affects postsaccadic object recognition. In Experiment 1, object
correspondence was broken by a brief postsaccadic blank screen. Observers made a
saccade to a peripheral object which was displaced during the saccade. This object
reappeared either immediately after the saccade or after the blank screen. Within the
postsaccadic object, a letter was briefly presented (terminated by a mask). Observers
reported displacement direction and letter identity in different blocks. Breaking object
correspondence by blanking improved displacement identification but deteriorated
postsaccadic letter recognition. In Experiment 2, object correspondence was broken
by changing the object’s contrast-polarity. There were no object displacements
and observers only reported letter identity. Again, breaking object correspondence
deteriorated postsaccadic letter recognition. These findings identify transsaccadic
object correspondence as a key determinant of object recognition across the saccade.
This is in line with the recent hypothesis that breaking object correspondence results in
separate representations of presaccadic and postsaccadic objects which then compete
for limited attentional processing resources (Schneider, 2013). Postsaccadic object
recognition is then deteriorated because less resources are available for processing
postsaccadic objects.
Keywords: saccade, visual stability, attention, object correspondence, transsaccadic memory
INTRODUCTION
Accurate vision is spatially and temporally limited. Spatially, it is limited to the fovea, the center
part of the eye’s retina which provides the highest visual resolution (e.g., Findlay and Gilchrist,
2003). The low resolution in the retinal periphery places a fundamental constraint on the visual
exploration of the world: To view a potentially interesting object in the periphery with high acuity,
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one must bring it onto the fovea by making a fast saccadic
eye movement. Temporally, online visual processing is limited
to ﬁxations, discrete episodes in which the eyes stand relatively
still. Every saccade interrupts useful visual input and changes the
retinal position and resolution of external objects. Nevertheless,
humans perceive the visual world as stable across saccades (for
reviews, see Bridgeman et al., 1994; Wurtz, 2008). Moreover,
coping with most natural tasks demonstrates that humans
sample and relate information on task-relevant objects across
eye movements (Land and Tatler, 2009; Schneider, 2013). This
implies that the visual system assesses object correspondence
across ﬁxations (Hollingworth et al., 2008; also called object
continuity, Schneider, 2013), it assesses whether input from
postsaccadic and presaccadic objects (apparently) comes from the
same external object (Kahneman et al., 1992; Irwin and Andrews,
1996). Object correspondence is a prerequisite for updating
presaccadic low-quality information on a peripheral object with
postsaccadic foveal information on the same object (Henderson
and Anes, 1994; Demeyer et al., 2009; Herwig and Schneider,
2014).
Transsaccadic object correspondence and updating are
considered elementary for building a task-relevant representation
of the visual environment, as they tie together the samples
obtained from successive ﬁxations (Schneider, 2013; Ganmor
et al., 2015; Herwig, 2015a; Wolf and Schütz, 2015; Wurtz, 2015).
However, it appears that signaling of object correspondence and
updating can also strikingly impair perception. An object can be
displaced during a saccade for up to a third of saccade amplitude
without this being noticeable (Bridgeman et al., 1975). This form
of transsaccadic change-blindness suggests that the postsaccadic
object location updates and overwrites the presaccadic object
location (Deubel et al., 1996). As a consequence, displacement
perception suﬀers because only the postsaccadic object location
remains available (Deubel et al., 1996).
How does the visual system assess object correspondence?
Object correspondence is signaled if a test of the presaccadic
object against the object after the saccade results in a match
(Deubel et al., 1996; Tas et al., 2012). This notion is supported by
a number of studies using the blanking paradigm, which breaks
object correspondence by blanking a saccade target object during
the saccade and delaying its reappearance until shortly after
eye-landing (Deubel and Schneider, 1994; Deubel et al., 1996,
1998, 2002; the discussion in terms of object correspondence
comes from Tas et al., 2012). Blanking improves accuracy in
reporting transsaccadic displacements of the saccade target object
considerably (Deubel and Schneider, 1994; Deubel et al., 1996). In
addition, blanking improves accuracy in reporting transsaccadic
changes of visual object features besides location (such as spatial
frequency, Weiß et al., 2015; see, also Deubel et al., 2002).
Together, these results indicate that blanking prevents updating
and overwriting of the presaccadic object with the postsaccadic
one. Both objects are compared and this allows to identify
displacements (Deubel and Schneider, 1994; Deubel et al., 1996,
2002) and changes of other visual features (Weiß et al., 2015).
Brieﬂy occluding the postsaccadic object (Deubel et al., 2002) and
changing its contrast-polarity (Tas et al., 2012) helps reporting
displacements in a similar way as blanking. This suggests that
breaking object correspondence in general prevents transsaccadic
updating. Instead of one updated object representation, separate
representations of the presaccadic and postsaccadic object should
emerge (Deubel et al., 1996; Tas et al., 2012; Schneider, 2013).
Critically, the beneﬁcial eﬀects of breaking object
correspondence for perceiving transsaccadic displacements
and feature changes may come at costs in terms of postsaccadic
object recognition. This hypothesis is based on the theory of
“Task-dRiven visual Attention and working Memory” (TRAM,
Schneider, 2013). TRAM follows the biased competition
approach to attention (Desimone and Duncan, 1995) and the
“Theory of Visual Attention” (Bundesen, 1990), assuming that
visual objects compete for object recognition. Speciﬁcally, an
object is recognized and becomes accessible (e.g., for report) if
it enters capacity-limited visual working memory. An object can
enter visual working memory if enough attentional processing
resources (e.g., neurons, Bundesen et al., 2005) have been
allocated to it. Object recognition is competitive because
these processing resources are limited and have to be split
among objects (Bundesen, 1990; Desimone and Duncan, 1995;
Bundesen et al., 2005). Thus, the more objects take part in
the competition, the less attentional processing resources are
available for processing each individual object in service of object
recognition. A central idea of TRAM is that the competition
for object recognition is organized in discrete competition
episodes of which eye ﬁxations are a prominent case. Two kinds
of objects participate in the competition. First, objects from the
current episode, including those objects that have updated their
corresponding counterparts from the preceding episode. Second,
objects from the preceding episode for which no corresponding
object was found in the current episode. Therefore, an object
that has not been updated due to broken object correspondence
introduces an additional competitor into the current competition
episode. As a consequence, attentional processing resources must
be split among more objects. This then cuts the resources for
processing each individual object and thereby imposes costs on
object recognition.
The present study aimed at testing the hypothesis that
breaking object correspondence across the saccade deteriorates
postsaccadic object recognition. Two experiments each
used a diﬀerent manipulation to break transsaccadic object
correspondence and examined its eﬀects on performance in a
postsaccadic letter recognition task.
EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1, blanking was used to break transsaccadic
object correspondence (Deubel et al., 1996; cf. Tas et al., 2012).
Observers made a saccade to a peripheral object which was
displaced during the saccade. The postsaccadic object appeared
either immediately after the saccade (no-blank condition) or
after a brief blank (blank condition). A single letter was
presented simultaneously to and within the postsaccadic object
and was terminated by a pattern mask. Both, displacement
identiﬁcation and postsaccadic object recognition performance
were assessed. Observers reported displacement direction and
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FIGURE 1 | Paradigm of Experiment 1. Observers made a saccade to an elliptic object containing an irrelevant special character. The object was displaced during
the saccade. The postsaccadic object contained a letter. It was shown for 80 ms (pattern-masked), either immediately after the saccade (no-blank condition) or after
a 100 ms blank (blank condition). Displacement direction was reported in one report block, letter identity in the other. Ellipses of broken lines provide reference
positions (they were not shown on the screen): A black ellipse of broken lines indicates the location of a previous object, a green ellipse of broken lines indicates the
location of an upcoming object.
letter identity in two diﬀerent blocks of trials. If breaking object
correspondence by blanking imposes costs on object recognition,
then performance in reporting the postsaccadic letter should
suﬀer in the blank condition compared to the no-blank condition.
This predicted deterioration in object recognition is diametrical
to the expected performance improvement for displacement
identiﬁcation (Deubel and Schneider, 1994; Deubel et al., 1996,
2002).
Method
Observers
Sixteen observers (eight males, eight females) between 20
and 32 years (Mdn = 27 years) were paid to participate in
Experiment 1. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision
(contact lenses) and gave written informed consent before the
experiment. The type of experiment was approved by Bielefeld
University’s ethics committee.
Apparatus and Stimuli
The experiment took place in a dimly lit room. Eye behavior
was recorded by a video-based tower-mounted eye-tracker
(Eyelink 1000, SR Research, Mississauga, ON, Canada) which
was calibrated using a nine-point grid procedure and sampled
observers’ right eyes at 1000 Hz. Observers’ heads were stabilized
by forehead and chin rests, 71 cm from the 19”-CRT-screen
(G90FB, ViewSonic, Brea, CA, USA) which ran with a resolution
of 1024 × 768 pixels (at physical dimensions of 36 cm × 27 cm)
and a refresh rate of 100 Hz.
The experiment was controlled by Experiment Builder
(v1.10.1025). Stimulus luminance was measured using a
MAVOLUX-digital luminance meter (Gossen, Nuremberg,
Germany). Stimuli were black (<1 cd × m−2) special
characters (§$&}/[µ∼) and letters (ABDGHJKLMNPRSTVX;
0.48◦ × 0.56◦) in Arial font and a black plus-character
(0.28◦ × 0.28◦) was used as ﬁxation cross. The saccade target
object was a gray ellipse (29 cd × m−2; 0.7◦ × 1.26◦). The
white background had a luminance of 89 cd × m−2. Four
diﬀerent pattern masks were used, which consisted of rectangles
(1.01◦ × 1.5◦) ﬁlled with black scrambled lines of diﬀerent
widths.
Design and Procedure
Figure 1 illustrates the experimental paradigm. Each trial began
with ﬁxation of a central ﬁxation cross (at least 490ms continuous
ﬁxation plus a variable delay between 0 and 500 ms; trials
were aborted and repeated if the ﬁxation cross was not ﬁxated).
Afterward, the ﬁxation cross was extinguished and an ellipse was
shown as saccade target object, 6◦ or 8◦ from screen center in
horizontal direction. This ellipse contained an irrelevant special
character and was presented until the observer made a saccade
to it (detected using velocity and acceleration thresholds of
30◦ × s−1 and 8000◦ × s−2). In the no-blank condition, the now
empty ellipse was displaced for 1◦ during the saccade (with the
next screen refresh after saccade detection). Initial position of the
ellipse (6◦ or 8◦, left or right to screen center) and displacement
direction (left or right) were randomized across trials with equal
numbers of occurrence in each condition. At the next screen
refresh after eye-landing, a letter was shown within the ellipse for
80 ms and terminated by a pattern mask lasting for 300 ms. The
letter was randomly drawn from the set of used letters (each letter
occurred equally often in each blanking condition and report
block; special characters were drawn analogously). The mask was
drawn randomly from the set of used masks. After 500 ms, a
response screen prompted observers to report letter identity or
displacement direction using the keyboard (unspeeded forced
choice; letter-keys or “F1” and “F12”, respectively). The next
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FIGURE 2 | Performance in Experiment 1. Letter report performance (left) and displacement report performance (right). Error-bars indicate 95% confidence
intervals for within-subjects designs (Morey, 2008). Broken lines indicate chance level.
trial started after the report was made. The blank condition
was identical to the no-blank condition except that an empty
screen was shown during the saccade and lasted for another
100 ms from the screen refresh after the eye-landing. Trials of
the two blanking conditions occurred in random order within
report blocks. All observers performed two report blocks (order
counterbalanced across sample) of 152 trials, the half of which
belonging to the no-blank and the other to the blank condition. In
these blocks, they either only reported displacement direction or
only letter identity. Observers performed 16 training trials before
each report block.
Results
Trials were excluded from the analyses, if no saccade was made
until 400 ms after onset of the saccade target object, saccade
latency was below 100 ms (anticipatory saccades), or the saccade
target object was missed by more than 2.5◦. A total of 4.3% of the
trials was discarded. Letter and displacement reports were each
pooled across trials on which saccade target objects appeared 6◦
or 8◦ to the left or right of ﬁxation (Deubel et al., 1996). They
were also pooled across orders of displacement and letter report
blocks because mixed analyses of variances (ANOVAs) showed
that neither order nor the interaction of order and blanking
conditions aﬀected letter or displacement report performance, all
Fs< 3.167, all ps > 0.096.
Accuracy was assessed as the proportion of correct responses.
A paired-samples t-test with dz (Cohen, 1988) as eﬀect size
showed that letter reports were signiﬁcantly more accurate in
the no-blank (M = 0.89, SD = 0.11) compared to the blank
condition (M = 0.75, SD = 0.17), t(15) = 4.671, p < 0.001,
dz = 1.17, Bayes Factor (BF) = 108.271, (Figure 2, left; Bayes
Factors were computed using the BayesFactor (0.9.10-2) package
for R (3.0.3), cf. Rouder et al., 2009, values greater one support
the alternative and values smaller one the null hypothesis). In
contrast, displacement reports were signiﬁcantly less accurate
in the no-blank (M = 0.64, SD = 0.12) than in the blank
FIGURE 3 | Effects of blanking on letter and displacement reports for
individual observers. Differences between the no-blank and blank condition
for both, displacement report (x-axis) and letter report (y-axis). Each point
represents the value of one observer. The gray quadrant indicates the region
in which points should fall if the effect of blanking on displacement report
performance is in the opposite direction of the effect of blanking on letter
report performance.
condition (M = 0.75, SD = 0.16), t(15) = −5.238, p < 0.001,
dz = −1.31, BF = 284.724, (Figure 2, right). As evident from
Figure 3, the eﬀects of blanking on letter report performance and
on displacement report performance were in opposite direction
for most observers.
Not surprisingly, observers’ mean saccade latencies (i.e., the
time between the onset of the saccade target object and saccade
detection) did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between the blanking
conditions, both in the letter report block (no-blank:M = 132ms,
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SD = 11 ms, blank: M = 133 ms, SD = 10 ms), t(15) = −1.756,
p = 0.100, dz = −0.44, BF = 0.893 and in the displacement
report block (no-blank: M = 166 ms, SD = 21 ms, blank:
M = 168, SD = 22 ms), t(15) = −0.858, p = 0.404, dz = −0.21,
BF = 0.352. The blanking conditions did not signiﬁcantly diﬀer
in deviations of gaze positions from the postsaccadic object in
the eye tracker’s ﬁrst sample after the onset of the postsaccadic
object (observers’ mean distance between gaze position and
postsaccadic object), neither in the letter report block (no-blank:
M = 1.14◦, SD = 0.13◦, blank: M = 1.18◦, SD = 0.13◦),
t(15) = −1.730, p = 0.104, dz = −0.43, BF = 0.864, nor in the
displacement report block (no-blank: M = 1.16◦, SD = 0.14◦,
blank: M = 1.18◦, SD = 0.14◦), t(15) = −0.545, p = 0.594,
dz = −0.14, BF = 0.291. Likewise, the blanking conditions did
not signiﬁcantly diﬀer in variability of gaze positions in these
samples of the eye tracker (observers’ standard deviation of
distances between gaze position and postsaccadic object), neither
in the letter report block (no-blank: M = 0.45◦, SD = 0.09◦,
blank: M = 0.47◦, SD = 0.08◦), t(15) = −1.397, p = 0.183,
dz = −0.35, BF = 0.579, nor in the displacement report block
(no-blank:M = 0.53◦, SD= 0.11◦, blank:M = 0.54◦, SD= 0.10◦),
t(15) = −0.437, p = 0.669, dz = −0.11, BF = 0.278.
Discussion
Experiment 1 provides ﬁrst support for the hypothesis that
breaking object correspondence across the saccade impairs
postsaccadic object recognition (Schneider, 2013). Recognition
of a postsaccadic letter was deteriorated in the blank condition,
where object correspondence was broken, compared to the
no-blank condition, where it was not broken. In stark
contrast, breaking object correspondence by blanking was
beneﬁcial for identifying transsaccadic object displacements.
This beneﬁcial eﬀect of blanking on perception of transsaccadic
object displacements replicates previous work and shows that
the present blanking manipulation was eﬀective (Deubel and
Schneider, 1994; Deubel et al., 1996, 2002).
It is well-established that blanking breaks transsaccadic object
correspondence (Tas et al., 2012) and prevents the updating
and overwriting of presaccadic object information (Deubel
and Schneider, 1994; Deubel et al., 1996, 2002; Weiß et al.,
2015). However, some issues must be considered before we can
conclude that the present deterioration in postsaccadic letter
recognition was in fact due to broken object correspondence.
First, the deterioration might have been due to the diﬀerent
temporal intervals between eye-landing and onset of the
postsaccadic object in the two blanking conditions. Visual
processing has been claimed to be enhanced immediately after
saccades (Ibbotson and Krekelberg, 2011). Thus, processing of
the postsaccadic letter might have been enhanced when the
object was immediately visible after the saccade in the no-
blank condition compared to when it appeared later in the
blank condition. Second, the onset of the postsaccadic object
was visible in the blank condition but was concealed by the
saccade in the no-blank condition (e.g., Krock and Moore, 2015).
Therefore, the deterioration might also stem from interference
of this onset with recognition of the letter (as a form of
masking; e.g., Enns and Di Lollo, 2000). Third, objects were
always displaced during the saccade and this may have aﬀected
postsaccadic object recognition diﬀerently in the two blanking
conditions. In line with these alternative explanations, one might
suppose that object correspondence was broken in both blanking
conditions, meaning it cannot account for the deteriorated
postsaccadic letter recognition. This might have been the case
because in both conditions a special character in the presaccadic
object changed into a letter in the postsaccadic object (cf.
Demeyer et al., 2010). To rule out these alternative explanations,
Experiment 2 examined how postsaccadic letter recognition was
aﬀected by manipulating transsaccadic object correspondence in
conditions with identical time courses and without any object
displacements.
EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 2, a change of contrast-polarity was used to break
transsaccadic object correspondence (Tas et al., 2012). Observers
made a saccade to a peripheral object which was black or
white. The contrast-polarity of this object either stayed the same
(no-change condition) or changed during the saccade (change
condition) so that a black presaccadic object changed into a white
postsaccadic one and vice versa. Similar to Experiment 1, a single
letter appeared simultaneously to and within the postsaccadic
object and was terminated by a pattern mask. In contrast to
Experiment 1, however, both of these polarity-change conditions
were identical in time course and there were no intrasaccadic
object displacements. Observers’ only task was to report the
postsaccadic letter. Now, if breaking object correspondence by
changing contrast-polarity imposes costs on postsaccadic object
recognition, then performance in reporting the postsaccadic
letter should suﬀer in the change compared to the no-change
condition.
Method
Observers
Twelve observers (2 males, 10 females) were paid to take part
in Experiment 2. They were between 21 and 31 years old
(Mdn = 27), all had normal or corrected-to-normal vision
(contact lenses) and gave written informed consent before the
experiment. The type of experiment was approved by Bielefeld
University’s ethics committee.
Apparatus and Stimuli
The apparatus and testing conditions in Experiments 1 and
2 were identical but not the same (i.e., the monitors were
of the same model but were two diﬀerent ones). Besides, a
desktop-mounted video-based eye-tracker (Eyelink 1000, SR
Research, Mississauga, ON, Canada) recorded eye behavior in
Experiment 2.
Experiment 2 was controlled by the Psychophysics Toolbox
(3.0.12; Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007) and
Eyelink Toolbox (3.0.12; Cornelissen et al., 2002) extensions for
MATLAB R2014b (The MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA). Stimuli
were gray (67 cd × m−2) special characters (%#§&; 0.4◦ × 0.4◦)
and letters (ABDEFGHJKLMNOPRSTVXZ; 0.32◦ × 0.4◦) in
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FIGURE 4 | Paradigm of Experiment 2. Observers made a saccade to an elliptic object containing an irrelevant special character. The postsaccadic object was
either of the same (no-change condition) or of the opposite contrast-polarity (change condition). It contained a letter and was visible for approximately 30 ms after
the saccade (pattern-masked). Observers reported letter identity.
Arial font and saccade target objects were black (1 cd × m−2)
or white (135 cd × m−2) ellipses (0.65◦ × 1.05◦). The gray
background had a luminance of 67 cd × m−2. A black square
(0.1◦ × 0.1◦) was used as central ﬁxation stimulus. Ninety-nine
pattern masks were algorithmically created for each observer and
for both, black and white ellipses. This relatively large number
of masks was chosen to minimize adaptation to the masks.
The masks consisted of black or white rectangles (2◦ × 2◦),
each containing nine letters that were drawn randomly without
replacement from the set of used letters. These letters were
mirror-reversed and upside-down, they overlapped partially, and
together covered an area of about 1◦ × 1◦ within a rectangle. For
black rectangles the letters were white and for white rectangles
they were black.
Design and Procedure
The experimental paradigm is illustrated in Figure 4. Observers
started each trial by pressing the space-bar. In the beginning of a
trial, observers ﬁxated a central ﬁxation stimulus for a random
interval ranging from 500 to 1000 ms. Afterward, the ﬁxation
stimulus was extinguished and an ellipse was presented as saccade
target object 8◦ to the left or right of screen center (randomized
across trials with equal numbers of occurrence in each condition).
The ellipse contained an irrelevant special character (randomly
drawn from the set of used special characters) and stayed
on screen until the observer made a saccade to it (detected
using velocity and acceleration thresholds of 35◦ × s−1 and
9500◦ × s−2). This presaccadic ellipse was either black or white.
The postsaccadic ellipse contained a letter (randomly drawn from
the set of used letters) and appeared during the saccade, that is,
on the next screen refresh after detection of saccade onset. In the
no-change condition, the postsaccadic ellipse and the presaccadic
ellipse were identical in their contrast-polarity. In the change
condition, the postsaccadic ellipse was of the opposite contrast-
polarity of the presaccadic ellipse. That is, a black presaccadic
ellipse changed into a white postsaccadic one and vice versa.
Whether presaccadic ellipses were black or white was randomized
across trials but the number of occurrences was equal in the two
polarity-change conditions. The postsaccadic ellipse was followed
by a pattern mask of the same polarity. The mask was presented
two or three screen refreshes after detection of saccade end so that
the postsaccadic ellipse was visible after the saccade for 31 ms on
average (SD = 3 ms). The mask was drawn randomly from the
set of created masks and lasted for 300 ms. After that, the screen
went blank and observers reported the letter using the keyboard
(unspeeded forced-choice). They could start the next trial after
100 ms.
Observers performed 64 trials of each polarity-change
condition in randomized order. Trials were aborted and repeated
on a randomly chosen subsequent trial if observers failed to ﬁxate
the central ﬁxation stimulus or if they missed the saccade target
object by more than 2.5◦. In this way, a total of 22.5% of the trials
was repeated. Observers performed 32 training trials before the
experiment.
Results
Seven trials were excluded from analysis because saccade latency
was below 100 ms or above 400 ms. Letter reports were pooled
across trials on which saccade target objects appeared to the left
or right of screen center (as for Experiment 1). They were also
pooled across trials with diﬀerent presaccadic ellipse polarities
because a repeated-measures ANOVA indicated that neither
presaccadic ellipse polarity nor its interaction with the two
polarity-change conditions (i.e., no-change or change) aﬀected
letter report performance, both Fs < 0.099, both ps > 0.758
(although distributions of proportions of correct responses were
negatively skewed for both presaccadic ellipse polarities in the
no-change condition).
Accuracy was measured as the proportion of correct
responses. Letter reports were signiﬁcantly more accurate in
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FIGURE 5 | Letter report performance in Experiment 2. Error-bars
indicate 95% confidence intervals for within-subjects designs (Morey, 2008).
The broken line indicates chance level.
the no-change condition (M = 0.91, SD = 0.15) than in the
change condition (M = 0.72, SD = 0.20), t(11) = 3.989,
p = 0.002, dz = 1.15; BF = 21.223 (Figure 5). As can be
expected, the two polarity-change conditions did not diﬀer
signiﬁcantly in observers’ mean saccade latencies (no-change
condition: M = 155 ms, SD = 20 ms; change condition:
M = 155 ms, SD = 21 ms), t(11) = −0.494, p = 0.631,
dz = −0.14, BF = 0.319. Likewise, the conditions did not
diﬀer signiﬁcantly in deviations of saccade landing positions
from saccade target objects (observers’ mean distances between
saccade landing positions and saccade target objects; no-change
condition: M = 0.77◦, SD = 0.19◦; change condition: M = 0.79◦,
SD = 0.19◦), t(11) = −1.665, p = 0.124, dz = −0.48,
BF = 0.846. Also, they did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly in variability
of deviations of saccade landing positions from saccade target
objects (observers’ standard deviations of distances between
saccade landing positions and saccade target objects; no-change
condition: M = 0.35◦, SD = 0.07◦; change condition: M = 0.35◦,
SD = 0.07◦), t(11) = −0.216, p = 0.833, dz = −0.06,
BF = 0.293.
Discussion
Experiment 2 provides further evidence that breaking
transsaccadic object correspondence impairs postsaccadic
object recognition (Schneider, 2013). Recognition of a
postsaccadic letter was deteriorated in the change condition,
where object correspondence was broken, compared with the
no-change condition, where it was not broken. As such, the
ﬁndings of Experiment 2 perfectly replicate and extend the
ﬁndings from Experiment 1. Moreover, Experiment 2 also
controlled for alternative interpretations of the ﬁndings of
Experiment 1.
In Experiment 2, transsaccadic object correspondence was
broken by changing contrast-polarity rather than by blanking.
This allowed to keep the temporal interval between eye-landing
and onset of the postsaccadic object constant in the two polarity-
change conditions. Therefore, in contrast to Experiment 1,
there were no diﬀerences in time course between conditions
which could account for the diﬀerences in postsaccadic letter
recognition. For this reason, two alternative explanations
of the ﬁndings of Experiment 1 can be dismissed for the
ones of Experiment 2. First, the diﬀerences in postsaccadic
letter recognition did not result from enhanced processing
immediately after saccades (Ibbotson and Krekelberg, 2011),
because letter recognition would have been enhanced in
both polarity-change conditions. Second, the diﬀerences did
not result from interference of the onset of the postsaccadic
object with letter recognition, because this onset happened
during the saccade and likewise in both polarity-change
conditions. Furthermore and again contrasting Experiment
1, there were no object displacements in Experiment 2. This
excludes any diﬀerential eﬀects of displacements between
conditions. Both experiments had in common, however,
that the presaccadic object contained an irrelevant special
character which changed into a letter in the postsaccadic
object. Although this change might have broken object
correspondence (Demeyer et al., 2010), this cannot refer to
the results of Experiment 2. The character change occurred
in both polarity-change conditions and notwithstanding
there was a pronounced eﬀect of the polarity change on
postsaccadic letter recognition. It has been shown previously
that changing contrast-polarity is an eﬀective tool to break
transsaccadic object correspondence (Tas et al., 2012). Thus,
even if the eﬀect of changing contrast-polarity only added to
the eﬀect of changing the special character into the letter, it
still demonstrates an eﬀect of object correspondence on object
recognition. Taken together, the ﬁndings of Experiment 2
therefore strongly argue that breaking object correspondence
across the saccade deteriorates postsaccadic object
recognition.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We asked whether breaking object correspondence across the
saccade impairs postsaccadic object recognition. The present
ﬁndings indicate that this is the case. In both of our experiments,
recognition of a postsaccadic letter was deteriorated when
transsaccadic object correspondence was broken, compared with
when it was not broken. Now we can ask which cognitive
mechanisms might underlie these eﬀects.
One possible interpretation of the present ﬁndings is
that breaking transsaccadic object correspondence increases
locational uncertainty of task-relevant information after the
saccade. The precision of saccades is limited so that there
is always variation in saccade landing positions. Therefore,
to sample information on a saccade target object after a
saccade, this object must be re-located (Hollingworth et al.,
2008), even if it remained at its location across the saccade.
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Breaking transsaccadic object correspondence may hinder
this re-location (and this might already happen during the
saccade, Panouillères et al., 2013). Information on where
to ﬁnd task-relevant information after the saccade would
then be less speciﬁc. This could impair postsaccadic object
recognition, for instance because less attentional processing
resources would be devoted to the location of the postsaccadic
object.
Alternatively, intact transsaccadic object correspondence may
provide computational savings which are lost in case object
correspondence is broken. Speciﬁcally, new high-resolution
foveal information on a postsaccadic object updates the
representation of the corresponding presaccadic object (Tas
et al., 2012; cf. Deubel and Schneider, 1994; Deubel et al.,
1996, 2002). In contrast, if transsaccadic object correspondence
is broken, then there is no presaccadic representation that
can (or should) be updated with postsaccadic information. An
entirely new representation must be created for the postsaccadic
object. This additional requirement may delay processing of
the postsaccadic object (such delays have for instance been
found when monkeys had to adapt their smooth pursuit
eye movements to postsaccadic motion patterns, Fallah and
Reynolds, 2012). Such processing delays then deteriorate the
postsaccadic recognition of objects and this is most prominent
when postsaccadic objects are only brieﬂy available (as in the
current experiments).
These two interpretations suggest a close link between
transsaccadic object correspondence and postsaccadic object
recognition. However, they do not provide a mechanistic
theory of the relationship between these processes. In contrast,
TRAM (Schneider, 2013) may deliver a ﬁrst step toward such
a theory by proposing that attentional weights (Bundesen,
1990) are not only mediating competition for access to visual
working memory across saccades but that they should also
establish correspondence between presaccadic and postsaccadic
objects.
Attentional weights represent the processing priority of
objects by combining the task-driven and the intrinsic relevance
of object features (Bundesen, 1990). Neuronally, attentional
weights are assumed to exist in spatially organized priority maps
in several brain areas (Bundesen et al., 2005; cf. Fecteau and
Munoz, 2006; Cavanagh et al., 2010; Zelinsky and Bisley, 2015).
Thus, attentional weights code for the feature-derived attentional
priority of objects but also for their spatial location. With
this combination of priority and location, attentional weights
can provide a number of functions fundamental for human
active vision. Within priority maps, attentional weights control
saccade target selection (“where-to-look-next?”, Wischnewski
et al., 2009, 2010; Schneider, 2013). This is a form of selection-for-
action (Allport, 1987; Neumann, 1987). In addition, attentional
weights govern the allocation of neuronal processing resources
to objects in order to accomplish object recognition (Bundesen
et al., 2005). This is selection-for-perception (covert visual
attention). Selection-for-action and selection-for-perception are
assumed to be tightly coupled (Schneider, 1995; Schneider and
Deubel, 2002; cf. Irwin and Gordon, 1998) and attentional
weights in priority maps may establish this coupling (Schneider,
2013; Herwig, 2015b). Furthermore, attentional weights (in this
context called “attentional pointers”) can align presaccadic and
postsaccadic information by keeping track of object locations
across saccades (Cavanagh et al., 2010). This proposal is based
on studies showing that the location sensitivity of neurons
in some priority maps (i.e., the maps assumed to implement
attentional weights, cf. Bundesen et al., 2005) is updated before
saccades to accommodate impending saccade-induced changes
of retinal locations (Duhamel et al., 1992). Along these lines,
TRAM proposes that the attentional weight of a presaccadic and
a postsaccadic object is used to test for object correspondence
across saccades (Schneider, 2013). Object correspondence is then
signaled if the attentional weight of the postsaccadic object
matches the attentional weight that is predicted based on the
presaccadic object. Thereby, the attentional weight could spatially
route postsaccadic feature input to presaccadically created object
representations in the process of transsaccadic updating. This
may give rise to visual stability: the perception of a stable world
despite the retinal image changes induced by saccades (e.g.,
Mathôt and Theeuwes, 2011).
In contrast, if object correspondence is broken, the visual
system signals that a new object has appeared after the
saccade (Kahneman et al., 1992; Irwin and Andrews, 1996).
According to TRAM, the attentional weight of the presaccadic
object is then encapsulated (i.e., retained with its current
connection to presaccadic features) to protect the presaccadic
object against being updated and overwritten by the new
(non-corresponding) postsaccadic object. This encapsulated
attentional weight competes with the attentional weights
of postsaccadic objects. Neuronal processing resources are
normalized over all present attentional weights (e.g., Bundesen
et al., 2005; Poth et al., 2014). Instead of having all neuronal
resources available for processing objects of the postsaccadic
competition episode, some amount of resources is again
(Schneider, 2013) or still (Petersen et al., 2012) allocated to
the presaccadic object. In sum, TRAM proposes that breaking
object correspondence across the saccade provokes attentional
competition between presaccadic and postsaccadic objects. This
attentional competition hypothesis provides one explanation why
breaking object correspondence impaired postsaccadic object
recognition in the present experiments. Testing the hypothesis
may be an interesting avenue for future studies aiming to
bridge research on transsaccadic object correspondence and on
mechanisms of visual attention and object recognition.
CONCLUSION
The present study shows for the ﬁrst time that breaking object
correspondence across the saccade deteriorates postsaccadic
object recognition. This reveals a crucial role of object
correspondence for vision across successive ﬁxations and
saccades. Natural human vision consists of a succession of
ﬁxations and saccadic eye movements. Therefore, classical
theories of task-driven object recognition (and visual attention;
Bundesen, 1990; Wolfe, 1994) should now take mechanisms of
transsaccadic object correspondence into account.
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Rapid saccadic eye movements bring the foveal region
of the eye’s retina onto objects for high-acuity vision.
Saccades change the location and resolution of
objects’ retinal images. To perceive objects as visually
stable across saccades, correspondence between the
objects before and after the saccade must be
established. We have previously shown that breaking
object correspondence across the saccade causes a
decrement in object recognition (Poth, Herwig, &
Schneider, 2015). Color and luminance can establish
object correspondence, but it is unknown how these
surface features contribute to transsaccadic visual
processing. Here, we investigated whether changing
the surface features color-and-luminance and color
alone across saccades impairs postsaccadic object
recognition. Participants made saccades to peripheral
objects, which either maintained or changed their
surface features across the saccade. After the saccade,
participants briefly viewed a letter within the saccade
target object (terminated by a pattern mask).
Postsaccadic object recognition was assessed as
participants’ accuracy in reporting the letter.
Experiment A used the colors green and red with
different luminances as surface features, Experiment B
blue and yellow with approximately the same
luminances. Changing the surface features across the
saccade deteriorated postsaccadic object recognition
in both experiments. These findings reveal a link
between object recognition and object
correspondence relying on the surface features colors
and luminance, which is currently not addressed in
theories of transsaccadic perception. We interpret the
findings within a recent theory ascribing this link to
visual attention (Schneider, 2013).
Introduction
Human vision is based on a reiterating cycle of
saccadic eye movements and intervals of relatively
stable eye position, the so-called ﬁxations. Saccades
shift the eye rapidly, directing its foveal high-acuity
region at potentially interesting parts of the environ-
ment. Fixations provide clear visual snapshots of
objects, snapshots that are not corrupted by the
suppression of information uptake or by the motion
blur, which occur during saccades (e.g., Krock &
Moore, 2014; Wurtz, 2008). However, snapshot-like
sampling also poses a problem for perception and
action. Perceiving objects as continuously present
across saccades and to act based on this perception
require that the snapshots of objects from successive
ﬁxations are linked (e.g., Higgins & Rayner, 2015;
Schneider, 2013). This linkage is complicated by the
fact that every saccade displaces an object’s image on
the retina and changes its resolution (e.g., Herwig &
Schneider, 2014; Wurtz, 2008, 2015). How, then, does
the visual system achieve coherent representations of
external objects across saccades?
Current theories propose that coherent transsaccadic
object representations depend on a test for object
correspondence across saccades (Hollingworth, Rich-
ard, & Luck, 2008; Tas, Moore, & Hollingworth, 2012).
This means the visual system tests whether postsaccadic
and presaccadic object representations likely stem from
the same external objects. If the test for object
correspondence is positive (i.e., object correspondence
is established), presaccadic object representations are
updated with postsaccadic information (Demeyer, De
Graef, Wagemans, & Verfaillie, 2009; Henderson &
Anes, 1994), leaving only one postsaccadic representa-
tion (Tas et al., 2012; see also Schneider, 2013). Having
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only one object representation may entail visual
stability, the perception of a continuous and stable
visual world despite the saccade-induced changes of
retinal images (for reviews on visual stability, see
Bridgeman, Van der Heijden, & Velichkovsky, 1994;
Mathoˆt & Theeuwes, 2011; Wurtz, 2008; Wurtz, Joiner,
& Berman, 2011). However, this also means that
presaccadic and postsaccadic objects cannot be com-
pared, which explains why object displacements
(Bridgeman, Hendry, & Stark, 1975) and changes of
visual object features (Deubel, Schneider, & Bridge-
man, 2002; Weiß, Schneider, & Herwig, 2015) are hard
to perceive when they occur during saccades. In
contrast, if the test for object correspondence is
negative (i.e., object correspondence is broken), pre-
saccadic and postsaccadic objects are assumed to be
represented separately (Deubel, Schneider, & Bridge-
man, 1996; Schneider, 2013; Tas et al., 2012). This
diminishes the perception of visual stability but helps to
discriminate intrasaccadic object changes, presumably
because the two representations can be compared
(Deubel & Schneider, 1994; Deubel et al., 2002; Deubel
et al., 1996; Tas et al., 2012; Weiß et al., 2015).
Transsaccadic object correspondence not only is
important for visual stability but also has recently been
shown to affect object recognition (Poth et al., 2015; see
also Schneider, 2013). In this study, participants made
saccades to a peripheral object. After the saccade, a
letter was shown in this object and terminated by a
pattern mask. Correspondence between the presaccadic
and the postsaccadic object was broken with two
different manipulations: ﬁrst, by introducing a blank
screen after eye landing and before onset of the
postsaccadic object (see Deubel & Schneider, 1994;
Deubel et al., 1996) and, second, by a large change of
the luminance and the contrast polarity of the object
during the saccade (see Tas et al., 2012). In both cases,
recognition of the postsaccadic letter was deteriorated.
This shows that breaking transsaccadic object corre-
spondence impairs postsaccadic object recognition.
Two explanations of this effect rely on the idea that the
presaccadic and postsaccadic object are represented
separately if object correspondence is broken. First, the
theory of Task-dRiven visual Attention and working
Memory (TRAM; Schneider, 2013) proposes that
broken object correspondence (object continuity)
across ﬁxations results in two different object repre-
sentations. Limited attentional resources must be split
between the two representations, cutting the resources
available to each individual object representation. This
loss of attentional resources per object explains the
deteriorated recognition of the postsaccadic object.
Second, the creation of a separate postsaccadic
representation in addition to the presaccadic one may
delay (or hinder) processing of the postsaccadic object.
Because the postsaccadic object was terminated by a
mask, this delay would have become manifest in
deteriorated recognition of the object (Poth et al.,
2015).
Postsaccadic object recognition depends on trans-
saccadic object correspondence (Poth et al., 2015), but
the mechanisms underlying this effect remain elusive.
To shed light on these mechanisms, it is important to
clarify which object features contribute to the test for
object correspondence. Two classes of features are
distinguished in the literature on object correspondence
across occlusion (Hollingworth & Franconeri, 2009)
and movement (Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992;
Mitroff & Alvarez, 2007): spatiotemporal and surface
features. Classical theories proposed that object corre-
spondence was established solely (Kahneman et al.,
1992) or primarily (Flombaum, Scholl, & Santos, 2009;
Scholl, 2007) on the basis of spatiotemporal features. In
stark contrast, however, more recent research revealed
that object correspondence across occlusion can also be
established based on surface features (such as color
and/or luminance), even when it conﬂicts with the
spatiotemporal feature location (Hollingworth &
Franconeri, 2009). Along the same lines, object
correspondence across saccades seems to rely on both
spatiotemporal (Demeyer, De Graef, Wagemans, &
Verfaillie, 2010; Deubel, Bridgeman, & Schneider,
1998; Deubel et al., 1996; Deubel et al., 2002) and
surface features (Tas et al., 2012). As explained above,
there is ﬁrst evidence (Poth et al., 2015) that
postsaccadic object recognition is deteriorated both
when transsaccadic object correspondence is broken by
blanking, which is a violation of spatiotemporal
correspondence, and by introducing large changes of
luminance and contrast polarity, which is a strong
violation of surface feature correspondence. Critically,
however, it remains to be clariﬁed whether this holds
also for surface features other than luminance and
contrast polarity and less intense feature changes.
The surface feature of color is generally considered
vital for human vision (e.g., Gegenfurtner & Kiper,
2003; Moutoussis, 2015), but it is unknown whether
color is used for establishing object correspondence
across saccades. Changing the apparent color of an
object is a common manipulation to study how surface
features contribute to object correspondence across
occlusion (Hollingworth & Franconeri, 2009) and
movement (Kahneman et al., 1992; Mitroff & Alvarez,
2007). However, such changes of apparent color may
coincide with changes in luminance and contrast
polarity (e.g., Mitroff & Alvarez, 2007), as these surface
features are usually not distinguished from color.
Therefore, the role of color for object correspondence
across occlusion and movement remains unclear. The
role of color may even be less clear for object
correspondence across saccades. On the one hand, the
color of a given object is represented with much lower
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quality in the visual periphery than in the fovea (e.g.,
Hibino, 1992; Johnson, 1986; Livingstone & Hubel,
1987; Nagy & Wolf, 1993). Thus, if color was used to
establish transsaccadic object correspondence, the
natural differences between an object’s peripheral
presaccadic and its foveal postsaccadic color could
erroneously break object correspondence. This would
impair postsaccadic object recognition (Poth et al.,
2015). One may therefore hypothesize that trans-
saccadic color changes are ignored. On the other hand,
there is evidence that at least large changes in apparent
color, which may include changes in luminance, can
break transsaccadic object correspondence and per-
ceived visual stability (Tas, 2015; cf. Hollingworth et
al., 2008, for evidence from corrective saccades).
Here, we investigated whether breaking object
correspondence across the saccade by changing the
surface feature of color impairs postsaccadic object
recognition. To retain the link to previous studies of
object correspondence, we examined the effects of
changes in apparent color (color, luminance, and
contrast polarity) on transsaccadic object correspon-
dence (Experiment A). In addition, we examined the
effects of changes between approximately equiluminant
colors on transsaccadic object correspondence (Exper-
iment B). Both experiments employed the experimental
paradigm by Poth et al. (2015; Experiment 2).
Participants made saccades to a peripheral object, a
letter was shown in this object after eye landing, and
the letter presentation was terminated by a pattern
mask. Participants’ task was to report the identity of
the postsaccadic letter. Transsaccadic object corre-
spondence was manipulated in two conditions: The
surface features of the object either stayed the same
across the saccade (no-change condition) or they were
changed during the saccade (change condition). Ex-
periment A used the opponent colors green and red as
surface features, each coinciding with a different
physical luminance and contrast polarity. Experiment
B used the colors blue and yellow with approximately
the same luminance and contrast polarity. If breaking
transsaccadic object correspondence by changing these
surface features impairs postsaccadic object recogni-
tion, then letter report performance should be lower in
the change compared with the no-change conditions of
both experiments.
Method
Participants
Ten participants took part in Experiment A. They
were between 20 and 30 years old (MD¼ 25 years), ﬁve
were male, and ﬁve female. Ten different participants
performed Experiment B. Their ages ranged from 21 to
26 years (MD ¼ 23.5 years), and two were male and
eight were female. All participants of both experiments
reported normal color vision and normal or corrected-
to-normal (contact lenses) visual acuity. All partici-
pants were paid and gave written informed consent
before participation, and the experiments were ap-
proved by Bielefeld University’s ethics committee.
Apparatus and stimuli
Participants performed the experiments in a dimly lit
room. They viewed the 19-inch CRT screen (G90fB,
ViewSonic, Brea, CA) from a distance of 71 cm while
their head position was ﬁxed by forehead and chin
rests. The screen had a resolution of 1,0243 768 pixels
(at physical dimensions of 363 27 cm) and a refresh
rate of 100 Hz, and it was controlled by a GeForce GT
640 (NVIDIA, Santa Clara, CA) graphics card. A
video-based desktop-mounted eye tracker sampled
participants’ right eyes at 1000 Hz (Eyelink 1000, SR
Research, Mississauga, Ontario, Canada). The eye
tracker was calibrated using a nine-point grid proce-
dure. Calibration was performed in the beginning of
the experiment, after training trials, after a pause in
about the middle of the experiment (and after
participants had made 50 ﬁxation or saccade errors in
total). Saccades were detected online using velocity and
acceleration thresholds of 358 (degrees of visual angle)
3 s1 and 950083 s2. Responses were collected using a
standard QWERTZ computer keyboard. The experi-
ment was programmed using the Psychophysics tool-
box (3.0.12; Brainard, 1997; Kleiner, Brainard, & Pelli,
2007; Pelli, 1997) and Eyelink toolbox (3.0.12; Corne-
lissen, Peters, & Palmer, 2002) extensions for MAT-
LAB (R2014b; The MathWorks, Natick, MA).
Color and luminance were measured using an X-Rite
i1 Pro spectrophotometer (Munich, Germany), and
measurements are provided as CIE Lxy coordinates. A
black (L ¼ 0.228 cd/m2, x ¼ 0.290, y¼ 0.286) square
(0.18 3 0.18) was used as central ﬁxation stimulus. In
Experiment A, saccade target objects were green (L ¼
90.871 cd/m2, x¼ 0.279, y¼ 0.591) and red (L¼ 30.664
cd/m2; x ¼ 0.599, y ¼ 0.327) ellipses (0.658 3 1.058).
Note that the objects differed in luminance and
contrast polarity. In Experiment B, saccade target
objects had approximately the same luminance, and
they were blue (L¼ 37.113 cd/m2; x¼ 0.194; y¼ 0.143)
and yellow (L ¼ 36.887 cd/m2; x ¼ 0.415; y¼ 0.479).
Letters (ABDEFGHJKLMNOPRSTVXZ; 0.328 3
0.48) and special characters (%#§&; 0.48 3 0.48) were
written in Arial font and matched the gray background
(L ¼ 47.687 cd/m2; x¼ 0.283, y ¼ 0.291) in both
experiments. In each experiment, 99 pattern masks
were algorithmically produced for each individual
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participant and for both colors. A large number of
masks was used to minimize adaptation to them. The
masks consisted of colored squares (28 3 28), ﬁlled with
nine black letters that were drawn randomly without
replacement from the set of letters. The nine letters
were mirror reversed and upside down and overlapped
partially, and all letters together covered an area of
about 18 3 18 within a square.
Procedure and design
Figure 1a illustrates the experimental paradigm,
which is based on the paradigm by Poth et al. (2015).
The participant pressed the space bar to start a trial. A
central ﬁxation stimulus was shown, and the partici-
pant ﬁxated it for a random interval between 500 and
1000 ms. Next, an elliptic saccade target object
appeared 88 horizontally from screen center. Whether
the object appeared to the left or right of screen center
was randomized across trials, whereby each side
occurred equally often for each of the postsaccadic
surface features and each condition. The object
contained an irrelevant special character, which was
randomly drawn from the set of special characters, and
it was presented until the participant made a saccade to
it. Figure 1b illustrates the surface features and
experimental conditions of both experiments. In
Experiment A, the presaccadic object was either green
or red (coincident with different luminances and
contrast polarities), and in Experiment B, it was either
blue or yellow (with approximately the same lumi-
nances and contrast polarities). These surface features
were randomized across trials, each occurring equally
often in each condition. The postsaccadic object
contained a letter that was randomly drawn from the
set of letters1 and was shown during the saccade (on the
next screen refresh after detection of saccade onset).
The presaccadic and the postsaccadic object had the
same surface features in the no-change condition and
different surface features in the change condition. Thus,
in the change condition of Experiment A, green objects
changed into red ones and vice versa. In the change
condition of Experiment B, blue objects changed into
yellow ones and vice versa. After the postsaccadic
object, a pattern mask of the same surface feature was
presented. This mask was shown two or three screen
refreshes (frames) after the online detection of saccade
end (and its registration by the experimental software),
so that the postsaccadic object was visible after the
saccade end detection for 31 ms on average (SD¼ 3
ms). The mask was randomly drawn from the set of
produced masks and was shown for 300 ms. It was
followed by a blank screen, and participants reported
the identity of the letter using the keyboard. There was
no time limit for the report. The next trial could be
started after an intertrial interval of 100 ms. Partici-
pants did not receive any instructions regarding the
surface features or changes.
Participants performed 64 trials of each condition in
randomized order. Trials were aborted and repeated on
a randomly selected subsequent trial if observers did
not ﬁxate the central ﬁxation cross or missed the
saccade target object by more than 2.58. In Experiment
A, 24.3% of the trials were repeated, in Experiment B
31.11%. Participants performed 32 training trials before
each experiment.
Figure 1. (a) Schematic illustration of the experimental paradigm. Participants fixated a central fixation stimulus, which was followed
by an elliptic saccade target object, displaying one of two surface features (green and red with different luminances in Experiment A,
blue and yellow with approximately the same luminance in Experiment B). This object appeared in the periphery and contained an
irrelevant special character. Participants made a saccade to the object. In the no-change condition, the object displayed the same
surface feature after the saccade. In the change condition, the postsaccadic object displayed different surface features than the
presaccadic one. In both conditions, the postsaccadic object contained a letter and was terminated by a pattern mask. Participants
reported the identity of the letter. Special characters, letters, and the background were gray (here drawn in black and white for better
visibility). (b) Employed surface features and experimental conditions of Experiment A and Experiment B.
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Results and discussion
Trials were excluded from analysis if saccade latency
(the time from onset of the saccade target object until
saccade onset detection) was less than 100 ms
(anticipatory saccades) or greater than 400 ms. Two
trials were excluded from Experiment A and four trials
from Experiment B. Table 1 provides descriptive
statistics of all dependent variables in both experi-
ments.
Letter report performance in Experiment A
Letter report performance was assessed as the
proportion of correctly reported letters for each
individual participant. Because of the truncated range
proportions take, all analyses were also performed on
acrsine-squareroot-transformed proportions in addi-
tion to original proportions. Both sets of analyses
yielded consistent results, and therefore, only analyses
of original proportions are reported.
Figure 2a depicts the mean proportion of correctly
reported letters across participants of Experiment A.
The effects of condition and postsaccadic surface
features on letter report performance were analyzed
using a 23 2 (no-change vs. change3 green vs. red)
repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA; with
type III sums of squares and g2G as effect size; Bakeman,
2005). The ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant main effect
of condition, F(1, 9) ¼ 15.607, p¼ 0.003, g2G ¼ 0.181.
Performance was higher in the no-change (M ¼ 0.90,
SD¼ 0.13) compared with the change condition (M ¼
0.73, SD ¼ 0.19). Thus, breaking transsaccadic object
correspondence by changing the combination of the
surface features color, luminance, and contrast polarity
impaired recognition of the postsaccadic letter. As
argued previously (Poth et al., 2015), one might suspect
that the change of the special character in the
presaccadic object into the letter in the postsaccadic
object also broke transsaccadic object correspondence.
It is important, however, that even if this were the case,
the present results would still demonstrate an effect of
breaking object correspondence by changing color,
luminance, and contrast polarity in addition to the
possible effect of changing the presaccadic special
character.
Letter report
performance
(proportion
correct)
Saccade
latency
(ms)
Saccade
landing error
(distance in 8)
Experiment A
No-change, green 0.96 (0.08) 149 (12) 0.80 (0.13)
No-change, red 0.83 (0.20) 153 (12) 0.74 (0.13)
Change, green 0.86 (0.16) 153 (12) 0.74 (0.16)
Change, red 0.60 (0.27) 148 (10) 0.76 (0.19)
Experiment B
No-change, blue 0.80 (0.25) 168 (19) 0.93 (0.29)
No-change, yellow 0.72 (0.27) 159 (16) 0.90 (0.25)
Change, blue 0.71 (0.26) 159 (14) 0.88 (0.28)
Change, yellow 0.63 (0.31) 167 (16) 0.91 (0.27)
Table 1. Means of letter report performance, saccade latency,
and saccade landing errors across participants for Experiment A
and B. Values are provided for cells formed by the two
conditions (no-change and change) and the two postsaccadic
surface features (green and red in Experiment A, and blue and
yellow in Experiment B). Standard deviations are in parenthe-
ses.
Figure 2. Letter report performance. Depicted are mean proportions of correct letter reports in the two conditions (change vs. no
change) and for both postsaccadic surface features (green and red in Experiment A, blue and yellow in Experiment B). Error-bars
indicate 61 standard error of the mean for within-subjects designs (Loftus & Masson, 1994); the dashed line indicates chance level.
(a) Experiment A. (b) Experiment B.
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There was also a signiﬁcant main effect of post-
saccadic surface features F(1, 9)¼ 12.751, p¼ 0.006, g2G¼0.227, showing that performance was higher for green
(M ¼ 0.91, SD¼ 10.10) than for red (M ¼ 0.72, SD ¼
0.22) postsaccadic objects. Postsaccadic object color,
luminance, and contrast polarity may have affected the
visibility and hence recognition of the postsaccadic
letter (as has been shown for luminance contrast by
Petersen & Andersen, 2012). The interaction between
the two factors was signiﬁcant as well, F(1, 9)¼ 9.895, p
¼ 0.012, g2G ¼ 0.028. Speciﬁcally, the difference between
performance in the no-change compared with the
change condition was smaller for the green postsacca-
dic objects (M ¼ 0.11, SD ¼ 0.14) compared with the
red ones (M ¼ 0.23, SD ¼ 0.16).
Saccade latencies and landing errors in Experiment A
Saccade latencies were assessed as each participant’s
mean interval (in ms) between the onset of the saccade
target object and detection of the saccade. Table 1
provides descriptive statistics for saccade latencies in
the two conditions in conjunction with the postsaccadic
surface features. Saccade latency was affected neither
by condition, F(1, 9)¼ 0.067, p¼ 0.801, g2G , 0.001, nor
by postsaccadic surface features, F(1, 9) ¼ 0.214, p ¼
0.655, g2G , 0.001. However, there was a disordinal
interaction between the two factors, F(1, 9)¼ 21.152, p
¼ 0.001, g2G ¼ 0.036. Note that this interaction effect
corresponds to a main effect of presaccadic surface
features if the presaccadic rather than the postsaccadic
surface features entered the ANOVA as second factor
besides condition. Saccade latencies were shorter when
presaccadic objects were green (M ¼ 148 ms; SD¼ 11
ms) rather than red (M ¼ 153 ms; SD¼ 12 ms). This
may indicate that green saccade target objects were
perceptually more salient, which implies they were
easier to detect and localize than red ones, leading to
faster saccades for the former compared with the latter.
Saccade landing errors were assessed as each
participant’s mean Euclidian distance (in 8) between
saccade landing sites and saccade target objects (i.e.,
the center coordinates of these objects). Neither
condition, F(1, 9) ¼ 0.362, p ¼ 0.562, g2G ¼ 0.003, nor
postsaccadic surface features, F(1, 9)¼ 1.399, p¼ 0.267,
g2G¼ 0.007, nor the interaction between the two factors,
F(1, 9) ¼ 2.346, p ¼ 0.160, g2G ¼ 0.015, had signiﬁcant
effects on saccade landing errors.
Letter report performance in Experiment B
As for Experiment A, letter report performance was
analyzed based on the original and the arcsine-square-
root-transformed proportions of correct reports. Only
the analyses of the original proportions are reported
because both sets of analyses delivered consistent
results.
Figure 2b depicts the mean proportion of correctly
reported letters across participants of Experiment B.
The ANOVA showed a signiﬁcant main effect of
condition, F(1, 9) ¼ 13.514, p¼ 0.005, g2G ¼ 0.031.
Thereby, performance was higher in the no-change (M
¼ 0.76; SD¼ 0.26) than in the change condition (M ¼
0.67; SD ¼ 0.28). This indicates that breaking trans-
saccadic object correspondence by changing between
the approximately equiluminant object colors impaired
recognition of the postsaccadic letter.
There was also a signiﬁcant main effect of post-
saccadic color, F(1, 9) ¼ 7.902, p ¼ 0.020, g2G ¼ 0.023,
whereby letter report performance was higher for blue
(M ¼ 0.75; SD¼ 0.25) than for yellow postsaccadic
objects (M ¼ 0.67; SD ¼ 0.29). This may suggest that
the postsaccadic color affected the visibility and
recognition of the letter. The interaction between
condition and postsaccadic color was not signiﬁcant,
F(1, 9) ¼ 0.013, p ¼ 0.912, g2G , 0.001.
Saccade latencies and landing errors in Experiment B
Saccade latency was unaffected by condition, F(1, 9)
¼ 0.079, p¼ 0.785, g2G , 0.001, and postsaccadic color,
F(1, 9)¼ 0.026, p¼ 0.876, g2G , 0.001. However, there
was an interaction between these two factors, F(1, 9)¼
45.035, p , 0.001, g2G ¼ 0.067. This interaction effect
corresponds to a main effect of presaccadic color if this
was included in the ANOVA instead of the postsacca-
dic color. Saccades were faster when presaccadic
objects were yellow (M ¼ 159 ms; SD¼ 15 ms) rather
than blue (M¼167 ms; SD¼17 ms). This effect may be
due to a higher perceptual saliency of the yellow
compared with the blue objects, which may have sped
up the detection and localization of saccade target
objects (see Experiment A).
Saccade landing errors were neither affected by
condition, F(1, 9)¼ 0.377, p¼ 0.554, g2G¼ 0.001, nor by
postsaccadic color, F(1, 9) , 0.001, p¼ 0.987, g2G ,
0.001, nor by the interaction of the two factors F(1, 9)¼
0.949, p ¼ 0.355, g2G ¼ 0.003.
General discussion
We tested the hypothesis that breaking object
correspondence across the saccade by changing surface
features impairs postsaccadic object recognition. The
results of two experiments support this hypothesis.
Experiment A revealed that transsaccadic changes
between the combined surface features color, lumi-
nance, and contrast polarity deteriorate postsaccadic
object recognition. Experiment B yielded similar
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ﬁndings for colors of approximately the same physical
luminance and the same contrast polarity. Together,
the results indicate that postsaccadic object recognition
depends on mechanisms establishing transsaccadic
object correspondence on the basis of these surface
features. Although it has been shown before that
luminance and contrast polarity contribute to trans-
saccadic object correspondence, the effects of color
with approximate equiluminance may be surprising.
That is, the presaccadic peripheral and the postsaccadic
foveal retinal images of an object provide color
information of substantially different quality (e.g.,
Hibino, 1992; Johnson, 1986; Nagy & Wolf, 1993; and
possibly perceived luminance, Livingstone & Hubel,
1987). Therefore, color might not be an ideal feature
for establishing object correspondence across the
saccade. Nevertheless, color seems to be used for this
purpose in concert with luminance and contrast
polarity, together paving the way for object recogni-
tion.
Hitherto, the dependency of postsaccadic object
recognition on transsaccadic object correspondence has
only been studied using two correspondence-breaking
manipulations: blanking and changing the contrast
polarity of achromatic objects, which coincided with
large luminance changes (Poth et al., 2015). The present
ﬁndings extend these results to chromatic objects. In
Experiment A, transsaccadic object correspondence
was broken by changing between colors with different
physical luminances and contrast polarities. Experi-
ment B replicated the results using colored objects of
about the same physical luminance. The perceived
luminance of a given color differs at different retinal
locations (and this might depend on individual
participants; Livingstone & Hubel, 1987), so that
saccades might always imply a change of an object’s
perceived luminance. Consequently, transsaccadic
changes of object color may change perceived lumi-
nance, even for physically equiluminant objects. This
means that perceived luminance could still have
contributed to the effect of Experiment B. Hence, this
effect may either be due to changes of the object’s
chromaticity and/or the associated luminance changes.
In either way, this demonstrates that the changes are
not ignored when transsaccadic object correspondence
is determined, so that they affect postsaccadic object
recognition. The present ﬁndings indicate that post-
saccadic object recognition depends on mechanisms of
transsaccadic object correspondence that use informa-
tion from surface features in general or at least from the
surface features of contrast polarity and luminance and
of color, whereby the latter might inherently include a
contribution of luminance. As such, these ﬁndings
conﬂict with the view that transsaccadic object
correspondence relies exclusively on spatiotemporal
features (Kahneman et al., 1992; with respect to effects
on postsaccadic object recognition). In sum, our
experiments demonstrated that postsaccadic object
recognition is deteriorated when transsaccadic object
correspondence is broken by changes of spatiotemporal
features (blanking) and of surface features such as
contrast polarity and luminance (Poth et al., 2015),
combined color, luminance, and contrast polarity
(Experiment A) and of color (Experiment B).
Presaccadic and postsaccadic objects are assumed to
be represented as separate entities if transsaccadic
object correspondence is broken (e.g., Tas et al., 2012;
see also Deubel et al., 1996; Schneider, 2013).
Consequently, the deteriorated object recognition can
be interpreted in at least two ways, which need not be
mutually exclusive. First, creating a separate represen-
tation for the postsaccadic object may delay or hinder
processing of this object. Recognition of this object
would then be deteriorated, especially if the object is
terminated by a mask (Poth et al., 2015). Second,
having separate representations of the presaccadic and
the postsaccadic object may introduce attentional
competition between them (Schneider, 2013). That is,
limited attentional resources are split between the two
representations. Fewer resources are available for
processing each individual object representation, which
then deteriorates object recognition (Bundesen, 1990;
Desimone & Duncan, 1995). We assessed postsaccadic
object recognition as performance in reporting a letter,
which participants viewed after the saccade in the
saccade target object. The letter should have been
processed as part of the surface of this object, so that
letter report performance reﬂects recognition of this
object (cf. Henderson & Anes, 1994; Kahneman et al.,
1992; Mitroff & Alvarez, 2007). However, it might be
possible that the letter has been processed as a separate
object. Letter report performance would then reﬂect
recognition of a newly appearing object at the spatial
location of the saccade target object rather than
recognition of this object itself. This would still be in
line with the two explanations, following the assump-
tion of competitive object recognition (e.g., Bundesen,
Habekost, & Kyllingsbæk, 2005; Desimone & Duncan,
1995). Either the creation of a representation for the
letter at this very location would be delayed or it would
suffer from greater attentional competition if trans-
saccadic object correspondence was broken and led to
two rather than one representation of the saccade
target object.
The present ﬁndings argue that the surface features
of combined color, luminance, and contrast polarity, as
well as color alone, are used by object correspondence
mechanisms, which track objects across saccade-
induced shifts of retinal images. Moreover, they argue
that these object correspondence mechanisms affect
mechanisms of object recognition. Based on TRAM
(Schneider, 2013), we suggest that this may be due to an
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interface between the two sets of mechanisms, which is
provided by visual attention (see also Poth et al., 2015).
We elaborate this hypothesis in the following.
Which mechanism tracks objects across the saccade-
induced changes of retinal images? The tracking of
object locations across saccades may be accomplished
by retinotopically organized brain areas (as, e.g.,
monkeys’ lateral intraparietal area, Duhamel, Colby, &
Goldberg, 1992; superior colliculus, Walker, Fitzgib-
bon, & Goldberg, 1995; and frontal eye ﬁelds, Umeno
& Goldberg, 1997). Shortly before a saccade, neurons
in these areas respond to stimuli at the locations where
their receptive ﬁelds (the retinal regions from which
they receive information) will be after the saccade. This
has been interpreted as a predictive remapping of the
neurons’ receptive ﬁelds to these locations (Duhamel et
al., 1992; but see Zirnsak, Steinmetz, Noudoost, Xu, &
Moore, 2014). The necessary information about the
amplitude and direction of the saccade seems to come
from a corollary discharge (efference copy) of the
motor signals eliciting the saccade (Sommer & Wurtz,
2006). When the receptive ﬁeld of a neuron is
predictively remapped, the neuron responds to a
particular object before the saccade. The following
saccade-induced shift of the neuron’s receptive ﬁeld
makes the neuron respond to the same object again
after the saccade. An additional process comparing the
presaccadic and postsaccadic activity of such neurons
might then allow one to infer the presence of an object
before and after the saccade. Therefore, such a
comparison has been hypothesized to underlie the
perception of visual stability of object locations across
saccades (Cavanaugh, Berman, Joiner, & Wurtz, 2016;
Duhamel et al., 1992; Wurtz et al., 2011). The
comparison may be part of the neuronal implementa-
tion of the test for transsaccadic object correspondence,
the test that is assumed to govern visual stability (Poth
et al., 2015; Tas et al., 2012). One problem remains,
however. The comparison provides information about
whether an object is present at a given location before
and after the saccade. It does not provide information
about the (surface) features of the object (e.g.,
Cavanagh, Hunt, Afraz, & Rolfs, 2010). Surface
features clearly contribute to visual stability (Tas, 2015;
Tas et al., 2012), which argues that the test for
transsaccadic object correspondence cannot be accom-
plished based on the described comparison alone. A
potential solution to this problem is provided by
TRAM (Schneider, 2013).
TRAM proposes a mechanism that tests for object
correspondence (object continuity) across interruptions
of visual input in between ﬁxations (as due to the
suppression of input during saccades, e.g., Krock &
Moore, 2014) and across changes of visual objects
within a ﬁxation. Critically, this test for object
correspondence allows us to take into account the
(surface) features of objects. Correspondence between
objects of successive ﬁxations should be tested on the
basis of the objects’ attentional weights (Schneider,
2013). The concept of attentional weight comes from
Bundesen’s (1990) theory of visual attention. The
attentional weight of an object indicates its current
relevance in a spatially organized fashion. It is
computed as the sum of the sensory evidences that the
object has certain features, whereby the sensory
evidence for each feature is weighted by the current
relevance of this feature. According to TRAM, the
attentional weight that an object will have after the
saccade should be predicted before the saccade is
executed. This counteracts the changes of attentional
weights due to predictable changes of sensory evidence,
for example, due to saccade-induced shifts of retinal
images of objects, which change their resolution (cf.
Herwig & Schneider, 2014). After the saccade, the
predicted attentional weight is compared with the
current attentional weight of the object. The test for
object correspondence is positive if the two agree and
negative if they disagree. Evidence that prediction
affects attentional weights has been provided recently
(Poth, Petersen, Bundesen, & Schneider, 2014). In this
study, participants increased the attentional weight of
an object that was monitored for a luminance change in
order to compensate for a low predicted (expected)
salience of this change.
Attentional weights are proposed to be implemented
in priority maps (Bundesen et al., 2005): spatially
organized (retinotopic) brain areas whose neurons seem
to code for the relevance and physical salience of
objects (Bisley & Goldberg, 2010; Fecteau & Munoz,
2006; Zelinsky & Bisley, 2015). Interestingly, the brain
areas supposed to contain priority maps are among the
ones whose neurons seem to predictively remap their
receptive ﬁelds before saccades (e.g., monkeys’ lateral
intraparietal area, Duhamel et al., 1992; superior
colliculus, Walker et al., 1995; frontal eye ﬁelds,
Umeno & Goldberg, 1997; note that some extrastriate
areas show remapping as well, Nakamura & Colby,
2002). Extending TRAM (Schneider, 2013), we there-
fore hypothesize that predictive remapping contributes
to the prediction of attentional weights.
Now that we have sketched a mechanism using
attentional weights to test for transsaccadic object
correspondence, we can ask how transsaccadic object
correspondence is linked to the object recognition
system. An answer to this question may reside in the
attentional weights as well. In fact, attentional weights
have originally been introduced to explain how relevant
objects are selected for object recognition at the
expense of irrelevant ones (Bundesen, 1990). To be
recognized, an object has to be processed with enough
processing resources, which might mean by enough
neurons (Bundesen et al., 2005; to eventually enter
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visual working memory where recognition is complete
and report possible). Attentional weights control the
allocation of processing resources to objects; each
object is assumed to receive processing resources in
proportion to its attentional weight relative to the
summed attentional weights of all objects in the visual
ﬁeld. More neurons are allocated to relevant than
irrelevant objects by virtue of a gating mechanism:
Gates in between the lower and higher cortical levels of
the ventral object recognition pathway are opened and
closed so that the receptive ﬁelds of neurons are
dynamically remapped to locations of relevant objects
(Bundesen et al., 2005; Desimone & Duncan, 1995).
Importantly, which gates are opened and which are
closed is determined by the attentional weights from
spatially organized priority maps (Bundesen et al.,
2005).
Taken together, following TRAM (Schneider, 2013;
see also Poth et al., 2015), transsaccadic object
correspondence and object recognition should be
linked by attentional weights. In this view, postsaccadic
object recognition may be impaired because of broken
transsaccadic object correspondence for (at least) two
reasons. First, a negative test for object correspondence
means that an object’s predicted attentional weight and
its actual postsaccadic attentional weight mismatch.
Therefore, after the saccade, there are two discrepant
attentional weights present. Postsaccadic object recog-
nition may be impaired because the postsaccadic object
is allocated neuronal processing resources according to
its attentional weight divided by the sum of the two
present attentional weights. In contrast, if the test for
object correspondence is positive, this means that the
object’s predicted and postsaccadic attentional weight
match. In this case, there is only one postsaccadic
attentional weight. Hence, the postsaccadic object is
allocated all available neuronal processing resources
(i.e., according to its attentional weight divided by only
itself). Compared with the situation of a negative test
for object correspondence, the object receives more
processing resources, which consequently improves
object recognition. In addition, the state of the gates in
the ventral object recognition pathway that is dictated
by the predicted postsaccadic attentional weight is then
the same as the one dictated by the actual postsaccadic
attentional weight. This may provide a basis for
transsaccadic updating processes (cf. Demeyer et al.,
2009; Henderson & Anes, 1994; and transsaccadic
integration, Ganmor, Landy, & Simoncelli, 2015;
Herwig, 2015; Wolf & Schu¨tz, 2015; but see Witten-
berg, Bremmer, & Wachtler, 2008). The lower- or mid-
level (surface) features of the postsaccadic object may
be routed to presaccadically created object representa-
tions through a consistent state of gates (cf. Poth et al.,
2015). As a consequence, representations from the
presaccadic and postsaccadic retinal images of objects
are combined within a common postsaccadic object
representation. This leads to the second reason why
breaking transsaccadic object correspondence affects
postsaccadic object recognition. We suggest that
combining presaccadic and postsaccadic representa-
tions may provide computational savings: The pro-
cessing of the object in question that started before the
saccade can be continued after the saccade. In contrast,
if object correspondence is broken and updating is
blocked, then processing of the postsaccadic object
might have to start completely anew. As a consequence,
object recognition might be delayed, leading to
performance decrements (especially when postsaccadic
objects are terminated by masks; Poth et al., 2015).
In sum, extending TRAM (Schneider, 2013), we
hypothesize that the dynamic remapping of receptive
ﬁelds in the ventral stream for object recognition (for
reviews, see Bundesen et al., 2005; Desimone &
Duncan, 1995) and the predictive remapping of
receptive ﬁelds in dorsal and frontal areas (for a
review, see Wurtz et al., 2011) is accomplished by
common attentional weights. In this vein, attentional
weights allow us to keep track of objects across
saccades, they establish correspondence between
presaccadic and postsaccadic objects, and they dis-
tribute neuronal resources across these objects for
object recognition.
Conclusion
The present study investigated whether breaking
object correspondence across the saccade by changing
the surface features of combined color, luminance, and
contrast polarity and the surface feature of color impair
postsaccadic object recognition. The ﬁndings from two
experiments indicate that this is the case. As such, they
provide new evidence for an interface between mech-
anisms of transsaccadic object correspondence relying
on surface features and mechanisms of object recogni-
tion. Based on the TRAM theory (Schneider, 2013), we
propose that this interface is provided by visual
attention.
Keywords: saccadic eye movements, visual attention,
visual stability, object recognition, transsaccadic memory
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Footnote
1 Letters and special characters were drawn ran-
domly with a unique random sequence per participant.
v2 tests indicated that the presentation frequencies of
speciﬁc letters (Experiment A: v2[57] ¼ 65.578, p ¼
0.204; Experiment B: v2[57]¼ 56.006, p¼ 0.512) and of
the combination of special characters and letters
(Experiment A: v2[237]¼ 238.86, p¼ 0.454; Experiment
B: v2[237]¼ 215.84, p ¼ 0.834) did not signiﬁcantly
depend on the cells formed by the two experimental
conditions (no-change and change) and the two
postsaccadic surface features (green and red in Exper-
iment A and blue and yellow in Experiment B).
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Abstract 27 
Human behavior is guided by visual object recognition. For being recognized, objects 28 
compete for limited attentional processing resources. The more objects compete, the lower is 29 
each objects’ processing speed. Here, we ask whether this competition is confined to eye 30 
fixations, periods of relatively stable gaze, or whether it extends from one fixation to the next, 31 
across the saccadic eye movements. Participants made saccades to a peripheral saccade target. 32 
They reported a letter that was shown after the saccade within the saccade target and for 33 
different durations (mask-terminated). Processing speed of this letter was measured by 34 
modeling report performance as a function of letter duration. Either no, two, or four additional 35 
non-target objects appeared before the saccade. In Experiment 1, presaccadic non-targets were 36 
task-irrelevant and had no effects on postsaccadic processing speed. In Experiment 2, 37 
presaccadic non-targets were task-relevant because participants matched them against a probe 38 
at trial end. Here, postsaccadic processing speed decreased with increasing number of 39 
presaccadic non-targets. These findings show that objects compete for recognition across 40 
saccades, but only if they are task-relevant. This reveals an attentional mechanism of task-41 
driven object recognition that is interlaced with active saccade-mediated vision (Schneider, 42 
2013; Poth, Herwig, & Schneider, 2015).  43 
  44 
  45 
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Attentional Competition across Saccadic Eye Movements 46 
Human goal-directed behavior heavily relies on the ability to recognize objects in the 47 
environment visually. The capacity for visual object recognition, however, is severely limited 48 
(for reviews, see Bundesen, Vangkilde, & Petersen, 2015; Duncan, 2006; Schneider, 1995). 49 
Objects in the visual field must compete for limited attentional neuronal processing resources 50 
(Desimone & Duncan, 1995). The more resources are allocated to an object, the faster it is 51 
processed (Bundesen, 1990). Visual attention biases the resource allocation so that currently 52 
important objects receive more resources than unimportant ones (Bundesen, 1990; Bundesen, 53 
Habekost, & Kyllingsbaek, 2005). This directly impacts on object recognition. Only the first 54 
few objects of a multi-object scene whose processing had been finished are encoded into a 55 
limited-capacity visual working memory (VWM, also called visual short-term memory; 56 
Bundesen, 1990; Bundesen et al., 2005, 2011). Once this has happened, the objects have been 57 
recognized and become available for report and action (Bundesen, 1990; Schneider, 2013). 58 
Importantly, the more equally relevant objects are present in the visual field, the smaller is 59 
their share of neuronal resources and the slower are they processed (Bundesen, 1990; 60 
Bundesen et al., 2005). Thus, visual object recognition increasingly suffers from attentional 61 
competition between objects as more and more objects enter the visual field (Desimone & 62 
Duncan, 1995). 63 
There is extensive evidence that objects compete for object recognition within eye 64 
fixations (e.g., Duncan, 2006; Poth, Petersen, Bundesen, & Schneider, 2014; Shibuya & 65 
Bundesen, 1988; Vangkilde, Bundesen, & Coull, 2011), which are the periods in which the 66 
eyes remain relatively stable (Findlay & Gilchrist, 2003; Land & Tatler, 2010). However, a 67 
fundamental hallmark of human vision is thereby neglected: the active sampling of the visual 68 
environment using rapid saccadic eye movements (for recent reviews, see Gegenfurtner, 69 
2016; Rolfs, 2015; Schütz, Braun, & Gegenfurtner, 2011). Visual acuity is highest only at the 70 
center of gaze, which falls on the central fovea of the eye’s retina (e.g., Cowey & Rolls, 1974; 71 
ATTENTIONAL COMPETITION ACROSS EYE MOVEMENTS 4 
 
Curcio & Allen, 1990). Therefore, humans make saccadic eye movements that move the 72 
fovea from one object to the next, so that the object is sampled in detail in the next fixation 73 
(e.g., Findlay & Gilchrist, 2003; Land & Tatler, 2010). It is unclear whether attentional 74 
competition between objects is constrained to a given eye fixation, or whether objects from 75 
one fixation can compete with and thus impair the processing of objects in the next fixation.  76 
One may hypothesize that there is no such transsaccadic attentional competition and 77 
assume that successive eye fixations are entirely distinct visual processing episodes. This 78 
visual separation hypothesis has intuitive appeal, because the retinal image is blurred and 79 
visual information uptake is suppressed during saccades, which indeed separates one fixation 80 
from the next (Krock & Moore, 2014; Wurtz, 2008). Moreover, only a limited number of 81 
objects shown before a saccade can be reported after the saccade in accordance with a spatial 82 
cue (Irwin, 1992; Irwin & Gordon, 1998). This has led to the proposal that only those objects 83 
survive the saccade that are represented in limited-capacity VWM (or a similar transsaccadic 84 
memory, respectively, for reviews, see Irwin, 1996; Mathôt & Theeuwes, 2011). The 85 
competition between objects takes place before their encoding into VWM, and must hence 86 
rely on object representations created prior to VWM encoding (Bundesen, 1990; Bundesen et 87 
al., 2005). Therefore, if only representations in VWM survive the saccade, the competing 88 
representations outside VWM should be lost across the saccade, so that there is no 89 
transsaccadic competition. 90 
What argues against the visual separation hypothesis is evidence that visual object 91 
information outside VWM partially persists across the saccade (Irwin, 1992; Irwin, Brown, & 92 
Sun, 1988). This persistence may be largely bound to the retinal locations of objects (Irwin et 93 
al., 1988) which are moved by the saccade. However, because the competition for object 94 
recognition concerns all visually available objects in the visual field (Bundesen, 1990; or at 95 
least great parts thereof, Bundesen et al., 2005; Desimone & Duncan, 1995), this persisting 96 
object information may compete with the actual objects in the next fixation. As a result, object 97 
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recognition in the next fixation should suffer per se from the object available in the previous 98 
fixation. 99 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the competition for object recognition can 100 
extend across changes and interruptions of visual input, such as those imposed by saccades, 101 
but only if the objects are relevant to the task at hand (Schneider, 2013). This task-driven 102 
competition hypothesis is directly based on Schneider’s (2013) theory of “Task-dRiven visual 103 
Attention and working Memory (TRAM)”. According to TRAM, objects from the previous 104 
fixation that are task-relevant but have not been fully processed will be encapsulated, 105 
protected against being wiped-out by the saccade, and enter the competition for object 106 
recognition in the next fixation. As a result, object recognition in this fixation should suffer 107 
from all task-relevant objects of the previous fixation (except for those for which 108 
correspondence between the fixations can be established, see also Poth, Herwig, & Schneider, 109 
2015; Poth & Schneider, 2016b). 110 
Here, we investigated the question of whether objects compete for object recognition 111 
across saccadic eye movements. In two experiments, participants made saccades to peripheral 112 
saccade target objects and then reported a letter that became visible within these objects after 113 
the saccade. The letter was presented for a number of different durations and terminated by a 114 
mask. We estimated the speed with which the letter was processed as the rate at which letter 115 
report performance increased with increasing presentation duration (Bundesen, 1990, after a 116 
minimum presentation duration has been exceeded). Importantly, visual processing speed of 117 
the postsaccadic letter should directly reflect the amount of neuronal processing resources it 118 
receives (Bundesen et al., 2005).  119 
Experiment 1 investigated whether recognition of a postsaccadic object suffers from 120 
attentional competition with presaccadic objects per se. To this end, the peripheral saccade 121 
target appeared either alone, or was flanked by two, or four irrelevant non-target objects 122 
(digits). The non-targets were extinguished as soon as participants made the saccade. Now, if 123 
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there was no attentional competition across the saccade, as per the proposed visual separation 124 
hypothesis, then the number of presaccadic non-targets should have no effect on the visual 125 
processing speed of the postsaccadic letter. In contrast, if there was attentional competition, 126 
for instance due to lingering presaccadic representations (Irwin et al., 1988; Irwin, 1992), then 127 
visual processing speed should be lower the more presaccadic non-targets are presented. To 128 
preview the results, the number of presaccadic non-targets had no effect on the visual 129 
processing speed of the postsaccadic letter, supporting the visual separation hypothesis. 130 
Experiment 2 went on to test the task-driven competition hypothesis. It investigated 131 
whether processing speed of a postsaccadic object suffers from attentional competition with 132 
presaccadic objects when these are task-relevant. The paradigm was identical to the one of 133 
Experiment 1, except that the non-targets were now task-relevant because they had to be 134 
matched against a probe at trial end. The results of Experiment 2 support the task-driven 135 
competition hypothesis: the more presaccadic non-targets had been shown, the lower was the 136 
speed of processing the postsaccadic letter. Cross-experiment analyses corroborated that this 137 
effect was indeed larger than the null effect of Experiment 1. 138 
Method 139 
Participants 140 
Nine participants performed Experiment 1. An additional participant was excluded 141 
from analysis due to letter reports at chance level (which prevented fitting the data with the 142 
model below). Participants were between 22 and 30 years old (MD = 25 years), three were 143 
male, six female, eight were right-, one was left-handed.  144 
Eight different participants performed Experiment 2. An additional participant aborted 145 
the experiment. Participants were between 20 and 31 years old (MD = 23.5 years), three were 146 
male, five female, seven were right-, one was left-handed.  147 
All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and normal color 148 
vision. They gave written informed consent before participation. The experiments followed 149 
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the ethical guidelines of the German Psychological Association (DGPs) and were approved by 150 
Bielefeld University’s ethics committee. 151 
Apparatus and Stimuli 152 
Participants performed the experiments in a semi-lit room. A head- and a chin-rest 153 
ensured that they viewed the computer screen (G90fB, ViewSonic, Brea, CA, USA) from a 154 
distance of 71 cm. The screen had a resolution of 1024 × 768 pixels at physical dimensions of 155 
36 × 27 cm, a refresh rate of 100 Hz, and was controlled by a GeForce GTX 970 graphics 156 
card (driver version 344.48, Nvidia, Santa Clara, CA, USA). A video-based tower-mounted 157 
eye tracker (Eyelink 1000, SR Research, Ottawa, Ontario, CA) recorded the behavior of 158 
participants’ right eyes at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz. Responses were collected using a 159 
standard computer keyboard (with QWERTZ layout). 160 
 The luminances and colors of stimuli were measured using an i1 Pro (X-Rite, Grand 161 
Rapids, MI, USA) and are reported as CIE Lxy-coordinates. Stimuli were shown against a 162 
gray background (screen center: L = 11.605 cd/m2, x = 0.294, y = 0.307, averaged across left 163 
and right stimulus locations: L = 10.829, x = 0.288, y = 0.303). A “+”-character (0.34° × 164 
0.34° [degrees of visual angle], L = 55.255 cd/m2, x = 0.291, y = 0.304) was used as central 165 
fixation cross. The saccade target was a red circle appearing left or right of screen center (see 166 
the procedure, L = 29.886 cd/m2, x = 0.606, y = 0.332; measurements were averaged across 167 
the two locations, as for all stimuli that appeared left and right of screen center). Non-targets 168 
were the digits from 1 to 9 (0.45° × 0.93°, L = 21.855 cd/m2, x = 0.535, y = 0.327). Letter 169 
stimuli were uppercase letters (0.39° × 0.67°) from the set [ABDEFGHJKLMNOPRSTVXZ], 170 
written in Arial font and in the background gray. For each individual participant, 30 pattern 171 
masks were algorithmically created (as described in Poth et al., 2015; Poth & Schneider, 172 
2016b) by overlaying nine black (L = 0.139 cd/m2, x = 0.252, y = 0.355) mirror-reversed and 173 
upside down letters (drawn randomly without replacement from the letter set) with horizontal 174 
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and vertical offsets. The large number of masks was intended to prevent adaptation to them. 175 
The pattern masks were placed on the red circle of the saccade target (see Figure 1). 176 
 177 
Procedure and Design  178 
Figure 1 illustrates the experimental paradigms of Experiment 1 and 2. 179 
  180 
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 181 
Figure 1. Paradigm of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. At the beginning of a trial, 182 
participants fixated a central fixation cross, which was followed by a red filled circle as 183 
saccade target. The saccade target either appeared alone, was flanked by two, or by four digit 184 
non-targets. When participants made a saccade to the peripheral target, any non-targets were 185 
extinguished, and a letter appeared postsaccadically within the saccade target. The letter was 186 
presented for different durations and terminated by a pattern mask. At the end of a trial, 187 
participants reported the letter without time limit. Only in Experiment 2, a probe digit 188 
followed participants’ letter report and they indicated whether it was shown as a non-target in 189 
the trial.  190 
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Experiment 1. Participants started each trial by pressing the space-bar. At the 191 
beginning of a trial, participants fixated the central fixation cross for a random duration 192 
between 500 and 1000 ms (that was a multiple of 10 ms). If participants moved gaze 2° from 193 
the fixation cross in this interval, the trial was aborted and repeated at a randomly chosen 194 
position in the sequence of remaining trials. The saccade target, the red circle, was then 195 
shown at 7° to the left or right of screen center until participants made a saccade to it. In the 0 196 
non-targets condition, the saccade target was shown alone. In the 2 non-targets condition, 197 
task-irrelevant digits were shown above and one below the saccade target (both 2° from the 198 
saccade target; see Figure 1). In the 4 non-targets condition, digits were shown above, below, 199 
left, and right of the saccade target (all in a distance of 2°; see Figure 1). Next, participants 200 
made a saccade to the saccade target (detected as gaze position crossing a boundary of 3° 201 
from screen center). If participants made no saccade until 400 ms after the onset of the 202 
saccade target, the trial was aborted and repeated at a randomly chosen position in the 203 
sequence of remaining trials. At the next screen refresh after saccade detection, any non-204 
targets were extinguished and a letter was shown within the saccade target. The letter was 205 
randomly chosen from the letter set. The letter was presented for 10, 20, 50, or 90 ms. To 206 
prevent an internal prolongation of letter presentation duration by early sensory (iconic) 207 
memory (e.g., Irwin & Thomas, 2008), the letter was terminated by a pattern mask lasting for 208 
300 ms (chosen randomly from the set of used masks). At the end of a trial, participants 209 
reported the letter without time limit by using the keyboard. Participants had to type in a letter 210 
to proceed, so that they had to guess if they were uncertain about the presented letter.  211 
 Participants performed 720 trials (plus repeated trials) in randomized order (30 trials × 212 
3 non-target conditions × 4 letter presentation durations × 2 locations of the saccade target).  213 
Before the experiment, participants received instructions written on the screen, reported them 214 
to the experimenter (who clarified any misunderstandings), and performed 40 training trials 215 
(randomly drawn from the trials of the main experiment). A nine-point grid calibration of the 216 
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eye tracker was performed at the beginning of the experiment, after the training trials, and 217 
after the 240th and 480th trial (irrespective of trial repetitions). 218 
Experiment 2. The procedure and design were identical to Experiment 1 except that 219 
any non-target digits flanking the saccade target were now task-relevant and had to be 220 
remembered until the end of a trial. In the 2 and 4 non-targets condition, participants’ report 221 
of the postsaccadic letter was followed by a centrally displayed probe digit. Participants then 222 
indicated whether the probe matched one of the non-targets shown on this trial (by pressing 223 
“1” if they did not match and “0” if they did match; labels stating “Ja”, German for “yes”, and 224 
“Nein”, German for “no” were placed above these keys). The probe matched a non-target on 225 
half of the trials per each cell of the design (see the design of Experiment 1). 226 
Eye movement analysis and trial exclusion criteria 227 
For all analyses, saccades were detected offline using the Eyelink 1000’s algorithm 228 
with a velocity threshold of 35° × s-1 and an acceleration threshold of 9500° × s-2. Trials were 229 
excluded from analysis, if no saccade to the saccade target was made (i.e. participants crossed 230 
the boundary for online saccade detection without meeting the offline saccade detection 231 
criteria), if saccade latency (the time from the onset of the saccade target to saccade onset 232 
detection) was below 100 ms, indicating anticipatory saccades, or if saccades missed the 233 
saccade target location by more than 2°. 234 
Statistical analysis, estimation of visual processing speed and perceptual threshold 235 
 Experimental conditions were compared using repeated measures analyses of variance 236 
(ANOVAs, with type II sums-of-squares and 𝜂𝐺
2 , as effect size, Bakeman, 2005), followed-up 237 
by post-hoc paired t-tests (two-sided and with Cohen’s dz as effect size, Cohen, 1988). If the 238 
t-test’s assumption of normally distributed differences was violated, Wilcoxon-signed rank 239 
tests were performed instead  (for which we report r as effect size and a Z-value that we call 240 
Zw as test statistic and that was computed using the coin package for R,  Hothorn, Hornik, van 241 
de Wiel, & Zeileis, 2008). 242 
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 To estimate visual processing speed and perceptual threshold, each participants’ letter 243 
report performance (the probability of reporting correctly) in each experimental condition was 244 
assessed as a function of letter presentation duration and fit with the following model that is a 245 
key ingredient of the “Theory of Visual Attention (TVA; Bundesen, 1990, see, also Bundesen 246 
& Habekost, 2008): 247 
𝑝(𝑡) = 1 −  𝑒−𝑣 (𝑡 −𝑡0) + 𝑒−𝑣(𝑡 −𝑡0) ∙ 𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒, 248 
where p(t) is the probability that the letter has been recognized at time t and pchance is the 249 
probability of reporting correctly by chance (.05 in the current experiments). t0 is the 250 
perceptual threshold, the maximum ineffective presentation duration that has to be exceeded 251 
for above-chance performance (see also Figure 2a). For times t > t0, p(t) is exponentially 252 
distributed with rate parameter v (the slope of the curve at t0, see Figure 2a), which provides 253 
the visual processing speed (recognized letters per unit time). Fitting was performed using a 254 
maximum-likelihood procedure (by means of the optim function implemented in R (R Core 255 
Team, 2016). 256 
Results 257 
 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the dependent variables of both experiments. 258 
  259 
ATTENTIONAL COMPETITION ACROSS EYE MOVEMENTS 13 
 
 260 
 261 
 262 
 263 
 264 
 265 
 266 
 267 
 268 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Experiment 1 and 2 269 
Experiment 1 
  Processing 
speed 
 Perceptual 
threshold 
 Median 
saccade 
latency 
 Mean 
landing 
error 
 Probe 
discrimination 
performance 
N non-
targets 
 M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
0  18.54 10.16  11.42 1.58  135 12  0.70 0.15  - - 
2  17.79 11.77  12.28 2.57  140 12  0.74 0.17  - - 
4  17.53 10.43  11.66 1.46  140 11  0.81 0.19  - - 
Experiment 2 
0  30.38 10.61  10.21 0.89  128 11  0.85 0.19  - - 
2  19.13 11.21  12.04 1.79  134 14  0.83 0.18  .63 .10 
4  14.79 8.23  11.22 1.32  134 14  0.89 0.20  .57 .08 
Note. Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of participants’ visual processing speed 270 
(letters/s), perceptual threshold (ms), their probe discrimination performance (proportion 271 
correct, only Experiment 2), their median saccade latency (ms), and mean saccade landing 272 
error (°) in the three non-target conditions.  273 
  274 
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Experiment 1 275 
 Excluded trials. 0.05% of the trials were excluded because no saccade was made, 276 
3.41% because saccade latency fell short of 100 ms, and 1.11% because saccades missed their 277 
target by more than 2°. 278 
 Visual processing speed and perceptual threshold. The model fit the data well, so 279 
that the correlation between predicted and observed values on average exceeded .91 (SD = 280 
.05) in all three non-target conditions. Visual processing speed did not differ significantly 281 
between the conditions, see Figure 2b, F(2, 16) = 0.523, p = .603, 𝜂𝐺
2  = .002. To assess 282 
whether it was more likely that there was no difference between the three conditions, the 283 
Bayes Factor in favor of the null hypothesis (BF01, with participant as random factor and 284 
whereby values larger 1 supporting the null hypothesis) was computed using the Bayes Factor 285 
package for R (Morey & Rouder, 2015). According to this analysis, it was more likely that the 286 
visual processing speed did not differ between the three conditions, BF01 = 3.275. Likewise, 287 
there were no significant differences between the perceptual thresholds in the three 288 
conditions, see Figure 2c, F(2, 16) = 0.733, p = .496, 𝜂𝐺
2  = .038 and also here it was more 289 
likely that such differences were absent, BF01 = 2.746. 290 
  291 
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 292 
 293 
 294 
 295 
 296 
 297 
Figure 2.aIn both experiments, letter report performance was assessed as a function of letter 298 
presentation duration and fit with an exponential model (Bundesen, 1990), yielding the 299 
perceptual threshold (x-intercept, maximum ineffective presentation duration) and processing 300 
speed (exponential rate and, equivalently, slope of the curve at the perceptual threshold). Note 301 
that the model actually used for data analysis allowed for chance performance in addition. 302 
b,cGray lines represent individual participants, black lines and circles represent sample means. 303 
bVisual processing speed (letters/s) and cthe perceptual threshold (ms) did not differ 304 
significantly between the different numbers of non-targets. Error-bars represent ± 1 standard 305 
error.  306 
ATTENTIONAL COMPETITION ACROSS EYE MOVEMENTS 16 
 
 Saccade latencies and landing errors. In each non-target condition, participants’ 307 
saccade latency was assessed as the median saccade latency across trials. Saccade latency 308 
differed significantly between the non-target conditions, F(2, 16) = 21.921, p < .001, 𝜂𝐺
2  = 309 
.046 (cf. Table 1). Specifically, saccades were initiated significantly faster in the 0 non-targets 310 
condition than in the 2 non-targets condition, t(8) = -5.498, p < .001, dz
 = -1.83 and the 4 non-311 
targets condition, t(8) = -5.393, p < .001, dz = -1.80. However, saccade latency did not differ 312 
significantly between the 2 and the 4 non-targets conditions, t(8) = -0.555, p = .594, dz = -313 
0.185. 314 
 Saccade landing error in the three non-target conditions was assessed as participants’ 315 
mean Euclidian distance (in °) between saccade landing sites and saccade target locations 316 
across trials. Saccade landing error differed significantly between non-target conditions, F(2, 317 
16) = 6.941, p = .007, 𝜂𝐺
2  = .073 (cf. Table 1). Saccades were significantly more accurate in 318 
the 0 non-targets condition compared with the 4 non-targets condition, t(8) = -3.486, p = .008, 319 
dz = -1.16. The difference in saccade landing error between the 0 and the 2 non-targets 320 
condition was not significant (but might be seen as close to for this test that was uncorrected 321 
for multiple comparisons), t(8) = -2.025, p = .078, dz = -0.67, and the same was the case for 322 
the difference between the 2 and 4 non-targets conditions, t(8) = -1.973, p = .084, dz = -0.66. 323 
Moreover, the non-target conditions did not differ significantly with respect to participants’ 324 
saccade precision (their SD of saccade landing errors across trials), F(2, 16) = 0.930, p = .415, 325 
𝜂𝐺
2  = .009. 326 
Experiment 2 327 
Excluded trials. 0.07 % of the trials were excluded from analysis because no saccade 328 
was made, 8.68 % because saccade latency was below 100 ms, and 6.22% because saccades 329 
missed the target by more than 2°. 330 
Visual processing speed and perceptual threshold. The exponential model fit 331 
participants’ data well so that the mean correlation of predicted and observed values exceeded 332 
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.94 (SD = .04) in each non-target condition. In contrast to Experiment 1, visual processing 333 
speed differed significantly between the three non-target conditions, see Figure 3a, F(2, 14) = 334 
8.750, p = .003, 𝜂𝐺
2  = .326, BF01 = 0.050 Visual processing speed was significantly higher in 335 
the 0 non-targets condition than in the 2 non-targets condition, Zw = 2.381, p = .016, r = .842, 336 
and in the 4 non-targets condition, Zw = 2.521, p = .008, r = .891. Likewise, processing speed 337 
was significantly higher in the 2 compared with the 4 non-targets condition, Zw = 2.240, p = 338 
.023, r = .792 (though the difference was only close to significance after Bonferroni 339 
correction, p = .070). 340 
  341 
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 342 
 343 
 344 
 345 
 346 
 347 
Figure 3. Gray lines represent individual participants, black lines and circles represent sample 348 
means. aVisual processing speed (letters/s) and bthe perceptual threshold differed significantly 349 
between the non-target conditions. cParticipants performed above chance level (dashed line) 350 
in probe discrimination, whereby performance was higher in the 2 than in the 4 non-targets 351 
condition. Error-bars represent ± 1 standard error. 352 
  353 
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Moreover, a mixed ANOVA (with type III sums-of-squares) with experiment as 354 
between-subjects factor showed that the differences in the effect of non-targets on visual 355 
processing speed between the experiments were significant (i.e. there was a significant 356 
interaction between experiment and condition), F(2, 30) = 7.957, p (Greenhouse-Geisser 357 
corrected) = .007, ε = 0.651, 𝜂𝐺
2  = .088.  358 
In Experiment 2, the perceptual threshold differed significantly between the three non-359 
target conditions as well, see Figure 3b, F(2, 14) = 3.762, p = .049, 𝜂𝐺
2  = 0.250, BF01 = 0.343. 360 
It was close to significantly lower in the 0 non-targets condition than in the 2 non-targets 361 
condition, Zw = -1.960, p = .055, r = -.693, but significance disappeared after Bonferroni 362 
correction (p = .164). Likewise, the perceptual threshold was also lower in the 0 compared 363 
with the 4 non-targets condition, Zw = -2.100, p = .039, r = -0.74, before but not after 364 
Bonferroni correction (p = .117). The difference between the 2 and 4 non-targets conditions 365 
was not significant, Zw = 0.980, p = .383, r = .347. It is important to note that the differences 366 
between the conditions in the perceptual threshold do not conflict with interpretation of the 367 
differences in visual processing speed. This is evident from the fact that the differences in 368 
perceptual threshold between the 0 and 2, and 0 and 4 non-targets conditions were in the 369 
opposite direction of their difference in visual processing speed (see Table 1 and Figure 3). 370 
Probe discrimination performance. One-sided one-sample t-tests showed that 371 
participants’ probe discrimination performance (proportion of correct responses) was above 372 
chance in both, the 2 and 4 non-targets conditions, see Figure 3c, both ts(7) > 2.273, both ps < 373 
.029. Moreover, probe discrimination was significantly higher in the 2 than the 4 non-targets 374 
condition,  t(7) = 2.790, p = .027, dz = 0.99. 375 
 Saccade latencies and landing errors. As in Experiment 1, saccade latency differed 376 
significantly between the non-target conditions, F(2, 14) = 13.514, p < .001, 𝜂𝐺
2  = .053. 377 
Saccades were initiated faster in the 0 non-targets condition, than in the 2 non-targets, t(7) = -378 
3.689, p = .008, dz = -1.30, and the 4 non-targets condition, t(7) = -4.168, p = .004, dz = -1.47. 379 
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The 2 and 4 non-targets conditions did not differ significantly, t(7) = -0.303, p = .770, dz = -380 
0.11. Note that the differences in saccade latency between the non-targets conditions should 381 
not conflict with the differences in visual processing speed. The differences in saccade latency 382 
were in the opposite direction of the differences in visual processing speed. This means that 383 
higher processing speed did not come at a cost of slower saccades. Conversely, note that the 384 
onset of the postsaccadic letter was contingent upon the saccade (i.e. on the time eye position 385 
crossed a boundary). Therefore, saccades that were initiated faster should not have exerted 386 
strong effects on the presentation duration of the postsaccadic letter, which against argues 387 
against a conflict of differences in saccade latency and visual processing speed. 388 
 Saccade landing errors did not differ significantly between the three conditions, F(2, 389 
14) = 0.904, p = .427, 𝜂𝐺
2  = .017, and the same was the case for saccade precision, F(2, 14) = 390 
0.364, p = .701, 𝜂𝐺
2  = .011. 391 
General Discussion 392 
We asked whether attentional competition between objects for recognition is confined 393 
to a single eye fixation or whether it extends across saccadic eye movements. More 394 
specifically, we raised the question if presaccadic and postsaccadic objects compete such that 395 
postsaccadic object recognition is slowed down as more objects are viewed before the 396 
saccade. The results of Experiment 1 argue against this hypothesis. The number of task-397 
irrelevant presaccadic objects had no effect on the speed with which a postsaccadic object was 398 
processed. As such, this finding may support the visual separation hypothesis, holding that 399 
successive fixations are distinct processing episodes without any competitive interactions 400 
between them. This hypothesis was, however, falsified by Experiment 2 which found 401 
attentional competition across the saccade when presaccadic objects were relevant to the 402 
current task. The speed of processing a postsaccadic object for its recognition here indeed 403 
decreased with increasing number of presaccadic objects. Cross-experiment analyses 404 
confirmed that this effect of transsaccadic attentional competition was indeed greater in when 405 
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presaccadic objects were task-relevant. In this way, the present results provide evidence for 406 
the task-driven competition hypothesis, which maintains that attentional competition between 407 
objects across saccades critically depends on the objects’ task-relevance (Schneider, 2013). 408 
Task-driven attentional competition across saccadic eye movements 409 
The present findings implicate the current task as a driving force of object recognition 410 
across saccadic eye movements. This is well in line with Schneider’s (2013) TRAM theory, 411 
which proposes a set of mechanisms that enable visual object recognition across saccades, as 412 
well as other changes and interruptions of visual input. TRAM is based on Bundesen’s (1990) 413 
TVA theory. TVA assumes that visual processing for object recognition relies on categorizing 414 
objects as having certain features. When a categorization of an object (e.g. that it is the letter 415 
“R”) has entered VWM, then storage space for all other categorizations of the object (e.g. that 416 
it is red) is reserved, and eventually the object will be represented in VWM with all its 417 
features. Critically, all object categorizations participate in a parallel and capacity-limited race 418 
towards VWM. Those objects whose processing finishes first are encoded into VWM until the 419 
number of objects that can maximally be retained in VWM is reached. The speed with which 420 
an object categorization is processed is proportional to the share of all available neuronal 421 
processing resources that is allocated to the object (Bundesen et al., 2005). Processing 422 
resources are allocated to objects according to the objects’ attentional weights, which indicate 423 
the objects’ current importance. More specifically, attentional weights code for the products 424 
of the sensory evidence that the object has a feature and the task-relevance of this feature, 425 
summed across all possible features. Because processing resources are limited, they are 426 
allocated to objects in a normalized fashion, according to a given object’s attentional weight 427 
relative to the sum of attentional weights of all objects in the visual field. Thus, the higher the 428 
relative attentional weight of an object, the more resources it receives and the faster its 429 
categorizations race toward VWM. As a result, the higher are the object’s chances of entering 430 
VWM. Thus, attentional competition between objects for recognition finds expression in a 431 
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lower speed of processing object categorizations as more and more objects enter the visual 432 
field. 433 
TRAM extends TVA to the situation of visual processing across saccadic eye 434 
movements. TRAM assumes that after encoding into VWM, objects are consolidated into a 435 
passive VWM, which retains the objects for cognitive processing and action control for more 436 
extended periods (e.g., across action steps, and without the capacity constraints of classical 437 
VWM). The consolidation into passive VWM consumes the neuronal processing resources 438 
that also accomplish encoding of the objects into VWM. If a saccade is made while 439 
consolidation has not yet finished, then the attentional weights of these objects are 440 
encapsulated, so that the associated neuronal resources cannot be redistributed to process new 441 
objects. Therefore, fewer resources are available in the next fixation, which slows down 442 
visual processing. One assumption of TRAM is most important for the current findings: For 443 
the attentional weight of an object to be encapsulated, the object must be task-relevant. This 444 
explains why postsaccadic object recognition was unaffected by irrelevant presaccadic objects 445 
in Experiment 1 but slowed down by the task-relevant ones in Experiment 2. The irrelevant 446 
presaccadic non-targets might have been encoded into VWM in Experiment 1 (cf. Bundesen, 447 
1990), as there should have been enough space for at least some of them (this is supported by 448 
the above-chance probe discrimination in Experiment 2, which should require prior encoding 449 
of the to-be-discriminated non-targets into VWM, Poth & Schneider, 2016a). However, 450 
because the objects were irrelevant to the task, their attentional weights and associated 451 
processing resources should not have been encapsulated when the saccade was made. Instead, 452 
their attentional weights should have been cleared, freeing neuronal resources for unimpaired 453 
processing in the next fixation. In contrast, in Experiment 2 the attentional weights of the 454 
presaccadic objects should have been encapsulated because the objects were task-relevant and 455 
because the time before the saccade did not suffice to complete consolidation into passive 456 
VWM (see, e.g., Carbone & Schneider, 2010). This should have cut the resources available 457 
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for processing the postsaccadic object and lead to the observed decrement in visual processing 458 
speed for this object. 459 
Object correspondence could prevent ubiquitous attentional competition 460 
The current experiments investigated the effects of presaccadic objects that were 461 
extinguished across the saccade on the speed with which a postsaccadic object was processed. 462 
However, one may ask how postsaccadic processing is affected if objects remain present 463 
across the saccade. Would there be attentional competition between the presaccadic and the 464 
postsaccadic instance of the same object? This would mean that every saccade imposed costs 465 
on visual processing, which would impair object recognition in most situations of human life.  466 
TRAM (Schneider, 2013) proposes a solution to this problem. After every saccade, the 467 
visual system tests whether a currently viewed object corresponds to one viewed before the 468 
saccade. If this test for object correspondence is positive, the postsaccadic object is processed 469 
using the same attentional weight as the presaccadic one and the features of the postsaccadic 470 
object update the representation of the presaccadic object which is now in VWM. In contrast, 471 
if the test for transsaccadic object correspondence is negative, then the presaccadic attentional 472 
weight of the object in VWM is encapsulated and a new representation is created for the 473 
postsaccadic object. As a consequence, processing of the postsaccadic object is impaired 474 
because the encapsulated attentional weight leaves fewer processing resources available. 475 
Consistent with this hypothesis, breaking object correspondence by blanking the postsaccadic 476 
object briefly, or by changing an object’s contrast-polarity (Poth et al., 2015) or color (Poth 477 
& Schneider, 2016b) across the saccade deteriorates postsaccadic object recognition. Thus, 478 
taken together, an ubiquitous attentional competition between objects across every saccade 479 
may be prevented by an additional mechanism that establishes transsaccadic object 480 
correspondence (Schneider, 2013). 481 
 482 
 483 
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Conclusion 484 
It has long been clear that within an eye fixation, objects compete for limited neuronal 485 
processing resources that are necessary for object recognition (Bundesen, 1990; Desimone 486 
& Duncan, 1995; Duncan & Humphreys, 1989). Our findings reveal that such a competition 487 
for object recognition also takes place across the saccade, but only if the objects are relevant 488 
to the current task. Within eye fixations, processing resources are allocated to objects 489 
according to their current task-relevance, supporting recognition of the most important ones 490 
(e.g., Bundesen, 1990). Across saccades, resources remain allocated to objects but, again, 491 
only if the objects are currently important. If they are not important, resources are freed so 492 
that new objects can be processed faster in the next fixation (Schneider, 2013). Taken 493 
together, we conclude that there must be mechanisms for task-driven object recognition that 494 
are not restricted to eye fixations but intertwined with active saccade-mediated vision. 495 
 496 
 497 
498 
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Christian H. Poth* and Werner X. Schneider
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Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany
Human vision is organized in discrete processing episodes (e.g., eye fixations or task-
steps). Object information must be transmitted across episodes to enable episodic
short-term recognition: recognizing whether a current object has been seen in a previous
episode. We ask whether episodic short-term recognition presupposes that objects
have been encoded into capacity-limited visual working memory (VWM), which retains
visual information for report. Alternatively, it could rely on the activation of visual features
or categories that occurs before encoding into VWM. We assessed the dependence
of episodic short-term recognition on VWM by a new paradigm combining letter report
and probe recognition. Participants viewed displays of 10 letters and reported as many
as possible after a retention interval (whole report). Next, participants viewed a probe
letter and indicated whether it had been one of the 10 letters (probe recognition). In
Experiment 1, probe recognition was more accurate for letters that had been encoded
into VWM (reported letters) compared with non-encoded letters (non-reported letters).
Interestingly, those letters that participants reported in their whole report had been near
to one another within the letter displays. This suggests that the encoding into VWM
proceeded in a spatially clustered manner. In Experiment 2, participants reported only
one of 10 letters (partial report) and probes either referred to this letter, to letters that
had been near to it, or far from it. Probe recognition was more accurate for near than
for far letters, although none of these letters had to be reported. These findings indicate
that episodic short-term recognition is constrained to a small number of simultaneously
presented objects that have been encoded into VWM.
Keywords: visual working memory, visual attention, episodic memory, object recognition, short-term memory
INTRODUCTION
Visual information processing is organized in discrete episodes. This is most evident from the fact
that the uptake of visual information is largely limited to eye fixations, discrete periods of stable
eye position that are interrupted by fast saccadic eye movements (e.g., Krock and Moore, 2015).
However, on a greater time scale, processing episodes can also be defined by steps of sensorimotor
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actions, other task-demands, and changes in the visual
environment (Petersen et al., 2012; Duncan, 2013; Schneider,
2013; Herwig, 2015; Poth et al., 2015; Poth and Schneider,
2016). To remain oriented in time and space and to act guided
by vision, visual information from consecutive processing
episodes must be linked. This is particularly evident from tasks
requiring to recognize that objects (or subjects) have been viewed
recently (e.g., Sternberg, 1966; Wickelgren, 1970; Kahana and
Sekuler, 2002; Zhou et al., 2004; Donkin and Nosofsky, 2012).
For example, imagine you are standing at a busy inner-city
intersection and someone shows you a picture of a dog that
just went missing and asks if you have seen it. To answer this
question, you must be able to recognize if the dog appeared in
one of the many recent processing episodes that consisted of
your eye fixations, steps of your actions, and periods of cars
passing by. Such tasks require episodic short-term recognition:
the cognitive function of recognizing whether a now-present
object has been contained in a recently passed visual processing
episode1 (cf. Kahana and Sekuler, 2002; Zhou et al., 2004; Donkin
and Nosofsky, 2012).
How is episodic short-term recognition accomplished? What
are its underlying mechanisms? First of all, to recognize that an
object has been present before, the object must be represented
internally. Several views on visual processing posit that initially,
objects are represented by activating their corresponding feature
or category representations in visual long-term memory (Cowan,
1988; Bundesen, 1990; Henderson, 1994; Henderson and Anes,
1994; Eriksson et al., 2015; cf. Oberauer, 2002; LaRocque
et al., 2014; for a more general overview, see Palmeri and
Tarr, 2008). These representations code for visual features and
categories of objects that have been acquired through past visual
experience and are often called visual types (e.g., Kanwisher,
1987; Kahneman et al., 1992; although other terms are in use
as well, e.g., Duncan and Humphreys, 1989; Bundesen, 1990).
Visual types represent objects in a multidimensional feature and
category space and they may also represent exemplars of certain
objects (cf. Kahana and Sekuler, 2002; Nosofsky et al., 2011;
Donkin and Nosofsky, 2012).
Critically, activating an object’s visual type (feature, category)
is only considered an initial step of processing (Duncan and
Humphreys, 1989; Bundesen, 1990; Bundesen et al., 2005;
Kyllingsbæk, 2014). This activation does neither suffice to act
upon the object nor to consciously perceive the object in the
sense that it can be reported. Importantly, the activation is “pre-
attentive” in the sense of being unselective: it proceeds likewise for
all objects in the visual field (or parts of the visual field, depending
on pre-existing spatial biases, Bundesen and Habekost, 2008,
p. 117, and retinal inhomogeneity, Strasburger et al., 2011).
That is, it proceeds before mechanisms of visual attention select
task-relevant objects for further processing at the expense of task-
irrelevant ones (e.g., Duncan and Humphreys, 1989; Bundesen,
1Note that the term episodic short-term recognition refers to the described
cognitive function (in the sense of a cognitive task-requirement). In this way,
the concept of episodic short-term recognition does not include any assumptions
about the cognitive mechanisms enabling to fulfill this function (such as for
example, interacting mechanisms of episodic long-term memory or working
memory).
1990; Bundesen et al., 2005; Duncan, 2006; Poth et al., 2014). For
action and report, objects must be attended, processed further,
and eventually encoded into visual working memory (VWM;
Duncan and Humphreys, 1989; Bundesen, 1990; Cowan, 2001;
Bundesen et al., 2005; Schneider, 2013; note that we use VWM
synonymously to the also common term of visual short-term
memory).
Visual working memory consists of a mechanism for retaining
visual object representations accessible over short time-windows
(for reviews, see Luck, 2008; Bundesen et al., 2011; Luck and
Vogel, 2013; LaRocque et al., 2014; Ma et al., 2014). In this way,
VWM may provide an essential basis for further processing these
representations, as recoding them into other representational
formats (e.g., the verbal format) so that they can be retained
and used by non-visual mechanisms of working memory (e.g.,
Logie, 2011). The capacity of VWM is limited so that it can only
hold about three to four objects (e.g., Sperling, 1960; Shibuya
and Bundesen, 1988; Luck and Vogel, 1997; Dyrholm et al.,
2011; Poth et al., 2014; note that capacity is also limited in
the number of object features, Wheeler and Treisman, 2002;
Oberauer and Eichenberger, 2013, and the precision of object
features, Wilken and Ma, 2004; Bays and Husain, 2008). Which
of all available objects are encoded into VWM depends on
selection by visual attention (e.g., Duncan and Humphreys, 1989;
Bundesen, 1990; Bundesen et al., 2005; Duncan, 2006; Poth et al.,
2014). Because of the limited capacity of VWM, all visually
available objects may initially and (pre-attentively) activate visual
types in visual long-term memory, but only a limited number
of objects is (attentively) processed up to the level of VWM
(Duncan and Humphreys, 1989; Bundesen, 1990; Bundesen et al.,
2005). Encoding objects into VWM is a core requirement of
visually controlled behavior, because objects can only be reported
and used for action when they are represented in VWM (Duncan
and Humphreys, 1989; Bundesen, 1990; Bundesen et al., 2005).
This paper focuses on the open question of whether encoding into
VWM is also necessary for episodic short-term recognition.
Episodic short-term recognition requires comparisons of
object representations of a recently preceding processing episode
with representations of objects of the current episode. This can
be conceptualized as a decision process (e.g., Pearson et al.,
2014) which is driven by the degree of similarity between
these two kinds of representations (e.g., Ratcliff, 1978; Donkin
and Nosofsky, 2012; cf. Kahana and Sekuler, 2002). Two rival
hypotheses can be advanced regarding the role of VWM in
this comparison process (based on the literature covered above).
According to the VWM-encoding hypothesis, episodic short-
term recognition of an object from a previous episode requires
that the object has been encoded into VWM. Consequently,
objects that have not been processed up to the level of VWM
cannot be used for episodic short-term recognition. Alternatively,
the type-activation hypothesis states that episodic short-term
recognition is also possible for objects which have not been
encoded into VWM but whose mere presentation has activated
their visual types in visual long-term memory. This means that
episodic short-term recognition is possible for all external objects
that have been visually available within recent eye fixations. In
such a case, activations of visual types could extend into the
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next processing episode. These remaining activations could be
matched against activations elicited by objects of this episode.
A resulting signal could then allow the comparison of object
representations from the previous episode and from the actual
environment underlying episodic short-term recognition (e.g.,
Ratcliff, 1978; Donkin and Nosofsky, 2012). Such a mechanism
could be similar to mechanisms assumed to produce attention-
independent priming effects, where the presentation of objects
facilitates their subsequent object recognition (e.g., Kahneman
et al., 1992; Henderson, 1994; Henderson and Anes, 1994; Jensen
and Lisman, 1998) or affects motor responses to other stimuli
(even if the objects are not discriminable, Klotz and Neumann,
1999, and hence not in VWM, Bundesen, 1990).
Here, we aimed at deciding between the two hypotheses.
In two experiments, we asked whether episodic short-term
recognition of an object requires that this object has previously
been encoded into capacity-limited VWM. To approach this
question, we introduced a new paradigm combining letter report
with probe recognition.
EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1, participants performed a whole report task
(e.g., Sperling, 1960; Shibuya and Bundesen, 1988) which was
combined with a probe recognition task. They briefly viewed
displays of to-be-memorized letters (memory letters) and then,
after a retention interval, reported as many letters as they could.
The retention interval outlasted early sensory memory (e.g.,
Sperling, 1960; Phillips, 1974; Irwin and Thomas, 2008) so that
letter reports should have required retention in VWM (followed
by a recoding into a verbal format on which the actual report
was based, e.g., Logie, 2011; Baddeley, 2012). Memory letters
were always 10 different ones, exceeding VWM capacity and
thus ensuring participants could never report all letters (Sperling,
1960; Shibuya and Bundesen, 1988). After reporting the letters, a
single probe letter appeared within the same trial and participants
indicated whether or not the probe had been shown as one of the
previous memory letters. Importantly, the probe was either one
of the memory letters and reported (reported condition), or one
of the memory letters but not reported (non-reported condition),
or it was a letter not contained in the set of memory letters (not
shown condition).
Here, episodic short-term recognition was assessed as
performance in probe recognition, that is, in indicating whether
or not the probe letter had been shown as one of the memory
letters. Which memory letters were encoded into VWM was
assessed by preceding letter reports. Since VWM is defined by the
accessibility of its content (e.g., Bundesen, 1990; Bundesen et al.,
2005; Schneider, 2013; but see, Soto et al., 2011), reported letters
must have been in VWM by definition. Following a number of
theories (e.g., Bundesen, 1990; Bundesen et al., 2005; Martens
and Wyble, 2010; Schneider, 2013), we assume that letters which
were not reported did not enter VWM. Consequently, the
VWM-encoding hypothesis predicts higher probe recognition
performance in the reported than in the non-reported and not
shown conditions. In contrast, no such performance differences
are expected based on the type-activation hypothesis. According
to this hypothesis, performance should be equal in the reported
and non-reported conditions. More specifically, episodic short-
term recognition should be possible for all presented memory
letters, irrespective of their encoding into VWM. That is because
all presented memory letters should have activated their visual
types in visual long-term memory as part of the initial processing
of the letters (e.g., Duncan and Humphreys, 1989; Bundesen,
1990; Bundesen et al., 2005; Kyllingsbæk, 2014; see above).
Besides testing these hypotheses, Experiment 1 explored whether
memory letters in the whole report task were encoded in a
spatially clustered manner. That is, whether letters in close
spatial proximity were encoded with preference over letters
that were farther apart. Such a spatial clustering may reveal
attentional selection strategies and this will become important in
Experiment 2.
Method
Participants
Fourteen participants were paid to take part in the experiment.
They were between 18 and 30 years old (Mdn = 20 years),
nine were male, five female, 13 were right-handed and
one left-handed, and all reported normal or corrected-to-
normal visual acuity and color vision. All participants gave
written informed consent before performing the experiments
that were conducted according with the ethical standards of
the German Psychological Association (Deutsche Gesellschaft
für Psychologie, DGPs), and were approved by Bielefeld
University’s ethics committee. One additional participant was
excluded from data analysis because of an experimentation
error.
Apparatus and Stimuli
The experiment took place in a dimly lit room. Stimuli were
presented on a 19′′ CRT-screen (Trinitron MultiScan G420,
Sony, Park Ridge, NJ, using a graphics card of type Quadro
NVS 290, NVIDIA, Santa Clara, CA, USA) with a refresh
rate of 85 Hz and a resolution of 1280 × 1024 pixels at
physical dimensions of 36 cm × 27 cm. The participant’s head
was stabilized by a chin rest positioned 71.8 cm from the
screen. Responses were collected using a standard computer
keyboard with German layout. Labels indicating “yes” (by the
German word “Ja”) and “no” (by the German word “Nein”)
were placed above the F1 and F9 keys of the keyboard.
The experiment was controlled by the Psychophysics Toolbox
3.0.12 extension (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997; Kleiner et al.,
2007) for MATLAB R2013b (The MathWorks, Natick, MA,
USA).
A MAVOLUX-digital luminance meter (Gossen, Nuremberg,
Germany) was used to measure stimulus luminance. Black letter
stimuli (0.32◦ of visual angle × 0.48◦; < 1 cd × m−2) from
the set [ABDEFGHJKLMNOPRSTVXZ] (this set of letters was
chosen to avoid highly confusable letters, as e.g., by Poth et al.,
2015) were located equally spaced on an imaginary circle with a
radius of 2◦ around screen center. Fixation cross (0.32◦ × 0.32◦)
and response screen text were white (108 cd × m−2). The
response screen showed the German text “Buchstaben?”, which
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means “Letters?” in English. Stimuli were shown against a gray
background (21 cd×m−2).
Procedure and Design
Before the experiment, participants read instructions on the
screen and reported them to the experimenter in their own
words. The experimenter repeated the instructions again, if
participants had reported them incorrectly. Figure 1 illustrates
the experimental paradigm. Participants initiated each trial by
pressing the space-bar. In the beginning of a trial, a fixation
cross was shown for 400 ms. Next, 10 memory letters were
presented for 200 ms. The letters were randomly drawn without
replacement from the set of used letters. The memory letters
were followed by a blank interstimulus interval (ISI) lasting
for 1000 ms (this duration ensures that early sensory (iconic)
memory representations of the letters have been decayed, e.g.,
Sperling, 1960; Phillips, 1974; Irwin and Thomas, 2008), after
which a response screen prompted participants to enter letters.
Participants should report as many from the preceding memory
letters as they could (without being required to report as many
as 10 letters). A maximum of 10 letters could be entered
(but this never happened). After confirming that they had
finished reporting letters by pressing the enter-key, another ISI
of 94 ms followed. Then a single probe letter was presented.
Participants indicated whether or not this probe was one of
the preceding memory letters by pressing the F1 or F9 key,
respectively.
The probe was manipulated in three conditions of a within-
subjects design. In the reported condition, the probe was
randomly chosen from the letters which were shown and reported
by the participant on this trial. In the non-reported condition, the
probe was one of the letters that were shown on this trial but that
the participant did not report. In both of these two conditions,
probes appeared at their locations in the display of the memory
letters. In the not shown condition, the probe was randomly
chosen from the set of all letters excluding the memory letters
of the trial (irrespective of whether participants had entered
these letters). In this condition, the probe appeared at a random
location.
Participants performed three blocks of 100 trials, each
comprising 25 trials of the reported, 25 trials of the non-reported,
and 50 trials of the not shown condition. Twice as many trials of
the not shown as of the other two conditions were included to
equate the number of trials in which a previously shown (correct
answer “yes”) or a not shown letter (correct answer “no”) was
probed. Within each block, trials of the three conditions were
administered in random order. Participants performed twelve
training trials prior to the experiment.
Results and Discussion
A significance criterion of p < 0.05 was used for all statistical
analyses. Performance in the three conditions was compared
using one-way repeated-measures analyses of variance with type
II sums-of-squares for which η2G (Bakeman, 2005) is reported
as effect size. Where the assumption of sphericity was violated,
p-values are based on Greenhouse–Geisser-corrected degrees
of freedom and the correction factor ε is reported alongside
the uncorrected degrees of freedom. Paired t-tests (two-tailed)
with Bonferroni-corrected p-values (pB) were used for pairwise
comparisons for which dz (Cohen, 1988) is reported as effect
size. These t-tests were supplemented with corresponding Bayes
factors (BF; Rouder et al., 2009), of which values greater one
favor the null hypothesis and values smaller one favor the
alternative hypothesis. All analyses were performed using R
(3.0.3; R Development Core Team, 2016).
A total of 3.3% of all trials were discarded before analysis
because either, (1) none of the memory letters was reported
(0.57%), or (2) duplicate letters were contained in the letter report
(2.76%).
Letter Report Performance
Letter report performance was assessed as participants’ mean
number of correctly reported letters, that is, for each
individual participant the mean number of typed-in
letters matching one of the memory letters across trials.
There were no significant differences regarding letter report
performance in the three conditions, F(2,26) = 2.231, p = 0.128,
η2G = 0.002. In addition, mean letter report performance was
in the range of three to four letters in all three conditions
(reported: M = 3.62, SD = 0.59, min = 2.41, max = 4.60;
non-reported: M = 3.56, SD= 0.61, min= 2.35, max= 4.41; not
shown: M = 3.56, SD= 0.59, min= 2.44, max= 4.5), consistent
with previous estimates of VWM capacity in letter report tasks
(Sperling, 1960; Shibuya and Bundesen, 1988).
Spatial Clustering of Reported Letters
Whether letters were encoded into VWM in a spatially clustered
manner was assessed as follows. For each trial, the extent to which
reported letters were spatially clustered within the original display
of memory letters (i.e., their spatial proximity in this display) was
quantified. The data was collapsed across conditions, since trials
in the three conditions did not differ until after letters had been
reported. Each correctly reported letter was selected for one step
of the analysis. For this selected letter, it was determined whether
or not the memory letters at the 10 positions relative to it were
correctly reported (Figure 2A). This must be always the case for
relative position zero, as this is the position of the selected letter
itself. The procedure resulted in a matrix with the dimensions
number of reported letters (rows)× 10 letter positions (columns)
and with entries coding for whether or not a given letter has been
reported. Now, spatial clustering of letter reports was assessed as
the proportions of reported letters for each letter position (i.e.,
for each column) across all reported letters (i.e., across all rows).
If participants reported letters in a spatially random manner,
then these proportions should be equal with the exception of
a proportion of 1 for the selected letters (see Figure 2B for a
computer simulation). In contrast, spatial clustering in encoding
letters would become manifest in higher proportions for letters at
positions more proximal compared with positions more distant
to the selected letter (Figure 2C for a computer simulation). Note
that these analyses require that the number of presented letters
clearly exceeds participants’ VWM capacity because otherwise
there would be no clear differences between proportions. This
condition is assumed to be met because participants reported
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental paradigm of Experiment 1. On each trial, participants fixated a fixation cross after which 10 memory letters were shown. After an
interstimulus interval (ISI), a response screen appeared (showing the text “Buchstaben?” instead of the here stated translation “Letters?”) and lasted until participants
indicated that they finished reporting as many memory letters as they could (whole report task). After another ISI a single probe letter was presented. Participants
then indicated whether or not the probe was one of the memory letters (probe recognition task). Probes have been either both, contained in the set of memory
letters and reported (reported condition), or contained but not reported (non-reported condition), or they have not been contained (not shown condition).
between three and four of the 10 presented letters (see the letter
report performance above).
As can be seen in Figure 2D, the mean proportions of
reported letters monotonically decreased with increasing distance
to selected letters and this pattern was present in all participants.
Page’s trend test was used to test whether monotonic decreases
from closer to more distant positions were statistically significant.
To this end, Page’s trend test was applied to the participants’
proportions at relative positions −1 to −4 and, separately, at
relative positions 1 to 5 (Figure 2A). Results revealed monotonic
decreases for both of these subsets of the data, locations −1 to
−4: L = 420, p < 0.001, locations 1 to 5: L = 768, p < 0.001 (and
these monotonic decreases were present in all of the three blocks
of trials, all Ls >= 420, all ps < 0.001).
Selective encoding of letters into VWM was not spatially
random. Instead, all participants encoded subsets of the memory
letters into VWM that were in close spatial proximity in the
letter display. This spatial clustering may reflect an attentional
encoding strategy. Participants learned over trials that always
more memory letters were shown than they could report. Thus,
participants learned they had to select subsets of the memory
letters for report. Spatial clustering may be a means to accomplish
such a selection from equally task-relevant objects by restricting
encoding to objects in close spatial proximity. In this way, spatial
clustering may reflect the distribution of spatial attention (e.g.,
Posner, 1980; Bundesen, 1990), which in this specific case selects
objects at or close to a strategically and internally specified
location.
Probe Recognition Performance
Probe recognition performance was assessed as the proportion of
trials on which probe letters were correctly recognized as having
been shown or not shown on the trial. Figure 3 depicts the
participants’ probe recognition performance, both at the sample
and individual level. Probe recognition performance differed
significantly between the three conditions, F(2,26) = 44.912,
ε= 0.522, p< 0.001, η2G = 0.771. Probe recognition performance
was significantly higher in the reported (M = 0.96, SD = 0.03)
compared with the non-reported (M = 0.29, SD = 0.19),
t(13) = 12.774, pB < 0.001, dz = 3.41, BF = 8.8 × 10−7,
and the not shown condition (M = 0.74, SD = 0.20),
t(13) = 4.170, pB = 0.003, dz = 1.11, BF = 0.028. Moreover,
performance was significantly lower in the non-reported than
in the not shown condition, t(13) = −4.498, pB = 0.002,
dz = −1.20, BF = 0.016. One-sample t-tests (two-sided)
revealed that performance was significantly below the chance
level of 0.5 in the non-reported condition, t(13) = −4.243,
p < 0.001, BF = 0.025, whereas it was significantly above
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FIGURE 2 | (A) For each correctly reported letter, it was determined whether letters at the 10 relative positions in the display of memory letters were reported as well.
Averaged across all correctly reported letters, this resulted in a proportion of correctly reported letters for each relative position. (B) Simulation of 1000 trials in each
of which three letters were randomly sampled from the display of memory letters. Proportions of correctly reported letters are shown as a function of position relative
to a selected correctly reported letter (averaged across trials). Proportions are approximately equal for all relative positions except for the position of the selected
letter (which must always equal one). (C) Simulation of 1000 trials in each of which three letters were sampled that where next to each other in the display of memory
letters. Proportions monotonically decrease from relative positions closer to selected letters to relative positions farther away from them. (D) For each individual
participant, observed proportions of correctly reported letters as a function of position relative to a selected reported letter (across all correctly reported letters and
averaged over all trials).
chance in the not shown condition, t(13) = 4.589, p < 0.001,
BF = 0.014.
Whether probe recognition depended on how many letters
participants entered for the whole report (irrespective of
whether letters were correct) was assessed as the point-biserial
correlation between the number of entered letters and probe
recognition performance, separately for each participant and
each condition. Values of three participants in the reported
condition had to be excluded from this analysis because probe
recognition was correct in all trials so that no correlation
could be computed. One-sample t-tests (two-sided) indicated
that the correlations of the 11 remaining participants did not
significantly depart from zero in any of the three conditions, all
|ts| (10) < 1.713, all ps > 0.110, all BFs > 1.149.
Probe recognition performance was close to ceiling in the
reported condition but it was substantially lower in the non-
reported and not shown conditions. These findings clearly
argue against the type-activation hypothesis which predicts
equal performance for all presented memory letters and
hence equal performance in the reported and non-reported
condition. Instead, the findings seem to support the VWM-
encoding hypothesis which predicts higher performance in the
reported condition, in which probe letters were encoded into
VWM. However, before arriving at these conclusions, several
issues should be considered. According to the VWM-encoding
hypothesis, performance should have been at chance level in
the non-reported condition but it was below chance level. This
may indicate that participants based their probe responses not
only on the letters they remembered having viewed on this
trial. Rather, they may have partly based their responses on
the letters they remembered having reported on this trial. This
would have biased them away from responding those probes
had been contained in the memory letters when they had not
reported the letters of these probes. This bias might also have
contributed to the above-chance performance in the not shown
condition. Besides biasing responses, reporting the letters itself
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 September 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1440
fpsyg-07-01440 September 19, 2016 Time: 12:24 # 7
Poth and Schneider Recognition and Visual Working Memory
FIGURE 3 | Mean probe recognition performance (proportions of correct responses to probe letters) in Experiment 1 across all participants (bars,
left) and for individual participants (colored points, right) in the three conditions. Error-bars indicate ±1 SE for within-subjects designs (Loftus and Masson,
1994). Chance level is indicated by the dashed line.
might also have improved their subsequent episodic short-
term recognition compared to non-reported letters. Similarly,
reporting memory letters might have interfered with retaining
non-reported letters. In addition, reporting the letters may have
prolonged the interval that the non-reported letters had to be
retained. In all of these cases, letters that were inaccessible for
report might have been available for later episodic short-term
recognition if intervening report requirements were controlled
for. Therefore, the aim of Experiment 2 was to control for
all effects reporting letters might have on probe recognition
performance.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 was designed to investigate episodic short-term
recognition performance for letters that were more likely to be
encoded into VWM compared with letters whose encoding was
less likely. To manipulate the likelihood of encoding specific
letters into VWM, we made use of the spatial clustering of VWM
encoding found in Experiment 1. Participants briefly viewed a
display of 10 letters in which a colored frame identified one letter
as report-target and frames in a different color identified the nine
other letters as non-targets regarding report. Participants’ task
was to report the single report-target after a retention interval.
After reporting, a single probe letter was shown and participants
were to indicate whether or not it had been presented as one of
the preceding letters (Figure 4). There were three conditions. In
the report-target condition, the probe tested recognition of the
report-target. In the near non-target condition, the probe tested
recognition of a letter that has been located directly beside the
report-target. In the far non-target condition, the probe tested
recognition of a letter that has been located far away from the
report-target, on the other side of the letter display.
The report-target has to be encoded into VWM, in order to
be accessible for being reported (e.g., Bundesen, 1990; Bundesen
et al., 2005; Schneider, 2013). Because of the spatial clustering of
letter reports in Experiment 1, we assumed that while participants
aimed at encoding the report-target, they were more likely to
encode near non-targets selectively compared with far non-
targets. This is compatible with the view that spatial attention
was primarily directed at the report-target (e.g., Kim and Cave,
1995; Gaspelin et al., 2015), but was secondarily directed more
at near non-targets than at far non-targets or was secondarily
directed at near non-targets only. According to the VWM-
encoding hypothesis, probe recognition performance should be
highest for report-targets, followed by near non-targets, and
lowest for far non-targets because of their lowest likelihood of
being encoded into VWM. In contrast, according to the type-
activation hypothesis probe recognition performance should
be equal for all presented letters and thus equal in all three
conditions. Importantly, the near and far non-targets were not
subject to report requirements.
Method
Participants
Ten paid participants took part in Experiment 2. They were
between 22 and 30 years old (Mdn= 25). Four of them were male,
six female, nine were right, and one left-handed. All participants
reported normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and color
vision. They gave written informed consent before performing
the experiments that were conducted according to the ethical
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FIGURE 4 | Experimental paradigm of Experiment 2. In the beginning of each trial, a fixation cross was shown, after which a display of letters appeared. Each
letter was located inside a red or green square. One square differed in its color from the others indicating the report-target, which was to be reported when a
response screen appeared after an ISI. Letters in squares of the other color were not to be reported (non-targets). After another ISI, a single probe letter was shown.
Then, participants indicated whether or not this probe has been shown as part of the letter display in this trial. The probe either (1) tested the report-target (i.e., was
shown at its position and either matched it or had not been presented on this trial; report-target condition), (2) or it tested one of the letters flanking the report-target
(near non-target condition), or (3) it tested one of the two letters opposite to the letters flanking the report-target (far non-target condition).
standards of the German Psychological Association (DGPs), and
were approved by Bielefeld University’s ethics committee.
Apparatus and Stimuli
The apparatus and experimental setup of Experiment 2 were the
same as those of Experiment 1. The stimuli of Experiment 2 were
identical to those of Experiment 1 with the following exceptions.
All letters were placed inside a square frame (0.72◦ × 0.72◦).
Frames of the nine non-targets were either all red (20 cd ×m−2;
RGB: 255, 0, 0) or green (76 cd × m−2; RGB: 0, 255, 0). The
frame of the report-target was in the other color (i.e., green
when the others were red or red when the others were green).
The colors of report-target and non-targets remained the same
throughout the experiment. Whether red or green indicated the
report-target was counterbalanced across the sample. The text of
the response screen was identical to that in Experiment 1, except
that it prompted participants to enter only one instead of several
letters (by the German text “Buchstabe?”, which means “Letter?”
in English).
Procedure and Design
As illustrated in Figure 4, the experimental paradigm of
Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1 except for
the following aspects. Instead of all 10 letters, participants were
to report only the one report-target (partial report). On each
trial, the position of the report-target was randomly chosen.
No confirmation of this report was required, instead the trial
proceeded as soon as a letter-key had been pressed. As in
Experiment 1, at the end of each trial a single probe letter was
shown and participants were required to indicate whether or not
it was shown within the letter display of this trial. Participants
performed three conditions of a within-subjects design. In the
report-target condition, the probe appeared at the location of the
report-target and either matched the report-target or consisted
in a letter not presented on this trial. In the near non-target
condition, the probe appeared at the location of one of the two
letters that flanked the report-target and either matched this letter
or had not been presented on this trial. In the far non-target
condition, the probe appeared at the location of one of the two
letters opposite to the two flanking letters, on the other side of the
letter display than the report-target and either matched this letter
or had not been shown on this trial.
Participants performed four blocks of 72 trials each
comprising 24 trials of the report-target, near non-target,
and far non-target condition. For the two non-target conditions,
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probes appeared equally often at positions in clockwise or
counter-clockwise direction of the report-target. In each of the
three conditions and for each possible probe location, trials
with probes matching the former letter at the probe’s location
(correct answer “yes”) and probes not shown (correct answer
“no”) occurred equally often. Participants performed 24 training
trials prior to the experiment.
Results and Discussion
The same statistical procedures were used as in Experiment
1. Two trials were excluded from analysis because participants
entered more than one letter in their letter report (which
could happen only if participants pressed two keys close to
simultaneously). Whether report-targets were in red or green
frames did not interact with any of the below described
dependent variables, all Fs < 1.64, all ps > 0.227 (revealed by
a repeated-measures ANOVA with type III sums-of-squares).
Therefore, data of participants with report-targets in red and
green frames was collapsed for the following analyses.
Letter Report Performance
Letter report performance was assessed as participants’
proportion of trials on which the report-target was correctly
reported. Unsurprisingly, there were no significant differences
between letter report performance in the three experimental
probe conditions (report-target condition: M = 0.94, SD = 0.07;
near non-target condition: M = 0.94, SD = 0.06; far non-
target condition: M = 0.93, SD = 0.07), F(2,18) = 0.545,
p = 0.589, η2G < 0.004. In addition, Friedman’s test was applied,
because the assumption of normal distribution of the repeated-
measures analysis of variance was not met. This test yielded a
non-significant effect as well, χ2(2)= 1.316, p= 0.518.
Participants’ letter report performance did not differ reliably
between the three conditions. Participants achieved close-to-
ceiling performance in all three conditions, as could be expected
since only one letter had to be reported which should not
touch the capacity limit of VWM (Sperling, 1960; Shibuya and
Bundesen, 1988).
Probe Recognition Performance
Different from Experiment 1, each condition contained trials
in which probes did and trials in which probes did not
match the letters they referred to. Therefore, probe recognition
performance could be quantified as d’, the difference between the
z-transformed rate of correct responses to probes shown on this
trial, z(“hit rate”), and the z-transformed rate of false responses
to probes not shown on this trial, z(“false alarm rate”; for an
overview, see Macmillan and Creelman, 2005). Performance at
chance level leads to a d’ of zero and close to perfect performance
to values of 4.65 (or higher and 0.5 was added to all data cells
on which hit and false alarm rates were based to avoid infinite
values for d’, Macmillan and Creelman, 2005, pp. 8–9,). To
facilitate comparison with the results of Experiment 1, in Table 1
we also report the probe recognition performance assessed as
the proportion of trials on which probe letters were correctly
recognized as having been shown or not shown on the trial.
Figure 5 depicts participants’ probe recognition performance
in the three conditions at the sample and individual level.
Performance differed significantly between the three conditions,
F(2, 18)= 86.859, p< .001, η2G = 0.824. That is, performance was
significantly higher in the report-target (M = 2.30, SD = 0.63)
compared with the near non-target (M = 0.58, SD = 0.43),
t(9) = 10.562, pB < 0.001, dz = 3.34, BF = 1.3 × 10−4, and
far non-target condition (M = 0.03, SD = 0.27), t(9) = 10.770
pB < 0.001, dz = 3.41, BF = 1.2 × 10−4. Performance was
also significantly higher in the near than in the far non-target
condition, t(9) = 3.435, pB = 0.022, dz = 1.09, BF = 0.127. This
data pattern was present in all except two participants whose
performance was slightly higher in the far compared with the
near non-target condition (Figure 5, right). In addition, two one-
sample t-tests revealed that performance was significantly above
chance in the near non-target condition, t(9) = 4.262, p = 0.002,
BF = 0.045, but did not differ from chance level (i.e., a d’ of
zero) in the far non-target condition, t(9) = 0.335, p > 0.745,
BF = 3.086.
Probe recognition performance was highest when the probe
letter tested the former report-target which had been encoded
into VWM, as evident from the near-ceiling performance in
reporting its identity. Importantly, performance was higher for
near non-targets than for far non-targets. This indicates that
episodic short-term recognition was better for letters that were
more likely to be encoded into VWM compared with letters less
likely to be encoded (given that encoding into VWM seems to
proceed in a spatially clustered manner, see Experiment 1). In
fact, performance for far non-targets was at chance level which
suggests that episodic short-term recognition was not possible
for these letters. Furthermore, Experiment 2 controlled for
potential alternative explanations of the findings of Experiment 1.
These alternative explanations stated that differences between the
conditions did not stem from whether letters were encoded into
VWM but from whether letters were reported. In Experiment
TABLE 1 | Probe recognition performance in the three conditions of Experiment 2 assessed as the proportion of correct responses to the probe.
M (SD) vs. report-target vs. near non-target
Report-target 0.79 (0.09) – –
Near non-target 0.61 (0.08) t(9) = −6.515, pB < 0.001,
dz = −2.06, BF = 3.79 × 10−3
–
Far non-target 0.51 (0.05) t(9) = −9.313, pB < 0.001,
dz = −2.94, BF = 3.30 × 10−4
t(9) = −3.451, pB = 0.022,
dz = −1.09, BF = 0.125
Provided are means (M) with standard deviations (SD) in parentheses, and for each of the three conditions (rows), the results of the pairwise comparisons to the other
two conditions (last two columns).
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FIGURE 5 | Mean probe recognition performance (d’) in Experiment 2 across all participants (bars, left) and for individual participants (colored points,
right) in the three conditions. Error-bars indicate ±1 SE for within-subjects designs (Loftus and Masson, 1994). Chance level is indicated by the
dashed line.
2, near and far non-targets both did not have to be reported
and differed only in their distance from the report-target. Hence,
the performance difference between these two conditions cannot
be attributed to effects reporting letters itself might have on
performance. Therefore, we interpret the higher performance for
near non-targets compared with the performance at chance level
for far non-targets as strong evidence for the VWM-encoding
hypothesis. Conversely, we interpret this finding as evidence
against the type-activation hypothesis.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We investigated whether episodic short-term recognition of
objects from a previous processing episode requires that these
objects have been encoded into VWM. For this purpose, we
introduced a new paradigm combining letter report with probe
recognition. In two experiments, episodic short-term recognition
was assessed as performance in recognizing whether a probe letter
was presented in the preceding letter display of the current trial.
In Experiment 1, probe recognition performance was higher for
letters that had been encoded into VWM compared with letters
that had not been encoded. In Experiment 2, only a single letter
had to be reported in the letter report task. This controlled for
effects reporting letters itself might have on probe recognition.
In Experiment 2, probe recognition performance was higher for
non-target letters that were near to a report-target letter, and
hence more likely to be encoded into VWM, compared with non-
target letters far from the report-target, whose encoding was less
likely. Crucially, this difference in probe recognition refers to
non-target letters which did not have to be reported. Strikingly,
performance was at chance level for letters far from the report-
target which were unlikely to enter VWM. Therefore, we interpret
the present findings as strong evidence for the VWM-encoding
hypothesis which states that episodic short-term recognition
presupposes that visual objects have been encoded into VWM.
Conversely, we interpret these findings as evidence against the
type-activation hypothesis. Note that one might distinguish a
strong form of the type-activation hypothesis, the one that we
have put forward so far, and a weaker form. The strong form
states that episodic short-term recognition can be accomplished
perfectly (at least in principle) for all objects of the current visual
field. In contrast, the weaker form states that episodic short-
term recognition can be accomplished for all objects of the visual
field, but not perfectly, and that recognition performance may
be improved by additional encoding into VWM. The results
of Experiment 2 provide evidence against both forms of the
type-activation hypothesis. The finding that probe recognition
performance was higher for near than for far non-targets argues
against the strong form. The finding that performance was at
chance level in the far non-target condition argues against the
weak form. That is, episodic short-term recognition seemed
impossible in this condition. Thus, taken together, the present
findings indicate that type-activation is not sufficient for later
episodic short-term recognition but that encoding into VWM is
required instead.
Visual Working Memory as a Basis of
Episodic Short-Term Recognition
Encoding an object into VWM seems to be necessary for its later
episodic short-term recognition. This means that the functional
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basis of episodic short-term recognition emerges at a level of
processing after the activation of visual types in visual long-
term memory (e.g., Kanwisher, 1987; Kahneman et al., 1992; cf.
Schneider, 1995) and after visual attention has mediated selective
encoding into VWM (Duncan and Humphreys, 1989; Bundesen,
1990; Bundesen et al., 2005; Schneider, 2013). In the present
study, letters were used as visual objects. After successful visually
based recognition, letters can be processed verbally, which makes
it likely that their episodic short-term recognition also involved
verbal processing in addition to visual processing. However,
because the letters had to be acquired visually, they had to
be encoded into VWM first, before such a verbal processing
could take place. After their encoding into VWM, they may
have been recoded into a verbal format. Such a verbal format
may have provided the advantage of verbal rehearsal by verbal
working memory, which may have prolonged and secured their
retention (e.g., Logie, 2011; Baddeley, 2012). Thus, importantly,
even though episodic short-term recognition may rely on several
different (working) memory mechanisms (such as visual and
verbal ones), encoding into VWM seems to be a necessary
processing step for these mechanisms to operate.
Why may encoding into VWM be necessary for episodic
short-term recognition? Several theories assume that by encoding
into VWM, information about visual objects is transformed into a
special representational state (e.g., Cowan, 1988; Oberauer, 2002;
LaRocque et al., 2014; cf. Olivers et al., 2011). We suggest that
it is this representational state that makes encoding into VWM
a requirement of episodic short-term recognition. Specifically,
we propose that two characteristics of this representational state
are necessary for episodic short-term recognition: binding and
robustness.
Binding means that different visual features of an object are
integrated which yields representations of objects as a whole, with
all their features (e.g., Treisman and Gelade, 1980). The mere
presentation of objects activates visual types (features) in visual
long-term memory but this happens in isolation (cf. Bundesen,
1990; Schneider, 1995). Episodic short-term recognition requires
binding of activated visual types because otherwise objects that
share visual features cannot be distinguished. VWM is assumed
to mark the first level in the course of visual processing at which
the visual types (or features) activated by an object are bound to
integrated object representations (Bundesen, 1990; Luck, 2008;
Schneider, 2013; Kyllingsbæk, 2014). This point is illustrated by
referring to integrated object representations as VWM objects
(Schneider, 2013), which have also been called object files
(Kahneman et al., 1992) and visual tokens (Schneider, 1995). In
sum, the binding of visual types within object representations
in VWM may be one reason for that episodic short-term
recognition requires encoding into VWM.
Robustness means that object representations in VWM
are protected against so-called proactive interference (Keppel
and Underwood, 1962). Proactive interference arises when
the same visual objects occur repeatedly (e.g., Endress and
Potter, 2014). It describes an impairment in recognizing if an
object has been viewed in the very recent past as opposed
to having been encountered before at all (e.g., Endress and
Potter, 2014). Episodic short-term recognition clearly requires
to assess whether an object has been viewed in a recently
passed episode rather than at some unspecified point in the past.
Hence, successful episodic short-term recognition presupposes
that proactive interference is eliminated. Robustness against
proactive interference is assumed to be a hallmark of VWM
representations and providing it is considered a core function of
VWM (Endress and Potter, 2014). Thus, taken together, episodic
short-term recognition may presuppose encoding of objects into
VWM because this might establish representations of objects as
bound units (cf. Luck and Vogel, 1997) which are robust against
proactive interference (cf. Endress and Potter, 2014).
Episodic Short-Term Recognition Might
Be Constrained by an
Encoding-Limitation but Not a
Retention-Limitation of Visual Working
Memory
As we have argued, the present findings indicate that episodic
short-term recognition presupposes encoding into VWM but
this seems to conflict with earlier findings. Specifically, Sternberg
(1966) presented participants with series of up to six digits
followed by a probe digit. Participants indicated whether the
probe was contained in a given series. The six presented digits
exceed the number of about three to four objects that VWM
can hold (e.g., Sperling, 1960; Shibuya and Bundesen, 1988; Luck
and Vogel, 1997). Thus, when the last two digits were shown,
VWM should have already been filled up so that the digits could
not be encoded into VWM. Nevertheless, Sternberg found that
probe recognition performance was close to ceiling even for
six digits. One might attribute this result to the relatively long
presentation durations of digits (1.2 s) that could have allowed
verbal rehearsal (e.g., Sternberg, 1975). However, congruent to
Sternberg’s findings, later experiments revealed high levels of
probe recognition performance for objects that were presented
more briefly and thus difficult to rehearse verbally (Endress and
Potter, 2014). Taken together, these findings are compatible with
the type-activation hypothesis in that they suggest episodic short-
term recognition is possible also for objects that have not reached
VWM.
How may the conflict between the present and Sternberg’s
(1966; cf. Endress and Potter, 2014) findings be resolved? One
solution is provided by Schneider’s (2013) recent “theory of
task-driven visual attention and working memory” (TRAM)
which offers an account of how visual information processing
might be accomplished within and across processing episodes.
According to TRAM, a new processing episode is started with
each onset of visual objects (e.g., after a saccadic eye movement).
A processing episode comprises three phases. Premising upon
Bundesen’s (1990) theory of visual attention (a model of biased
competition, Desimone and Duncan, 1995), TRAM’s first two
phases describe how visual attention mediates selective encoding
of visual objects into capacity-limited VWM. In TRAM’s third
phase, objects that have been encoded into initial activation-
based VWM (i.e., VWM based on persistent neural activity)
are consolidated which results in passive VWM representations
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(which do not require neural activity but may rely on short-
term changes in synaptic connectivity, as reviewed by Eriksson
et al., 2015; Postle, 2015; and Stokes, 2015). Critically, according
to TRAM, the number of passive VWM representations is
not constrained by the traditionally assumed capacity-limitation
of VWM. With this in mind, one may interpret classical
estimates of VWM capacity (Sperling, 1960; Shibuya and
Bundesen, 1988; Luck and Vogel, 1997) as reflecting an
encoding limitation but not a retention limitation. In other
words, classical VWM capacity may constrain the amount of
object information that can be acquired within one processing
episode but not the amount of information that can be
retained across episodes. In Sternberg’s (1966) paradigm, each
of the serially presented digits should have started a new
processing episode. Within each of these episodes, a passive
VWM representation of the digit should have emerged. Probe
recognition should then have been based on a comparison of
these passive VWM representations with actual probe digits
(which could involve retrieving passive representations again
into classical activation-based VWM; Schneider, 2013). In
this vein, episodic short-term recognition becomes possible
for more serially presented objects than classical VWM can
retain. In contrast, TRAM posits that if several objects are
presented simultaneously, as in the present experiments, then
this can reach the encoding limit of VWM. All simultaneously
presented objects are processed within the same processing
episode. Therefore, encoding further objects becomes impossible
if activation-based VWM is filled up. Critically, creating
passive VWM representations of objects presupposes that the
objects have been encoded into VWM. Thus, in a given
processing episode, only as many objects as VWM can hold
can be consolidated into passive VWM representations. As a
consequence, episodic short-term recognition across successive
processing episodes should be limited with respect to the
number of simultaneously shown objects that can be encoded
into VWM. In contrast, episodic short-term recognition should
not be restricted with respect to the number of retained
objects in VWM because this includes also passive VWM
representations that have arisen over the course of several
episodes, as in Sternberg’s experiments. Interestingly, recent
findings might suggest that in such situations of serial object
presentations (RSVP), the capacity of passive VWM can be
extended beyond “magical number four” by eliminating proactive
interference (Endress and Potter, 2014). As an alternative
to consolidation in passive VWM, representations of objects
in classical VWM could also be recoded into a different
representational format (Petersen et al., 2012) which might
then be used for later episodic short-term recognition. The
objects of the present experiments consisted of letters which
may have been recoded into the verbal format (that is open
to verbal rehearsal, e.g., Sternberg, 1975, and may allow
retention by working memory systems dedicated to verbal
information, e.g., Baddeley, 2012). However, since the to-be-
recoded object information is acquired visually, recoding would
still presuppose encoding into VWM (Petersen et al., 2012).
Hence, episodic short-term recognition would still be constrained
by the encoding limitation of VWM but not by a retention limit.
However, testing this hypothesis is left for further experimental
studies.
CONCLUSION
The present study shows that episodic short-term recognition
of objects from previous episodes presupposes that the objects
have been processed up to the level of VWM. In this way, VWM
not only provides bound visual objects for online perception and
action within a processing episode but also paves the way for
episodic short-term recognition across episodes. However, this
also implies that episodic short-term recognition is only possible
for a limited number of simultaneously presented objects due to
the encoding limitation of VWM (Schneider, 2013; cf. Sperling,
1960; Shibuya and Bundesen, 1988; Luck and Vogel, 1997).
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Abstract 
Visual working memory retains visual information for controlling behavior. We studied how 
information in visual working memory is prioritized for being used. In two experiments, 
participants memorized the stimuli of a memory display for a brief interval, followed by a 
retro-cue. The retro-cue was either valid, indicating which stimulus from the memory display 
was relevant (i.e. had priority) in the upcoming comparison with a probe, or was neutral 
(uninformative). Next, the probe was presented, terminated by a mask, and participants 
reported whether it matched a stimulus from the memory display. The presentation duration 
of the probe was varied. Assessing performance as a function of presentation duration allowed 
to disentangle two components of working memory: memory-retention and the speed of 
processing the probe for the memory-based comparison. Compared with neutral retro-cues, 
valid retro-cues improved retention and at the same time accelerated processing of the probe. 
These findings show for the first time that prioritization in working memory impacts on 
distinct mechanisms: Retrospectively, it supports memory-retention, and prospectively, it 
enhances perceptual processing in upcoming comparison tasks. 
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Prioritization in visual working memory enhances memory-retention and speeds up 
processing in a comparison task 
Visual working memory (VWM) is a cornerstone of human visual cognition. It 
temporarily retains visual information and makes it accessible for cognitive operation, report, 
and action control (Eriksson, Vogel, Lansner, Bergstrom, & Nyberg, 2015; Oberauer, 2009; 
Poth & Schneider, 2016a; Schneider, 2013). VWM has only limited capacity (Luck & Vogel, 
1997; Shibuya & Bundesen, 1988; Sperling, 1960). Efficient use of this capacity dictates 
selectivity: Currently relevant information must enter VWM with priority over less relevant 
information. This prioritization is performed by mechanisms of visual attention (Bundesen, 
1990; Bundesen, Habekost, & Kyllingsbæk, 2005; Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Schneider, 
1995). The bulk of attention research focused on prioritization up to the time of encoding into 
VWM (Bundesen, Vangkilde, & Petersen, 2015; Duncan, 2006; Poth & Schneider, 2013). 
However, flexible visual cognition requires that changes of priority can be accommodated 
also when they happen after information has entered VWM. 
Indeed, more recent research demonstrated that prioritization continues after encoding 
into VWM. This research made use of the retro-cuing paradigm (Griffin & Nobre, 2003; 
Landman, Spekreijse, & Lamme, 2003). Participants memorized a set of visual stimuli, the 
memory display, over a retention interval which was followed by a probe stimulus. The task 
was to report whether the probe matched an item from the memory display. A so-called retro-
cue (i.e. a “retrodictive” cue) was shown after the memory display but before the probe 
appeared. In the experiments of current interest, retro-cues could be valid or neutral (Astle, 
Summerfield, Griffin, & Nobre, 2012; Kuo, Stokes, & Nobre, 2012). A valid retro-cue 
predicted which of the items from the memory display was going to be relevant for the 
upcoming comparison with the probe. A neutral retro-cue did not contain any predictive 
information regarding this comparison. The central result is that valid retro-cues improved 
comparison performance relative to neutral retro-cues. Over a decade of research accumulated 
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evidence for beneficial effects of valid retro-cues in different versions of the basic paradigm 
(Astle et al., 2012; Griffin & Nobre, 2003; Landman et al., 2003; Makovski & Jiang, 2007; 
Makovski, Sussman, & Jiang, 2008; Souza, Rerko, & Oberauer, 2014). Thus, it seems safe to 
conclude that valid retro-cues prioritize an item from a preceding memory display while the 
memory display is retained in VWM. 
Still controversial, however, is the question which mechanisms underlie the 
prioritization within VWM (Souza & Oberauer, 2016). Current accounts assume that valid 
retro-cues improve comparison performance by manipulating the representations of the 
memory display in VWM. Specifically, some authors propose that they strengthen the VWM 
representation of the cued item, increasing the utility of this item for the comparison (Kuo, 
Yeh, Chen, & D'Esposito, 2011; Lepsien, Thornton, & Nobre, 2011; Nobre, Griffin, & Rao, 
2008). Others propose that they free VWM capacity and reduce interference within VWM by 
having uncued items removed from VWM (Souza et al., 2014; Williams, Hong, Kang, 
Carlisle, & Woodman, 2013). Again others suggest that valid retro-cues protect the cued item 
against decay (Matsukura, Luck, & Vecera, 2007; Murray, Nobre, Clark, Cravo, & Stokes, 
2013; Pertzov, Bays, Joseph, & Husain, 2013) or new interfering information (such as from 
the probe; Makovski et al., 2008; Makovski & Jiang, 2007). Finally, some suggest that valid 
retro-cues grant the cued items priority in the process of being compared to the probe (Astle et 
al., 2012; Makovski et al., 2008; Nobre et al., 2008). Fundamental to all these accounts is that 
retro-cues are, as the term implies, retroactive. That is, all accounts assume that valid retro-
cues engage mechanisms that, in one way or the other, prioritize information from the past 
which is now retained in VWM. 
Here, we ask whether retro-cues facilitate memory-retention in VWM, or whether they 
enhance future perceptual processing in service of the comparison task, or both. To this end, 
we introduce a novel paradigm which allows to disentangle such retrospective and 
prospective effects of retro-cues (Figure 1). Participants briefly viewed a memory display of 
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two colored squares and memorized them over a retention interval. This interval outlasted 
iconic memory traces and thus called for retention in VWM (for a review, see Irwin & 
Thomas, 2008). Afterwards, a probe stimulus was presented that either matched or did not 
match an item from the memory display, with each alternative occurring in half the trials. 
Participants’ task was to indicate whether or not the probe matched an item from the memory 
display. A retro-cue appeared after the retention interval but before the probe. The retro-cue 
was either valid or neutral. A valid retro-cue pointed at the location of one of the items from 
the preceding memory display, the one that was going to be relevant for the upcoming 
comparison with the probe. Specifically, if the probe matched an item from the memory 
display, it was always the one indicated by the retro-cue. A neutral retro-cue did not contain 
any specific location information. We varied the presentation duration of the probe and 
terminated it with a pattern mask. This enabled us to assess performance as a function of the 
presentation duration. To disentangle the retrospective and the prospective effects of retro-
cues, we fit these data with an exponential model (cf. Bundesen, 1990; Wickelgren, 1977) and 
compared the estimated parameters between valid and neutral retro-cues. The exponential 
model comprised three parameters. First, the level of asymptotic performance which is 
reached when the probe is shown long enough (see the upper asymptotes of the smooth curves 
in Figure 2). The perceptual processing of the probe should improve with increasing 
presentation duration (e.g., Petersen & Andersen, 2012; Shibuya & Bundesen, 1988). At the 
asymptote, however, performance stops to increase with increasing presentation duration of 
the probe. Therefore, when the asymptote were reached, perceptual processing (encoding) of 
the probe should be over and variations of the asymptote should be due to post-perceptual 
factors. In the present case, variations in the asymptote should reflect the performance level 
for retaining the items of the memory display in VWM. Second, the rate at which 
performance increases with increasing presentation duration of the probe toward asymptotic 
performance (see how steeply the smooth curves increase with increasing presentation 
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duration in Figure 2). This is a well-established measure of processing speed (Bundesen, 
1990; Bundesen et al., 2015; Shibuya & Bundesen, 1988; Wickelgren, 1977). Applied to the 
present case, it should represent the speed with which the probe is perceptually processed in 
order to accomplish the comparison with the items of the memory display. Third, a temporal 
threshold, reflecting the presentation duration of the probe that must be exceeded to increase 
performance above chance level (cf. Bundesen, 1990; Wickelgren, 1977). 
If retro-cues facilitate memory-retention in VWM, then valid retro-cues should result 
in a higher asymptotic performance than neutral ones. In contrast, if retro-cues enhance 
processing for the upcoming comparison task, then valid retro-cues should lead to a higher 
processing speed of the probe than neutral ones. We tested these hypotheses in Experiment A 
and, in addition, performed a close replication with Experiment B. 
Method 
Participants 
Eleven participants were paid to perform Experiment A. One additional participant 
was excluded because of problems with the eye-tracker calibration (see below) and corrupted 
eye-tracking data files. The participants were between 21 and 34 years old (MD = 24 years), 
eight were female, three were male, and all reported normal or corrected-to-normal (contact 
lenses) visual acuity and normal color vision. Thirteen participants received course credit for 
performing Experiment B. They were between 18 and 27 years old (MD = 20 years), eleven 
were female, two male, and all reported normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and 
normal color vision. All participants gave written informed consent before participation, the 
experiments were approved by Bielefeld University’s ethics committee, and complied with 
the ethical guidelines of the German Psychological Association (DGPs). 
Apparatus and stimuli 
Both experiments took place in a dimly lit room. A chin-and-forehead rest 
(Experiment A), and a chin rest (Experiment B) ensured that participants viewed the CRT-
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monitors from a distance of 71 cm. In Experiment A, the CRT-monitor (G90fB, ViewSonic, 
Brea, CA, USA) ran at a refresh rate of 100 Hz and a resolution of 1024×768 pixels 
(corresponding to physical dimensions of 36×27 cm). For control purposes, a video-based 
desktop-mounted eye tracker sampled participants’ right eyes at 1000 Hz (Eyelink 1000, SR 
Research, Mississauga, Ontario, Canada; 9-point grid calibration). In Experiment B, the CRT-
monitor (Trinitron MultiScan G420, Sony, Park Ridge, NJ, USA) ran at a refresh rate of 85 
Hz and a resolution of 1024×768 pixels (corresponding to physical dimensions of 36×27 cm). 
Responses were collected using standard computer keyboards (QWERTZ-layout). The 
experiments were controlled by the Psychophysics toolbox (3.0.12; Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 
1997, and in Experiment A, the Eyelink toolbox, 3.0.12; Cornelissen, Peters, & Palmer, 2002) 
extensions for Matlab (R2014b in Experiment A, R2013b in Experiment B, The MathWorks, 
Natick, MA, USA). 
Stimulus-luminance was measured using an LS-110 luminance meter (MINOLTA, 
Osaka, Japan). Stimulus-luminance is reported for Experiment A and B side by side (i.e. 
luminance A/luminance B). An empty light-gray square was used as fixation stimulus 
(0.67×0.67° of visual angle, with a linewidth of 4 pixels; 59/45 cd/m2), henceforth called 
fixation square. Valid retro-cues consisted in a brightening of two lines of this square, neutral 
ones in a brightening of the whole square (102/114 cd/m2). The stimuli of the memory display 
were squares (0.67×0.67°) of the following eight colors: red (RGB: 255, 0, 0; 34/23 cd/m2), 
magenta (RGB: 255, 0, 255; 43/34 cd/m2), yellow (RGB: 255, 255, 0; 112/101 cd/m2), orange 
(RGB: 255, 145, 0; 59/44 cd/m2), blue (RGB: 0, 0, 255; 17/12 cd/m2), cyan (RGB: 0, 255, 
255; 103/92 cd/m2), green (RGB: 0, 255, 0; 100/80 cd/m2), and black (RGB: 0, 0, 0; 1/< 1 
cd/m2). For each individual participant, 99 pattern masks were algorithmically created in the 
beginning of the experiment. Masks consisted of a square composed of a 4×4 matrix of 
smaller squares (0.30×0.30° each) whose colors were randomly chosen from the set of colors 
with the constraint that each color occurred twice in each mask (see, Figure 1 for an example 
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mask). The gray background had a luminance of 34/22 cd/m2. The white question mark of the 
response screen was written in Arial (0.50°×1.00°; 102/114 cd/m2). 
Procedure and design 
Figure 1 illustrates the paradigm of Experiment A (the paradigm of Experiment B was 
similar in most respects, see below). Participants started each trial by pressing the space-bar. 
In the beginning of a trial, the fixation square was shown at screen center for 400 ms. In 
Experiment A, the eye-tracker monitored if eyes were open (i.e. pupils visible) until the end 
of this fixation period and if they were not, the period was prolonged until the next screen 
refresh after the eyes were open again. In Experiment B, eye behavior was not recorded. The 
fixation square stayed on for the most of a trial. After the fixation period, the memory display 
containing two differently colored squares was shown for 100 ms in Experiment A, and for 94 
ms in Experiment B. The colors of the squares were randomly chosen from the set of used 
colors. The squares appeared at two out of four possible positions (2° from screen center 
horizontally to the left or right × vertically to the left or right, see Figure 1) and this was 
randomized across trials with each pairing of positions occurring equally often. The memory 
display was followed by an interstimulus interval (ISI) of 1000 ms, after which the retro-cue 
was presented for 100 ms in Experiment A and 94 ms in Experiment B. Valid retro-cues 
consisted in a selective brightening of two sides of the fixation square, forming an arrow 
pointing at one of the two location of the squares of the previous memory display. Across 
trials, each location was cued equally often. Neutral retro-cues consisted in a brightening of 
the whole fixation square. The retro-cue was followed by another ISI of 1000 ms. The probe 
then replaced the fixation square at screen center. In Experiment A, the probe was shown for 
eight different durations (10, 20, 30, 40, 60, 90, 120, and 180 ms). In Experiment B, it was 
shown for six different durations (12, 24, 35, 59, 106, and 141 ms). The presentation of the 
probe was terminated by a central pattern mask lasting for 300 ms in Experiment A and 306 
ms in Experiment B. Afterwards, a central question mark was presented until participants 
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responded. Participants were instructed to respond with the F9-key if the probe matched an 
item from the memory display and the F1-key if it did not match any of them. There was no 
time limit for the response. On half of the trials, the color of the probe matched the color of 
one of the items from the memory display. On the other half, it was had one of the colors that 
did not appear on this trial. Participants were informed that if a valid retro-cue was shown and 
the probe matched the color of an item from the memory display, then this would be the color 
of the item indicated by the retro-cue.  
Participants performed Experiment A in a single session of 768 trials, 48 trials per 
retro-cue condition (valid vs. neutral) and per presentation duration of the probe. Participants 
performed Experiment B in two sessions (on separate days) of 576 trials each, yielding 1152 
trials in total, 96 trials per retro-cue condition and per presentation duration of the probe. 
Trials were administered in randomized order in Experiment A and in both sessions of 
Experiment B. Participants performed 30 training trials (randomly chosen with replacement 
from all trial types) before each participation. 
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Figure 1. Paradigm of Experiment A. The paradigm of Experiment B was similar but differed in the display 
durations (and other aspects, see the Methods). Participants fixated a fixation square, after which a memory 
display with two colored squares appeared. After an interstimulus interval (ISI), a retro-cue was shown. If the 
retro-cue was valid, it indicated the location of the previous item from the memory display that was going to be 
relevant for the current trial. If it was neutral, it did not contain any predictive information. After another ISI, a 
probe was presented whose presentation duration was parametrically varied across trials. The probe was 
terminated by a pattern mask. In the end of a trial, a question mark prompted participants to indicate whether or 
not the probe matched an item from the memory display. 
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Results 
 To control for response biases, performance in indicating whether the probe matched 
an item from the memory display was assessed as d’ (the z-transformed rate of “yes”-
responses to probes matching an item from the memory display minus the z-transformed rate 
of “yes”-responses to probes not matching an item from the memory display; 0.5 was added 
to the data cells on which rates were computed to prevent infinite values of d’, see Macmillan 
& Creelman, 2005). Performance was assessed as a function of presentation duration of the 
probe. For each participant and each retro-cue condition, these data were fit with an 
exponential model of the type 
𝑑′ =  𝜔(1 − exp(−𝑣 ∗ (𝑡 − 𝑡0))) 
where ω is the upper asymptote of performance (in d’), v is the rate parameter of the 
exponential distribution which measures processing speed of the probe within the comparison 
with the items of the memory display (in items/s; cf. Bundesen, 1990; Bundesen et al., 2015; 
Wickelgren, 1977). The third parameter, t0, is a temporal threshold consisting in the 
presentation duration of the probe that has to be exceeded to increase performance above 
chance level (in ms; cf. Bundesen, 1990). Fitting was accomplished using the nonlinear least-
squares (nls) method implemented in R (3.0.3; R Core Team, 2016). Figure 2 depicts the 
performance in each retro-cue condition and corresponding model fits, for one participant in 
each experiment. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of estimated parameters for the two 
retro-cue conditions of both experiments. Goodness-of-fit was quantified as Pearson’s 
correlation r between the predicted values based on the fitted model and participants’ 
observed values (see, Table 1). 
  
PRIORITIZATION IN VISUAL WORKING MEMORY 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Performance of a participant of Experiment A (left) and one of Experiment B (right). Data points 
represent performance in indicating whether or not probes matched an item from the memory display at each of 
the presentation durations of the probe. The two retro-cue conditions are depicted separately. Smooth curves 
represent least-squares fits of the exponential model to the data of the two retro-cue conditions. 
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 The parameter estimates were compared between the retro-cue conditions using 
paired-samples t-tests (two-sided, with a significance criterion of p < .05, and dz as effect size 
Cohen, 1988, and for which the assumption of normally distributed differences was assessed 
beforehand using Shapiro-Wilk tests). t-tests were supplemented with corresponding Bayes 
Factors (BF10, Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009, whereby values greater one 
favor the alternative and values smaller one favor the null hypothesis). Figure 3 illustrates the 
parameter comparisons between the retro-cue conditions of the two experiments. 
In Experiment A, the retention performance ω was significantly higher when retro-
cues were valid than when they were neutral, t(10) = 3.212, p = .009, dz = 0.97, BF10 = 6.42. 
Experiment B replicated this result, t(12) = 2.808, p = .016, dz = 0.78, BF10 = 3.99. These 
findings demonstrate a retrospective effect of retro-cues. They indicate that valid retro-cues 
facilitated the retention of the relevant item from the memory display as compared with 
neutral retro-cues. 
The processing speed v was significantly higher when retro-cues were valid compared 
with neutral, and this was likewise the case in Experiment A, t(10) = 2.400, p = .037, dz = 
0.72, BF10 = 2.14, and Experiment B, t(12) = 2.589, p = .024, dz = 0.72, BF10 = 2.89. These 
findings reveal a prospective effect of retro-cues on future visual processing. Specifically, 
compared with neutral retro-cues, valid retro-cues increased the speed with which an 
upcoming probe was processed, in order to assess whether it had been contained in the 
preceding memory display. 
There were no differences between the valid and the neutral retro-cue condition 
regarding the temporal threshold, t0, neither in Experiment A, t(10) = -0.629, p = .543, dz = -
0.19, BF10 = 0.35, nor in Experiment B, t(12) = 0.787, p = .447, dz = 0.22, BF10 = 0.36. 
  
PRIORITIZATION IN VISUAL WORKING MEMORY 14 
 
Figure 3. Estimated model parameters in the two retro-cue conditions of Experiment A (upper panel) and 
Experiment B (lower panel). Depicted are the means of the retention performance ω (in d’), of the processing 
speed v (in items/s), and of the temporal threshold t0 (in ms), across participants. Error-bars indicate ± one 
standard error for within-subjects designs (Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of Experiment A and B. 
  Experiment A  Experiment B 
  Valid retro-cue  Neutral retro-cue  Valid retro-cue  Neutral retro-cue 
ω  3.51 (0.50)  3.10 (0.64)  3.49 (0.81)  3.07 (0.89) 
v  34.70 (11.08)  27.80 (10.53)  47.42 (20.22)  36.72 (14.72) 
t0  8 (3)  9 (5)  11 (3)  10 (3) 
r  .945 (.030)  .917 (.036)  .962 (.027)  .961 (.029) 
Note. Descriptive statistics of estimated parameters for the two retro-cue conditions of Experiment A and B. 
Provided are means and standard deviations (in parentheses) across participants for the asymptotic performance 
level ω (in d’), the processing speed v (in items/s), the temporal threshold t0 (in ms), and for Pearson’s correlation 
between the values predicted by the fitted model and the observed values. 
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Discussion 
The present experiments reveal that retro-cues impact on two distinct components of 
VWM performance. First, valid retro-cues improve memory-retention in VWM. This was 
evident from the higher retention performance when retro-cues were valid compared with 
neutral. We assessed retention performance as the asymptote of performance as a function of 
the presentation duration of the probe. Asymptotic performance reflects a component of 
VWM performance that is independent from perceptual processing of the probe, because 
performance does not improve further when the probe is presented longer. Second, valid 
retro-cues enhanced the speed with which probe stimuli were perceptually processed in order 
to be compared to the items retained in VWM. We assessed the speed of processing the probe 
for this memory-based comparison as the rate of performance increase with increasing 
presentation duration of the probe.  
Valid retro-cues improved memory-retention. This indicates that prioritization 
modulates representations in VWM independently of the time available to process the probe 
for the upcoming comparison task. This is in line with several not mutually exclusive 
accounts assuming that retro-cues impact on VWM-based performance by directly 
modulating VWM representations. Valid retro-cues may strengthen the representations of 
cued items in VWM (Kuo et al., 2011; Lepsien et al., 2011; Nobre et al., 2008). They may 
remove uncued items from VWM, thereby freeing capacity and reducing interference within 
VWM (Souza et al., 2014; Williams et al., 2013). They may protect the representations of 
cued items in VWM against decay (Matsukura et al., 2007; Pertzov et al., 2013) or interfering 
new information (Makovski et al., 2008; Makovski & Jiang, 2007). 
Crucially, valid retro-cues also accelerated the perceptual processing of probe stimuli 
for performing the upcoming comparison task. This indicates that prioritization in VWM has 
effects beyond pure memory-retention. In this way, this present finding calls for an extension 
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of current accounts of the beneficial effects of valid retro-cues on VWM-based performance. 
The finding can be interpreted in two ways.  
The first explanation is that the presentation duration of the probe stimulus determined 
the quality of its representation in VWM. The rate of performance increase with increasing 
probe presentation duration was higher when retro-cues were valid than neutral. Thus, a valid 
retro-cues may have compensated for the low representational quality of the probe at short 
presentation durations, for example by enhancing the VWM representations of the cued items, 
which would be in line with previous accounts (e.g., Kuo et al., 2011; Lepsien et al., 2011; 
Nobre et al., 2008). The present findings would then show that valid retro-cues improve a 
component of VWM that can be traded-off for the representational quality of the probe 
stimulus. However, with the effects on memory-retention, the findings would also indicate 
that valid retro-cues improve a VWM component beyond this, one that does not interact with 
the representational quality of the probe.  
The second explanation assumes that the acceleration of the processing of the probe 
resulted from a prospective monitoring process. A valid retro-cue indicates which of the items 
in VWM will be relevant for the comparison to an upcoming probe. Consequently, the 
environment may be monitored for the features of the cued item already before the probe 
appears. It has previously been shown that monitoring processes rely on visual attention 
(Poth, Petersen, Bundesen, & Schneider, 2014). In the present case, the features of the cued 
item may be monitored for by engaging the pigeonholing (“attention to features”) mechanism 
from Bundesen’ theory of visual attention (TVA; Bundesen, 1990; Bundesen et al., 2015). 
Pigeonholing influences the speed with which visual features of objects are processed for 
being encoded into VWM. This should happen by up- or down-regulating a perceptual bias 
for categorizing any given object as having a certain feature. The perceptual bias is internal, 
meaning that it is independent of what objects are actually viewed. Specifically, the 
perceptual bias for a certain feature may be implemented by increasing or decreasing the 
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firing rates of visual neurons preferentially coding for this feature (Bundesen et al., 2005). 
Increasing the perceptual bias for the features of the cued item would increase the speed of 
encoding the probe into VWM, if the probe has these features. This would imply that the 
present processing acceleration stemmed from the trials on which the probe matched the cued 
item. Indeed, effects of retro-cues have been found more pronounced for such matches 
(Lepsien, Griffin, Devlin, & Nobre, 2005; Nobre et al., 2008). However, a processing 
acceleration on trials on which the probe did not match an item from the memory display 
could still be explained in terms of pigeonholing by assuming an additional decision deadline 
(cf. Bundesen’s 1990 explanation of target-absent response times in visual search). In this 
scenario, valid retro-cues would lower the deadline for processing the probe in order for 
deciding that it did not match an item from the memory display. 
On the neuronal level, active or passive working memory processes may underlie the 
effects of valid retro-cues. Both types of processes rely on the sensory recruitment hypothesis, 
stating that the retention of information in VWM is enacted by the same visual brain areas 
that encode this information at first (Ester, Anderson, Serences, & Awh, 2013; Miller, 
Erickson, & Desimone, 1996; Serences, Ester, Vogel, & Awh, 2009; Supèr, Spekreijse, & 
Lamme, 2001). The hypothesis of active working memory processes relies on the assumption 
that retention in VWM is performed by maintaining the spiking activity of the neurons coding 
for the retained items and their features (Chelazzi, Miller, Duncan, & Desimone, 1993). The 
retrospective effects of valid retro-cues on memory-retention in VWM could consist in an 
increase of activity in neurons coding for the features of the cued item, or a decrease in those 
coding for features of other items, or both (Lepsien et al., 2011; Trapp & Lepsien, 2012). An 
increase of spiking activity of these neurons could at the same time provoke the prospective 
effects of valid retro-cues. The increased firing would support the future encoding of stimuli 
by these neurons, explaining why processing of the probe was accelerated in the present 
experiments. 
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The hypothesis of passive working memory processes is grounded on recent evidence 
questioning maintained spiking activity as the sole neuronal implementation of retention in 
VWM (for an overview, see Stokes, 2015). Findings from single-cell neurophysiology 
(Stokes et al., 2013) and brain imaging and stimulation (e.g., Rose et al., 2016; for a review, 
see Larocque, Lewis-Peacock, & Postle, 2014) suggest a passive (V)WM (Schneider, 2013), 
which presumably relies on increased synaptic connectivity rather than maintained spiking 
activity (Mongillo, Barak, & Tsodyks, 2008; though synaptic connectivity may stem from an 
initial increase of neuronal firing, e.g., Stokes, 2015). Valid retro-cues could also exert their 
effects here, by modulating the synaptic connectivity in visual brain areas at short time scales. 
Valid retro-cues could increase the synaptic connectivity of neurons coding for the features of 
the cued item. Enhanced synaptic connectivity could make VWM representations more 
robust, offering another explanation why valid retro-cues improved retention performance. 
Interestingly, if valid retro-cues increased the short-term synaptic connectivity of these 
neurons, this might also increase their efficiency of encoding new stimuli (Stokes et al., 2013; 
Sugase-Miyamoto, Liu, Wiener, Optican, & Richmond, 2008). Hence, this provides another 
explanation of why valid retro-cues accelerated processing of probes. It is important to note, 
however, that both, active and passive working memory processes are feature-based. 
Therefore, both processes would only be able to operate if the features of probes matched the 
features of the cued items in VWM. This would call for an additional process implementing a 
decision deadline, in the same way as the prospective monitoring process that relied on 
Bundesen’s (1990) pigeonholing mechanism.  
To conclude, the present study shows that priority within VWM not only affects the 
retention of past information but also future processing in a comparison task. Visual attention 
seems not only to set processing priorities for encoding into VWM (Bundesen, 1990) and for 
selection within VWM (Griffin & Nobre, 2003; Landman et al., 2003), but at the same time 
also for processing upcoming information. In this vein, visual attention may provide a bridge 
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between episodes of visual processing that are composed of encoding into and retention in 
VWM (as proposed by Schneider, 2013; see also Poth, Herwig, & Schneider, 2015; Poth & 
Schneider, 2016b).  
  
PRIORITIZATION IN VISUAL WORKING MEMORY 20 
References 
 
Astle, D. E., Summerfield, J., Griffin, I., & Nobre, A. C. (2012). Orienting attention to 
locations in mental representations. Attention, Perception & Psychophysics, 74(1), 146–
162. doi:10.3758/s13414-011-0218-3  
Bundesen, C. (1990). A theory of visual attention. Psychological Review, 97(4), 523–547. 
doi:10.1037/0033-295X.97.4.523  
Bundesen, C., Habekost, T., & Kyllingsbæk, S. (2005). A neural theory of visual attention: 
Bridging cognition and neurophysiology. Psychological Review, 112(2), 291–328. 
doi:10.1037/0033-295X.112.2.291  
Bundesen, C., Vangkilde, S., & Petersen, A. (2015). Recent developments in a computational 
theory of visual attention (TVA). Vision Research, 116, 210–218. 
doi:10.1016/j.visres.2014.11.005  
Chelazzi, L., Miller, E. K., Duncan, J., & Desimone, R. (1993). A neural basis for visual 
search in inferior temporal cortex. Nature, 363(6427), 345–347. doi:10.1038/363345a0  
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences (2nd ed.). Mahwah, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Cornelissen, F. W., Peters, E. M., & Palmer, J. (2002). The Eyelink Toolbox: Eye tracking 
with MATLAB and the Psychophysics Toolbox. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, 
& Computers, 34(4), 613–617. doi:10.3758/BF03195489  
Duncan, J. (2006). EPS Mid-Career Award 2004: Brain mechanisms of attention. Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 59(1), 2–27. doi:10.1080/17470210500260674  
Duncan, J., & Humphreys, G. W. (1989). Visual search and stimulus similarity. Psychological 
Review, 96(3), 433–458. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.96.3.433  
Eriksson, J., Vogel, E. K., Lansner, A., Bergstrom, F., & Nyberg, L. (2015). Neurocognitive 
architecture of working memory. Neuron, 88(1), 33–46. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2015.09.020  
Ester, E. F., Anderson, D. E., Serences, J. T., & Awh, E. (2013). A neural measure of 
precision in visual working memory. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 25(5), 754–761. 
doi:10.1162/jocn_a_00357  
Griffin, I. C., & Nobre, A. C. (2003). Orienting attention to locations in internal 
representations. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 15(8), 1176–1194. 
doi:10.1162/089892903322598139  
Irwin, D. E., & Thomas, L. E. (2008). Visual sensory memory. In S. J. Luck & A. 
Hollingworth (Eds.), Visual memory (pp. 9–41). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Kleiner, M., Brainard, D., Pelli, D., Ingling, A., Murray, R., & Broussard, C. (2007). What's 
new in Psychtoolbox-3? Perception, 36(14), 1. 
Kuo, B.-C., Stokes, M. G., & Nobre, A. C. (2012). Attention modulates maintenance of 
representations in visual short-term memory. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 24(1), 
51–60. doi:10.1162/jocn_a_00087  
Kuo, B.-C., Yeh, Y.-Y., Chen, A. J.-W., & D'Esposito, M. (2011). Functional connectivity 
during top-down modulation of visual short-term memory representations. 
Neuropsychologia, 49(6), 1589–1596. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.12.043  
Landman, R., Spekreijse, H., & Lamme, V. A. (2003). Large capacity storage of integrated 
objects before change blindness. Vision Research, 43(2), 149–164. doi:10.1016/S0042-
6989(02)00402-9  
Larocque, J. J., Lewis-Peacock, J. A., & Postle, B. R. (2014). Multiple neural states of 
representation in short-term memory? It's a matter of attention. Frontiers in Human 
Neuroscience, 8, 5. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00005  
PRIORITIZATION IN VISUAL WORKING MEMORY 21 
Lepsien, J., Griffin, I. C., Devlin, J. T., & Nobre, A. C. (2005). Directing spatial attention in 
mental representations: Interactions between attentional orienting and working-memory 
load. NeuroImage, 26(3), 733–743. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.02.026  
Lepsien, J., Thornton, I., & Nobre, A. C. (2011). Modulation of working-memory 
maintenance by directed attention. Neuropsychologia, 49(6), 1569–1577. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.03.011  
Loftus, G. R., & Masson, M. E. (1994). Using confidence intervals in within-subject designs. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 1(4), 476–490. doi:10.3758/BF03210951  
Luck, S. J., & Vogel, E. K. (1997). The capacity of visual working memory for features and 
conjunctions. Nature, 390(6657), 279–281. doi:10.1038/36846  
Macmillan, N. A., & Creelman, C. D. (2005). Detection theory: A user's guide (2nd ed.). 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Makovski, T., & Jiang, Y. V. (2007). Distributing versus focusing attention in visual short-
term memory. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14(6), 1072–1078. 
doi:10.3758/BF03193093  
Makovski, T., Sussman, R., & Jiang, Y. V. (2008). Orienting attention in visual working 
memory reduces interference from memory probes. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 34(2), 369–380. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.34.2.369  
Matsukura, M., Luck, S. J., & Vecera, S. P. (2007). Attention effects during visual short-term 
memory maintenance: Protection or prioritization? Perception & Psychophysics, 69(8), 
1422–1434. doi:10.3758/BF03192957  
Miller, E. K., Erickson, C. A., & Desimone, R. (1996). Neural mechanisms of visual working 
memory in prefrontal cortex of the macaque. Journal of Neuroscience, 16(16), 5154–5167. 
Mongillo, G., Barak, O., & Tsodyks, M. (2008). Synaptic theory of working memory. 
Science, 319(5869), 1543–1546. doi:10.1126/science.1150769  
Murray, A. M., Nobre, A. C., Clark, I. A., Cravo, A. M., & Stokes, M. G. (2013). Attention 
restores discrete items to visual short-term memory. Psychological Science, 24(4), 550–
556. doi:10.1177/0956797612457782  
Nobre, A. C., Griffin, I. C., & Rao, A. (2008). Spatial attention can bias search in visual short-
term memory. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 1, 4. doi:10.3389/neuro.09.004.2007  
Oberauer, K. (2009). Design for a working memory. Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 
51, 45–100. doi:10.1016/S0079-7421(09)51002-X  
Pelli, D. G. (1997). The VideoToolbox software for visual psychophysics: Transforming 
numbers into movies. Spatial Vision, 10(4), 437–442. doi:10.1163/156856897X00366  
Pertzov, Y., Bays, P. M., Joseph, S., & Husain, M. (2013). Rapid forgetting prevented by 
retrospective attention cues. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 39(5), 1224–1231. doi:10.1037/a0030947  
Petersen, A., & Andersen, T. S. (2012). The effect of exposure duration on visual character 
identification in single, whole, and partial report. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception and Performance, 38(2), 498–514. doi:10.1037/a0026728  
Poth, C. H., Herwig, A., & Schneider, W. X. (2015). Breaking object correspondence across 
saccadic eye movements deteriorates object recognition. Frontiers in Systems 
Neuroscience, 9, 176. doi:10.3389/fnsys.2015.00176  
Poth, C. H., Petersen, A., Bundesen, C., & Schneider, W. X. (2014). Effects of monitoring for 
visual events on distinct components of attention. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 930. 
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00930  
PRIORITIZATION IN VISUAL WORKING MEMORY 22 
Poth, C. H., & Schneider, W. X. (2013). Aufmerksamkeit [Attention]. In A. Stephan & S. 
Walter (Eds.), Handbuch Kognitionswissenschaft (pp. 221–230). Weimar: J. B. Metzler. 
Poth, C. H., & Schneider, W. X. (2016a). Episodic short-term recognition requires encoding 
into visual working memory: Evidence from probe recognition after letter report. Frontiers 
in Psychology, 7, 1440. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01440  
Poth, C. H., & Schneider, W. X. (2016b). Breaking object correspondence across saccades 
impairs object recognition: The role of color and luminance. Journal of Vision, 16(11), 1. 
doi:10.1167/16.11.1  
R Core Team. (2016). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. Vienna, 
Austria: R Foundation for Statistical Computing. Retrieved from https://www.R-
project.org/  
Rose, N. S., LaRocque, J. J., Riggall, A. C., Gosseries, O., Starrett, M. J., Meyering, E. E., & 
Postle, B. R. (2016). Reactivation of latent working memories with transcranial magnetic 
stimulation. Science, 354(6316), 1136–1139. doi:10.1126/science.aah7011  
Rouder, J. N., Speckman, P. L., Sun, D., Morey, R. D., & Iverson, G. (2009). Bayesian t tests 
for accepting and rejecting the null hypothesis. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16(2), 
225–237. doi:10.3758/PBR.16.2.225  
Schneider, W. X. (1995). VAM: A neuro-cognitive model for visual attention control of 
segmentation, object recognition, and space-based motor action. Visual Cognition, 2(2-3), 
331–376. doi:10.1080/13506289508401737  
Schneider, W. X. (2013). Selective visual processing across competition episodes: a theory of 
task-driven visual attention and working memory. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 368(1628), 20130060. 
doi:10.1098/rstb.2013.0060  
Serences, J. T., Ester, E. F., Vogel, E. K., & Awh, E. (2009). Stimulus-specific delay activity 
in human primary visual cortex. Psychological Science, 20(2), 207–214. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02276.x  
Shibuya, H., & Bundesen, C. (1988). Visual selection from multielement displays: Measuring 
and modeling effects of exposure duration. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 14(4), 591–600. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.14.4.591  
Souza, A. S., & Oberauer, K. (2016). In search of the focus of attention in working memory: 
13 years of the retro-cue effect. Attention, Perception & Psychophysics, 78(7), 1839–1860. 
doi:10.3758/s13414-016-1108-5  
Souza, A. S., Rerko, L., & Oberauer, K. (2014). Unloading and reloading working memory: 
attending to one item frees capacity. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 40(3), 1237–1256. doi:10.1037/a0036331  
Sperling, G. (1960). The information available in brief visual presentations. Psychological 
Monographs: General and Applied, 74(11), 1–29. doi:10.1037/h0093759  
Stokes, M. G. (2015). 'Activity-silent' working memory in prefrontal cortex: a dynamic 
coding framework. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 19(7), 394–405. 
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.05.004  
Stokes, M. G., Kusunoki, M., Sigala, N., Nili, H., Gaffan, D., & Duncan, J. (2013). Dynamic 
coding for cognitive control in prefrontal cortex. Neuron, 78(2), 364–375. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2013.01.039  
Sugase-Miyamoto, Y., Liu, Z., Wiener, M. C., Optican, L. M., & Richmond, B. J. (2008). 
Short-term memory trace in rapidly adapting synapses of inferior temporal cortex. PLoS 
Computational Biology, 4(5), e1000073. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000073  
PRIORITIZATION IN VISUAL WORKING MEMORY 23 
Supèr, H., Spekreijse, H., & Lamme, V. A. (2001). A neural correlate of working memory in 
the monkey primary visual cortex. Science, 293(5527), 120–124. 
doi:10.1126/science.1060496  
Trapp, S., & Lepsien, J. (2012). Attentional orienting to mnemonic representations: Reduction 
of load-sensitive maintenance-related activity in the intraparietal sulcus. 
Neuropsychologia, 50(12), 2805–2811. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2012.08.003  
Wickelgren, W. A. (1977). Speed-accuracy tradeoff and information processing dynamics. 
Acta Psychologica, 41(1), 67–85. doi:10.1016/0001-6918(77)90012-9  
Williams, M., Hong, S. W., Kang, M.-S., Carlisle, N. B., & Woodman, G. F. (2013). The 
benefit of forgetting. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 20(2), 348–355. 
doi:10.3758/s13423-012-0354-3  
 
Appendix
128
Zusammenfassung
(German summary)
Menschliches Verhalten basiert zu einem großen Teil auf visueller Kognition, der Verarbeitung visueller
Informationen über externe Objekte. Zwei Funktionen visueller Kognition scheinen besonders wichtig
für zielgerichtetes Verhalten. Als erste Funktion ermöglicht es die Objekterkennung, Objekte in der
Umwelt als Mitglieder von Objektkategorien zu identifizieren, so dass sie zur Erfüllung von Aufgaben
genutzt werden können. Als zweite Funktion ermöglicht es die Kurzzeiterkennung, zu erkennen ob
ein Objekt in der Umgebung kürzlich gesehen wurde. Dadurch erst kann aktuelles Verhalten bezüglich
des Objekts mit früherem Verhalten in Beziehung gesetzt werden. Beide Funktionen teilen eine Ein-
schränkung: Sie müssen über distinke Episode visueller Verarbeitung hinweg erfüllt werden, die durch
Änderungen der Vearbeitungsanforderungen unterbrochen werden.
Für die Objekterkennung bergen visuelle Verarbeitungsepisoden das Problem der selektiven Inte-
gration. Es muss entschieden werden, ob Objektinformationen der aktuellen Verarbeitungsepisode die
der Vorherigen erneuern und so mit diesen integriert werden sollen. Alternativ ist auch die getrennte
Repräsentation der Objekte beider Episoden möglich. Die Entscheidung ist bedeutend. Erneuerung
und Integration sollte eine kumulative und schnelle Objekterkennung ermöglichen. Objektveränderun-
gen sollten durch Integration jedoch verdeckt werden, da deren Wahrnehmung einen Vergleich zweier
Repräsentationen erfordert, hier jedoch nur eine Repräsentation vorliegt. Eine Trennung von Objek-
trepräsentationen birgt zwar Vorteile für die Veränderungswahrnehmung, sollte die Erkennung von Ob-
jekten jedoch beeinträchtigen. Der Grund dafür ist, dass die Objekterkennung mittels begrenzten Verar-
beitungsressourcen geschieht, die im Falle getrennter Objektrepräsentationen auf diese verteilt werden
müssten.
Für die Kurzzeiterkennung führen visuelle Verarbeitungsepisoden zum einem Abgleichsproblem.
Das heißt, dass ein Objekt der aktuellen Episode (unabhängig von dessen Objektkategorie) mit Repräsen-
tationen von Objekten abgeglichen werden muss, die nicht nur der vorherigen, sondern mehrerer kür-
zlich zurückliegenden Episoden entstammen können.
Ziel der vorliegenden Dissertation ist es, einen ersten Schritt zum Verständnis der Mechanismen
zu gehen, die die Probleme lösen, die sich aus visuellen Verabeitungsepisoden ergeben und somit
Objekt- und Kurzzeiterkennung über Episoden hinweg ermöglichen. Zu diesem Zweck führten wir
fünf empirische Studien zu Fragen durch, deren Klärung zur Entwicklung einer Theorie der Objekt- und
Kurzzeiterkennung erforderlich ist.
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Die ersten drei Studien konzentrierten sich auf Objekterkennung, die über die visuellen Verar-
beitungsepisoden von Fixationen der Augen hinweg stattfindet. Fixationen bezeichnen Perioden der
visuellen Informationsaufnahme, in denen die Augen relativ stillstehen. Sie werden unterbrochen durch
schnelle sakkadische Augenbewegungen. Sakkaden sind zur Objekterkennung nötig, weil sie die Fovea
im Zentrum der Retina des Auges auf interessierende Objekte richten, damit diese scharf gesehen wer-
den. Bilder von Objekten auf der Retina werden duch Sakkaden verschoben und verändert und die
Aufnahme visueller Informationen wird durch sie unterbrochen. Daher teilen Sakkaden die visuelle Ve-
rarbeitung in Episoden distinkter Fixationen, denen die Mechanismen zur Objekterkennung begegnen
müssen.
In zwei Studien (Poth et al., 2015; Poth & Schneider, 2016a) untersuchten wir, wie das Problem
der selektiven Integration gelöst wird, um die Objekterkennung über aufeinanderfolgende Fixationen
hinweg zu unterstützen. Genauer untersuchten wir die aktuelle Hypothese, dass das Problem durch
einen Mechanismus gelöst wird, der ein Objekt vor und nach der Sakkade auf Korrespondenz (bzw.
Kontinuität) hin testet (Schneider, 2013). Wird Objektkorrespondenz festgestellt, sollten das prä- und
postsakkadische Objekt in einer gemeinsamen Repräsentation integriert werden. Wird Objektkorre-
spondenz hingegen gebrochen, dann sollten das prä- und postsakkadische Objekt getrennt repräsen-
tiert werden. Diese Trennung sollte Vergleiche der Objekte ermöglichen und so die Diskrimination
von transsakkadsichen Objektverschiebungen verbessern. Die Objekterkennung sollte jedoch unter der
Trennung leiden, weil dazu nötige begrenzte Verarbeitungsresourcen auf mehrere statt eine Repräsen-
tation aufgeteilt werden müssen. Die Ergebnisse beider Studien stützten diese Hypothesen. Wurde die
Objektkorrespondenz nach einer Sakkade zum Objekt durch kurzzeitiges Auslassen des Objekts ge-
brochen, verbesserte sich die Diskrimination von Objektverschiebungen, aber verschlechterte sich die
Objekterkennung. Dies zeigt, dass Objektkorrespondenz über die Sakkade sich auf die Objekterkennung
nach der Sakkade auswirkt. Weitere Experimente untersuchten die Natur der Objektkorrespondenz. Sie
zeigten, dass eine Beeinträchtigung der Objekterkennung auch dann auftritt, wenn die Objektkorrespon-
denz durch transsakkadische Veränderungen der Kontrastpolarität (und Luminanz) eines Objekts, dessen
Farbe-und-Luminanz oder dessen Farbe allein gebrochen wurde. Zusammen mit dem erstgenannten Be-
fund bedeutet dies, dass die Objektkorrespondenz über die Sakkade sowohl auf den raumzeitlichen als
auch auf den Oberflächenmerkmalen eines Objekts basiert.
In der dritten Studie (Poth & Schneider, 2016b, eingereicht) untersuchten wir nun die Grenzen der
Objekterkennung über Sakkaden. Da Objekterkennung begrenzte Verarbeitungsresourcen erfordert,
kann sie zu einer Zeit nur für wenige Objekte erfolgen. Hier untersuchten wir, ob verschiedene Ob-
jekte über Sakkaden hinweg um diese begrenzten Resourcen konkurrieren müssen. In diesem Fall ver-
langsame sich die visuelle Verarbeitung nach der Sakkade mit steigender Anzahl gesehener Objekte vor
der Sakkade. Die Ergebnisse der Studie zeigen, dass Objekte über die Sakkade um Verarbeitungsres-
sourcen konkurrieren und so die Objekterkennung verlangsamen. Dies geschieht jedoch nur, wenn die
Objekte aufgabenrelevant sind. Diese Ergebnisse stützen die Kernvorhersage einer aktuellen Theorie,
nämlich, dass die Bedeutsamkeit einer Objektrepräsentation darüber entscheidet, ob sie die Sakkade
überdauert und anschließend Verarbeitungsressourcen verbraucht (Schneider, 2013).
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Mit der vierten Studie (Poth & Schneider, 2016c) wandten wir uns nun von den Verarbeitungsepiso-
den aufeinanderfolgender Fixationen denen zu, die durch erscheinende und verschwindende Objekte
und betreffende Aufgabenanforderungen definiert sind. Hier fragten wir nach der Beziehung zwischen
den Mechanismen, die die Objekt- und die Kurzzeiterkennung leisten. Es wird angenommen, dass die
visuelle Verarbeitung zur Objekterkennung mit der Enkodierung in ein kapazitätsbegrenztes visuelles
Arbeitsgedächtnis endet, durch das Objekte zum Bericht zur Verfügung stehen. Wir untersuchten, ob
die Enkodierung ins visuelle Arbeitsgedächtnis nun nicht nur zur Objekterkennung in dieser sondern
auch zur Kurzzeiterkennung in späteren Verarbeitungsepisoden nötig ist. Die Ergebnisse sprachen dafür,
indem sie zeigten dass Objekte, die vermutlich nicht ins Arbeitsgedächtnis gelangten, später nicht zur
Kurzzeiterkennung genutzt werden konnten. Dies bedeutet, dass die anfänglichen Schritte visueller Ver-
arbeitung, die vor der Enkodierung ins Arbeitsgedächtnis ablaufen zur späteren Kurzzeiterkennung nicht
ausreichen. Das visuelle Arbeitsgedächtnis scheint daher zur Lösung des Abgleichproblems beizutra-
gen, indem es die Informationsmenge limitiert, die bei der Kurzzeiterkennung berücksichtigt wird.
In der fünften Studie (Poth & Schneider, 2016d, eingereicht) setzten wir die Untersuchung der
Kurzzeiterkennung fort, indem wir fragten wie sie in einer vorausgegangenen Verarbeitungsepisode
vorbereitet werden kann. Wir testeten, wie sich die Priorisierung von Objektrepräsentationen im vi-
suellen Arbeitsgedächtnis auf zwei distinkte Leistungskomponenten einer bevorstehenden Kurzzeit-
erkennungsaufgabe auswirkt. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigten, dass eine solche Priorisierung die Gedächt-
nisleistung steigert, jedoch auch die visuelle Verarbeitung von Objekten zur Kurzzeiterkennung in einer
zukünftigen Episode beschleunigt. Dies zeigt, dass Änderungen der Verarbeitungsprioritäten zu mo-
mentan ablaufenden Lösungen des Abgleichproblems der Kurzzeiterkennung beitragen.
Zusammengenommen, zeigen die fünf Studien wie die Mechanismen der Objekt- und Kurzzeit-
erkennung bestimmte Probleme bewältigen, die sich aus der Unterteilung visueller Vearbeitung in dis-
tinkte Episoden ergeben. In diesem Sinne weisen die Studien auf visuelle Verarbeitungsepisoden als
eine Problemquelle für die Objekt- und Kurzzeiterkennung hin, die in aktueller Forschung größtenteils
vernachlässigt wird. Umgekehrt, geben die Studien jedoch auch Anlass, über den funktionalen Wert
visueller Verarbeitungsepisoden zu spekulieren.
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